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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


IJljilflSflpIjkal  Classics  for  Cncjlislj  §lciibtrs 


WILLIAM   KNIGHT,   LL.D. 

PROFESSOR   OF    MORAL    PHILOSOPHY,   UNIVEHaiTY   OF  ST   ANDREWS 


F  I  C  H  T  E 


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FI CH  TE 


ROBEET     ADAMSOl^",     M.A. 

PROFESSOR  OF  LOGIC    IN  THE   OWENS   COLLEGE, 
VICTORIA   UNIVERSITV,    MANCHESTER 


WILLIAM    RLACKWOOD    AND    SONS 

EDINBURGH    AND    LONDON 

MDCCCLXXXI 


All  r.iqhti  reserved 


Education 
Library 

B 


PREFATOKY    NOTE. 


The  account  of  Fichte's  system  in  the  latter  part  of 
this  vohime  has  no  pretensions  to  be  regarded  as  more 
than  an  introdjiction  to  his  philosophy.  When  it  is  re- 
membered that  Fichte's  works  appear  in  eleven  substan- 
tial volumes,  and  that  many  of  them  are  elaborate  and 
detailed  expositions  of  special  branches  of  philosophy  in 
general,  it  will  be  evident  that  a  summary  or  compressed 
statement  would  have  but  small  value,  and  that  a  short 
sketch  must  of  necessity  be  introductory  in  character. 

I  have  to  thank  Dr  William  Smith  for  the  kind  per- 
mission to  use  his  translations  of  certain  of  Fichte's 
works.  The  passage  quoted  from  the  *  Eeden,'  is  taken, 
with  one  or  two  verbal  alterations,  from  his  '  Memoir  of 
Fichte.' 

The  delay  in  the  appearance  of  this  volume  of  the 
series  of  'Philosophical  Classics'  is  due  to  causes  for 
which  I  am  alone  responsible. 

R  ADAMSON. 
The  Owens  College,  June  1881. 

926543 


CONTENTS. 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I.    INTRODUCTORY,         ....  1 

II.    YOUTH    AND    EARLY    STRUGGLES,         .                  .  8 

III.  THE   JENA    PROFESSORSHIP,                    .                  .  41 

IV.  BERLIN    AND    THE   WAR   OF    LIBERATION,         .  65 

1.  FRIENDS    AND    LITERARY    ACTIVITY    AT    BERLIN 

(1799-1806.) 

2.  FALL   AND     REGENERATION     OP    PRUSSIA  :     THE 

BERLIN  UNIVERSITY. 

3.  WAR  OF  LIBERATION  :  DEATH  OF  FICHTE. 

V.    GENERAL   IDEA    OF   FICHTe's   PHILOSOPHY,     .  105 

VI.    "  WISSEN8CHAPTSLEHRE  "     IN     ITS     EARLIER 

FORM,  .  .  .  .125 

1.  DOGMATISM  AND   IDEALISM. 

2.  HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  :  SPINOZA  AND  KANT. 

3.  FIRST   PRINCIPLES. 

4.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  SYSTEM. 

VII.    LATER    FORM    OF    TUB    "  WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE,"     189 
VIII.    CONCLUDING    REMARKS,  .  .  .214 


F  I  C  H  T  E. 


CHAPTEE    I. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


It  happens  but  rarely  that  the  life  of  a  philosopher  has 
been  so  closely  connected  with  the  historical  develop- 
ment of  his  people,  that  his  name  should  be  remembered 
rather  on  account  of  his  practical  activity  than  for  his 
speculative  researches.  Yet  if  one  does  not  misinter- 
pret the  evidence  supplied  in  ample  quantity  by  the 
numerous  speeches,  addresses,  essays,  memorials,  and 
other  documents  which  marked  the  celebration  of  the 
centenary  of  Fichte  in  1862,  circumstances  in  his  case 
must  have  combined  to  bring  about  this  result.  Many 
occasional  references  were  made  by  various  speakers  and 
writers  to  the  philosophy  of  Fichte,  and  much  was  said 
of  the  speculative  depth  and  richness  of  his  writings, 
but  all  such  remarks  were  manifestly  external  and  by 
the  way.  The  subtle  metaphysician  of  the  '  Wissenschafts- 
lehre '  had  evidently,  in  the  estimation  of  his  admirers, 
been  overshadowed  by  the  patriotic  orator  of  the  '  Ad- 
p. — IV.  A 


2  Fichte. 

dresses  to  the  German  I^ation.'  There  exists  not  now, 
there  never  did  exist  to  any  extent,  a  school  of  follow- 
ers of  Fichte ;  it  may  well  be  doubted  if  there  are  at 
present  half-a-dozen  students  of  his  works.  As  a  pa- 
triot, as  representative  of  what  seems  noblest  and  lofti- 
est in  the  German  character,  he  lives,  and  wiU  doubt- 
less continue  to  live,  in  the  grateful  remembrance  of 
his  countrymen ;  as  a  metaphysician,  he  lives  not  at 
all  beyond  the  learned  pages  of  the  historians  of  phil- 
osophy. 

That  such  should  be  the  case  will  not  appear  surpris- 
ing when  there  are  taken  into  consideration  the  nature  of 
the  historical  surroundings  of  Fichte's  career,  and  the 
relations  in  which  he  stood  to  them.  His  life  coincided 
in  time  with  the  rise  and  partial  development  of  the 
two  events  which  have  most  affected  the  current  of 
modern  history, — the  revolution  in  political  ideas  which 
originated  in  France,  and  the  birth  of  intellectual  activ- 
ity in  Germany.  His  life's  work  was  the  part  he  played 
in  the  furtherance  of  these  movements,  and  the  durability 
of  his  fame  has  of  necessity  depended  on  the  signifi- 
cance of  his  contributions  to  them,  and  the  way  in  which 
they  have  worked  themselves  out. 

Although  the  revolution  in  political  and  social  organi- 
sations and  the  rise  of  new  foiins  of  intellectual  life  in 
Germany  differed  widely  in  external  features, — for  they 
belonged  to  diverse  spheres  of  practical  activity, — they 
were  in  fundamental  agreement,  not  only  as  regards  their 
ultimate  aim,  but  also  as  regards  the  idea  on  which  they 
proceeded.  Both  were  in  character  reconstructive;  in 
both  the  foundation  for  the  new  edifice  was  sought  in  the 
common,  universal  nature  of  humanity  itself.     The  ncAV 


Introductory.  3 

political  idea  of  the  French  Eevolution — an  idea  ex- 
pressed clearly,  though  with  some  contradictoriness,  in 
the  Contrat  social — was  that  of  the  human  agent,  endowed 
by  nature  with  certain  primitive  and  inalienable  rights, 
as  the  unit  in  the  organisation  of  the  state.  The  individ- 
ual, on  this  view,  was  no  longer  to  be  regarded  as  receiv- 
ing all  state-rights  by  historical  accident;  distinctions 
of  rank  among  citizens  were  no  longer  to  be  accepted  on 
mere  ground  of  fact;  the  state  itself  was  to  be  looked  upon 
as  the  mechanism  in  and  through  which  the  primitive 
rights  of  aU  individuals  may  receive  due  and  adequate 
realisation ;  and  the  final  standard  of  judgment  as  to  the 
forms  of  the  state  organisation  was  placed  in  the  reason 
of  the  individual  The  body  pohtic  thus  appeared  not  as 
the  accidental  result .  of  the  conflict  of  individual,  arbi- 
trary volitions,  but  as  the  necessary  product  of  the  con- 
joint will  of  individuals  with  common  characteristics, 
with  primitive  and  equal  rights.  The  individual  was 
thought  of,  not  as  the  embodiment  of  pure  arbitrary  ca- 
price, but  as  the  expression  of  a  certain  common  nature, 
to  the  development  of  which  he  has  an  original,  indefeas- 
ible right.  A  doctrine  like  this  is  liable  to  misuse,  for 
the  notion  of  rational  liberty  may  easily  degenerate,  and 
historically  did  degenerate,  into  the  apotheosis  of  mere 
power  of  wiU ;  and  the  positive  element  in  it,  the  idea 
of  the  abstract  rights  of  the  individual,  probably  requires 
much  modification :  but  it  was  an  important  advance  upon 
the  previous  theory  and  practice  of  politics. 

When  one  examines  the  general  characteristics  of  the 
new  intellectual  productions  of  Germany,  more  especi- 
ally in  the  sphere  of  philosophy,  one  is  struck  by  the 
close  resemblance  in    fundamental  idea  to   that  just 


4  Fichte. 

noted.  It  was  the  essence  of  Kant's  endeavour,  both  in 
speculative  and  in  ethical  research,  to  show  that  the 
ultimate  unit,  the  conscious  subject,  was  not  a  mere  atom, 
devoid  of  intrinsic  characteristics,  receiving  all  know- 
ledge from  without,  and  impelled  to  act  solely  by  the 
natural  relations  between  his  individual  impulses  and 
things.  In  his  view,  the  nature  of  the  thinking  sub- 
ject was  an  indispensable  factor  both  in  knowledge  and 
in  action.  In  all  knowledge,  as  he  strove  to  show, 
there  is  a  common  element  which  springs  from  the  very 
essence  of  the  subject  as  cognitive  or  conscious ;  in  all 
action,  the  indispensable  element  is  the  conscious  exer- 
cise of  Avill  under  common,  universal  law.  Thus  in  the 
Kantian  philosophy,  the  ultimate  standard,  both  of  in- 
tellectual and  of  ethical  judgment,  was  indeed  the  individ- 
ual, but  the  individual  only  as  containing  a  universal  or 
common  feature.  On  the  basis  supplied  by  this  com- 
mon element,  philosophy  might  proceed  to  reconstruct 
what  had  been  dissolved  by  the  speculative  atomism  of 
Hume. 

Although,  from  the  nature  of  the  matter,  no  similarly 
exact  statement  can  be  given  for  the  essence  of  the  in- 
tellectual efforts  in  the  direction  of  pure  literature, 
there  was  manifest  in  them  in  various  degrees  the  same 
tendency  towards  expression  of  the  universal  common 
elements  in  human  life,  as  opposed  to  the  treatment  of 
trivial,  personal,  and  accidental  aims  and  occurrences 
which  had  characterised  much  of  the  earlier  eighteenth 
century  literature.  If  evidence  of  this  were  otherwise 
wanting,  it  would  be  amply  supplied  by  considering  the 
excesses  of  the  principle  in  the  writings  of  the  first 
Eomantic  school,     Not  every  one  could  bend  the  bow 


Introductory.  5 

of  Kant  and  Ficlite  :  the  philosophic  principle  that  the 
individual  consciousness  is  the  ultimate  test  of  truth 
and  goodness,  became  for  weaker  minds  a  practical  pre- 
cept of  moral  and  intellectual  scepticism.  The  universal 
element  sank  out  of  sight,  and  there  remained  only,  as 
aim  of  life,  the  satisfaction  of  individual,  personal  ca- 
price, *  Wilhelm  Lovell '  is  but  a  reckless  parody  of  the 
Kantian  system;  'Lucinde,'  a  hideous  misapplication  of 
Fichte's  'Wissenschaftslehre.' 

Now  the  historic  results  of  these  two  movements  have 
been,  for  Germany  at  least,  very  different  in  character. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  rude  shock  given  by  the  political 
revolution  and  its  consequences  to  the  amorphous  organ- 
isation of  the  German  States,  absolutely  forced  upon  the 
German  mind  a  conception  which  otherwise  might  long 
have  remained  dormant — the  conception  of  a  united, 
single  German  power.  History  amply  shows  us  that  it  is 
often  by  what  we  in  our  ignorance  call  the  brutal  neces- 
sity of  facts  that  an  idea  gains  for  itself  a  place  among 
the  realities  of  life  ;  and  there  can  be  no  question  that 
the  unity  of  the  German  people,  foreshadowed  in  elo- 
quent language  by  her  patriotic  thinkers  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  century,  has  been  wrought  out,  with  much 
swaying  and  struggling,  rather  by  the  pressure  of  exter- 
nal forces  than  by  the  unanimous  acceptance  of  the 
idea.  However  this  may  be,  and  however  widely  the 
united  German  empire  may  differ  in  inner  characteristics 
from  that  patriotic  state  to  which  Fichte,  in  his  famous 
'Addresses,'  summoned  his  countrymen,  no  German  who 
feels  the  full  significance  of  the  unity  of  his  nation  can 
fail  to  look  back  with  pride  and  gratitude  to  the  elo- 
quent thinker,  who,  with  the  thoroughness  of  a  pliiloso- 


6  FicMe. 

pher  and  the  zeal  of  a  patriot,  drew  in  ideal  form  the 
outlines  of  that  which  has  now  been  happily  realised. 
The  part  which  Fichte  has  played  in  this  movement  is 
a  warrant  of  undying  fame. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  speculative  movement  begun 
by  Kant  is  yet  far  from  having  exhausted  itself :  it  can 
hardly  be  said  to  have  begun  to  produce  its  full  fruits. 
The  contributions  made  here  by  Fichte  were  of  the  highest 
importance,  and,  as  will  afterwards  become  clear,  they 
form  an  integral  portion  of  the  completed  philosophic 
view,  which  in  partial  fashion  was  first  presented  by 
Kant.  Nevertheless,  Fichte's  work  as  a  philosopher 
was  never,  even  for  himself,  a  finished  whole,  and  the 
permanent  results  of  his  activity  have  been  absorbed 
in  the  more  comprehensive  elaboration  of  the  Kantian 
principles  which  make  up  the  philosophy  of  HegeL  It 
is  not  probable,  therefore,  that  Fichte's  system,  as  a 
system,  will  ever  discharge  a  more  important  function 
than  that  which  has  already  been  its  work  in  the  history 
of  philosophy.  It  has  made  clear  much  that  was  ob- 
scure in  Kant ;  it  has  contributed  to  give  a  wider  range 
to  the  method  of  philosophy  characteristic  of  the  Kant- 
ian system,  and  it  has  served  to  efi"ect  the  transition 
from  Kant  to  Hegel.  More  than  this  it  has  not  done, 
and  cannot  do.  Not  without  a  certain  historic  justifi- 
cation, therefore,  has  it  come  about  that  the  fame  of 
Fichte  depends  more  on  his  patriotic  and  practical 
efforts  than  on  his  specidative  labours. 

Ample  materials  for  the  life  of  Fichte  are  supplied  by 
the  biographical  work  of  his  son,  I.  H.  Fichte,  'J.  G. 
Fichte's  Lebenund  literarischer  Eriefwechsel,'  2  vols.,  2d 


Introductory.  7 

ecL,  1862.  An  interesting  sketch,  from  these  materials, 
has  been  long  before  the  English  reader  in  Dr  W.  Smith's 
'Memoir  of  Fichte,'  3d  ed.,  1873.  I.  H.  Fichte's  work 
should  be  supplemented  by  Weinhold,  '  Achtundvierzig 
Briefe  von  J.  G.  Fichte  und  seinen  Verwandten,'  1862 ; 
and  by  Noack,  '  J.  G.  Fichte  nach  seinem  Leben,  Lehren 
imd  Wirken,'  which  is  somewhat  ill-tempered  but 
amusing. 

The  complete  works  of  the  philosopher  fill  eleven 
volumes.  The  last  three,  '  Nachgelassene  Werke,'  con- 
sisting mainly  of  the  notes  of  lecture  courses,  were  pub- 
lished by  I.  H.  Fichte  in  1834-35.  The  other  works, 
most  of  which  had  been  separately  published,  were  col- 
lected, arranged,  and  edited,  also  by  I.  H.  Fichte,  in 
1845-46.  The  arrangement  is  systematic,  but  not  free 
from  faults.  Several  of  the  more  important  of  the  popu- 
lar writings  of  Fichte  have  been  translated  with  great 
elegance  and  skill  by  Dr  W.  Smith,  to  whom  it  is  due 
that  Fichte  is  more  than  a  name  in  this  country.  Trans- 
lations of  some  of  the  philosophic  works  have  appeared 
in  America,  where  the  earnest  study  of  German  thought 
has  been  fostered  by  the  unwearied  and  self-sacrificing 
zeal  of  Dr  W.  T.  Harris,  the  editor  of  the  '  Journal  of 
Speculative  Philosophy.'  There  is  no  English  work 
upon  Fichte's  system ;  in  German  the  best  expositions 
are  those  of  Lowe,  Fortlage,  Erdmann,  and  Ivuno 
Fischer. 


CHAPTEE    11. 

YOUTH   AND   EARLY   STRUGGLES. 
BIRTH   AND  EDUCATION. 

JoHANN  Gottlieb  Fichte  was  born  on  the  19tli  JSIay 
1762,  at  Eammenau,  in  Saxon  Lusatia.  The  little  vil- 
lage of  Eammenau  lies  in  the  picturesque  country,  well 
wooded  and  well  watered,  between  Bischofswerda  and 
Camenz,  not  far  from  the  boundary  separating  the  dis- 
trict of  Meissen  from  Upper  Lusatia.  Here,  as  the  tra- 
ditions of  the  Fichte  family  run,  a  Swedish  sergeant  in 
the  army  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  who  had  been  wounded 
in  a  skirmish  in  the  neighbourhood,  was  left  by  his 
comrades  in  the  care  of  one  of  the  kindly  Lutheran 
villagers.  Eeturning  health  did  not  lead  the  stranger 
to  take  his  departure.  He  continued  under  the  hospi- 
table roof  of  his  benefactor,  married  the  daughter  of  the 
house,  and,  as  all  the  sons  had  fallen  in  the  bloody  wars 
of  religion,  became  heir  to  the  small  portion  of  ground 
belonging  to  the  family.  From  this  northern  settler 
sprang  the  numerous  family  of  the  Fichtes,  noted,  even 
in  a  neighbourhood  distinguished  for  simplicity  of  man- 
ners and  uprightness  of  character,  for  their  solid  probity 
and  sterling  honesty. 


Youth  and  Early  Struggles.  9 

The  grandfather  of  the  philosopher,  the  only  descend- 
ant of  the  original  stock  remaining  in  Eammenau,  cul- 
tivated the  tiny  patrimonial  property,  and  in  addition 
carried  on  a  small  trade  in  linen  ribbons,  maniifactured 
at  his  own  loom.  His  son,  Christian  Fichte,  was  sent 
at  an  early  age  to  the  neighbouring  town  of  Pulsnitz, 
and  apprenticed  to  Johann  Schurich,  a  Avealthy  linen- 
spinner  and  owner  of  a  factory.  After  the  fashion  of 
diligent  apprentices  in  all  ages,  Christian  Fichte  wooed 
and  won  the  heart  of  his  master's  daughter,  but  not 
without  much  trouble  was  the  consent  of  the  wealthy 
burgher  given  to  a  marriage  which  he  thought  beneath 
his  family  rank.  Only  on  condition  that  his  son-in-law 
did  not  presume  to  settle  in  Pulsnitz  was  a  reluctant 
permission  given,  and  Christian  Fichte  enabled  to  bring 
his  bride  to  the  paternal  roof.  "With  her  dowry  he 
built  a  house  for  himself  in  Eammenau,  still  in  the 
possession  of  his  descendants,  and  established  there  his 
looms.  On  the  19th  May  1762  was  bom  their  eldest 
child,  Johann  Gottlieb,  who  was  quickly  followed  by  six 
sons  and  one  daughter. 

From  what  may  be  gathered  regarding  his  parents  in 
Fichte's  letters,  it  is  plain  that  the  marriage  was  not 
altogether  productive  of  happiness.  Madame  Fichte 
seems  never  to  have  been  able  quite  to  forget  that  in 
uniting  herself  to  a  humble  peasant  and  handicraftsman 
she  had  descended  from  a  superior  station.  She  had  all 
tlie  pride  and  narrowness  of  ideas  which  are  natural 
possessions  of  the  wealthier  classes  in  a  small  provincial 
town.  Her  temper,  obstinate,  quick,  and  capricious, 
overmastered  the  weaker  and  more  patient  nature  of  her 
husband,  and  she  was,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  the 


10  FicUe. 

head  of  the  household.  Her  eldest  son  resembled  her 
strongly  in  the  main  features  of  his  character,  though 
he  had  in  addition  solidity  of  principle  and  reserve,  and 
their  wills  came  into  frequent  and  painful  collision. 
The  mother,  like  many  a  Scottish  matron  in  similar  case, 
had  the  darling  ambition  to  see  her  talented  son  invested 
with  the  dignity  of  clergyman,  and  for  many  years  cir- 
cumstances led  him  thoroughly  to  coincide  with  this 
wish.  As  he  gradually  altered  his  views,  and  felt  him- 
self less  and  less  inclined  for  the  clerical  career,  his  rela- 
tions with  his  mother  became  more  and  more  strained 
and  unpleasant.  Fortune  had  removed  him  from  the 
paternal  home  at  an  early  age,  and  he  was  rarely  able  to 
visit  his  family;  but  after  the  final  decision  as  to  his 
career,  even  such  occasional  intercourse  seemed  to  cease. 
The  rudiments  of  his  education  Fichte  began  to  receive 
very  early  from  his  father,  who,  when  the  day's  work 
was  over,  would  teach  the  lad  to  read  and  to  repeat  by 
heart  proverbs  and  hymns,  and  would  talk  to  him  of  his 
apprentice  travels  in  Saxony  and  Franconia,  Of  even 
greater  importance  for  his  training  was  the  curiously  in- 
tense interest  the  boy  displayed  in  listening  to  the  weekly 
sermons  in  the  village  church.  These  sermons  he  would 
repeat  aloud,  almost  word  for  word,  in  such  fashion  as 
to  show  that  the  effort  was  not  one  of  mere  passive  re- 
tention, but  of  active  imagination.  Strength  of  memory, 
intense  fondness  for  reading  and  for  quiet  imaginative 
meditation,  and  deep  earnestness  of  moral  character, 
marked  him  at  an  early  age  as  a  boy  of  remarkable  gifts. 
An  anecdote  referring  to  this  period  of  his  life,  when  he 
was  about  seven  years  of  age,  is  characteristic  enough  to 
deserve  notice.     His  father  had  brought  him  as  a  pre- 


Early  Education.  11 

sent  from  the  neighbouring  fair  a  copy  of  the  famous 
story  of  the  Invuhierable  Siegfried.  The  delight  in  this 
book  so  overmastered  him  that  his  other  tasks  began  to 
be  neglected,  and  he  determined  to  free  himself  from 
temptation  by  destroying  the  cause  of  the  evil  Quietly 
and  secretly  he  took  the  little  book,  and,  after  a  hard 
struggle  Avith  himself,  summoned  courage  enough  to  hurl 
it  into  the  streamlet  that  flowed  by  the  house.  As  he 
saw  the  little  treasure  carried  away  by  the  stream  he 
burst  into  tears ;  but  to  his  father's  inquiry  as  to  how 
the  accident  had  happened  he  would  give  no  explana- 
tion, preferring  then,  as  often  in  later  years,  to  endure 
misunderstanding  and  pain  rather  than  to  ofi'er  defence 
for  what  he  felt  was  right.  "When,  some  time  later,  his 
father  proposed  to  give  him  a  similar  book  as  a  present, 
he  earnestly  entreated  that  it  might  be  bestowed  upon 
one  of  his  brothers,  and  that  he  might  not  again  be 
subjected  to  such  temptation. 

So  gifted  by  nature,  the  boy  might  have  grown  up  in 
his  narrow  surroimdings,  able  and  upright,  notable  per- 
haps among  his  fellows,  but  wasting  powers  fitted  for 
greater  things,  had  not  a  mere  accident  transferred  him 
to  a  wider  sphere  of  life,  and  given  him  opportunity 
for  a  fuller  development.  Freiherr  von  Miltitz,  owner 
of  an  estate  at  Seven  Oaks,  near  Meissen,  chanced  one 
Sunday  in  the  year  1771  to  visit  the  family  Von  Hoff- 
mann in  Eammenau,  and  arrived  too  late  to  hear  the 
sermon  by  the  village  pastor,  whom  he  much  admired. 
On  expressing  regret,  he  was  informed  that  the  loss  could 
readily  be  repaired,  for  there  was  in  the  village  a  little 
lad  able  to  repeat  vei'batim  any  sermon  that  had  been 
preached.     The  little  Fichte  was  sent  for,  and  so  great 


12  Fichte. 

an  impression  was  made  upon  Von  Miltitz  that  lie  at 
once  proposed  to  the  parents  to  undertake  the  charge  of 
the  lad's  education  if  they  would  submit  him  to  his 
care.  ]N"o  objection  was  raised  on  their  side,  and  Fichte 
was  forthwith  removed  by  his  patron  to  Seven  Oaks. 

The  surroundings  of  his  new  home,  the  restraints  of 
his  new  mode  of  life,  at  first  weighed  heavily  upon  the 
boy's  mind,  and  his  kind  protector  judged  it  best  to 
place  him  under  the  care  of  the  Pastor  Krebel  at  Nied- 
erau,  near  Meissen.  Here  he  remained  for  nearly  three 
years,  affectionately  cared  for  by  the  childless  pastor  and 
his  wife,  and  receiving  a  thorough  groundwork  in  ele- 
mentary classics.  In  1774  he  appears  to  have  been  for  a 
brief  interval  at  the  public  school  of  Meissen,  though  there 
is  some  obscurity  about  this  fact  in  his  biography;  and  in 
October  of  that  year  he  was  entered  at  the  famous  foun- 
dation-school of  Pforta,  near  Naumburg.  His  patron, 
Yon  Miltitz,  had  died  in  the  early  part  of  1774,  and  we 
have  no  record  to  show  by  what  means  the  expenses  of 
Fichte's  education  continued  to  be  defrayed.  From  a 
chance  expression  in  one  of  his  letters  of  a  later  date,  it 
would  appear  probable  that  his  parents  at  least  contri- 
buted, but  undoubtedly  they  were  not  in  a  condition  to 
undertake  the  whole  charge. 

The  years  spent  at  Schulpforta  had  a  powerful  influ- 
ence on  the  development  of  Fichte's  character,  in  both 
a  moral  and  an  intellectual  aspect.  The  school  was 
even  then  regulated  on  the  old  monastic  plan,  and  much 
resembled  what  in  this  coimtry  till  recently  used  to  be 
the  system  of  the  old  foundation  or  endowed  schools. 
The  pupils  were  strictly  secluded  from  the  outer  world  ; 
the   order  of  daily  life,  of  amusement,  of  costume,   of 


Schidpforta.  1 3 

study,  was  regiUated  by  antiquated  precepts.  Each  of 
the  older  scliolars  had  a  junior  intrusted  to  his  care,  and 
exercised  ahnost  unlimited  control  over  his  apprentice. 
The  happiness  of  the  juniors  thus  depended  much  upon 
tlie  qualities  of  the  older  members,  and,  as  is  inevitable 
in  any  close  institution,  the  traditions  of  the  place  were 
in  many  respects  evil,  and  detrimental  to  the  character 
of  the  scholars.  Such  a  constrained  life  tended  only  to 
deepen  and  strengthen  traits  already  sufficiently  marked 
in  Fichte's  character.  He  was  by  nature  reserved,  yet 
opinionative — that  is,  little  capable  of  altering  any  view 
of  the  truth  of  which  he  had  become  convinced,  and  alto- 
gether incapable  of  making  any  effort  to  remove  miscon- 
ception which  might  arise  as  to  his  action.  The  entire 
want  of  family  life  contributed  to  strengthen  this  habit 
of  inner  self-dependence,  which  could  have  found  relief 
only  in  the  manifold  interests  and  duties,  in  the  constant 
sympathy  and  co-operation  with  others,  arising  from  the 
details  of  domestic  intercourse.  JSTo  substitute  for  this 
was  found  in  Schulpforta  The  course  of  instruction, 
moreover,  thorough  but  nan'ow — for  it  was  almost  entirely 
confined  to  the  classical  curriculum — was  not  that  best 
suited  to  develop  the  neglected  side  of  Fichte's  character. 
In  his  life  and  in  his  works,  what  one  notices  as  most 
striking  is  his  incapacity  for  appreciating  experience.  In 
metaphysics,  in  psychology,  in  ethics,  in  politics,  he  con- 
structs from  within.  Nature,  in  his  system,  appears 
merely  as  the  negative  limit  of  mind.  N"or  in  his  prac- 
tical activity,  as  will  appear,  was  he  more  fortunate, 
"  Fichte,"  said  Goethe,  with  much  truth,  "  too  often  for- 
gets that  experience  is  not  in  the  least  what  he  has 
imagined  it  to  be."     It  hardly  admits  of  question  that  a 


14  Fichte. 

more  realistic  education,  a  training  in  physical  science 
such  as  his  great  predecessor  fortunately  possessed,  would 
have  given  greater  weight  and  force  to  Fichte's  specula- 
tions, greater  elasticity  and  prudence  to  his  action. 

It  was  some  time  before  Fichte  accommodated  himself 
to  the  life  at  Schulpforta.  He  was  at  first  unfortunate 
in  the  senior  selected  for  him.  The  close  restraint  and 
the  unbearable  tyranny  to  which  he  was  subjected 
preyed  upon  him,  and,  after  having  given  warning  to 
his  senior  in  his  naively  honourable  fashion  that  he 
would  endeavour  to  escape  from  the  school  unless  he 
were  treated  differently,  he  did  begin  a  flight  towards 
l^aumburg,  Avith  the  vague  intention  of  making  his  way 
into  the  world  of  which  he  knew  so  little,  and  settling  as 
a  new  Eobinson  Crusoe  in  some  deserted  island.  Only 
the  thought  that  by  carrying  out  his  exploit  he  would 
for  ever  cut  himself  off  from  his  parents,  induced  him  to 
return  to  the  hated  schooL  A  frank  confession  of  his 
intention,  and  of  the  grounds  for  it,  procured  him  not 
only  pardon  from  the  rector,  but  also  relief  from  the 
tyranny  of  his  former  senior.  He  was  placed  under  the 
charge  of  another  pupil,  and  the  years  began  to  flow 
more  happily  for  him.  "When  at  length  he  had  reached 
the  dignity  of  Primaner,  he  began  to  enjoy  the  greater 
liberty  of  study  permitted  to  the  senior  scholars ;  and 
though  the  great  works  of  recent  German  literature  were 
carefully  excluded  from  the  school,  he  then  obtained 
through  Lieber,  a  newly  introduced  tutor,  the  successive 
numbers  of  Lessing's  '  Anti-Goeze.'  Tlie  style  and  matter 
of  this  work  made  a  deep  impression  on  him,  and  in  his 
enthusiastic  fashion  he  resolved  that  the  earliest  oppor- 
tunity should  be  taken  to  make  himself  known  to  the 


University  Studies.  15 

author,  and  acknowledge  his  gratitude  to  him.  The  cir- 
cumstances of  his  life  and  the  premature  death  of 
Leasing,  however,  prevented  this  resolution  from  being 
carried  into  effect. 

In  October  1780,  Fichte's  school  career  closed;  his 
final  essay,  'Oratio  de  recto  prseceptorum  poeseos  et 
rhetorices  usu,'  stiU  existing  in  the  archives  of  Schul- 
pforta,  received  its  meed  of  praise,  and  he  was  ready  for 
the  higher  educational  training  of  a  university.  In  the 
Michaelmas  term  of  that  year  he  enrolled  himself  in  the 
Theological  Faculty  at  Jena- — not,  so  far  as  we  can  judge, 
because  liis  heart  was  entirely  given  to  the  theological 
career,  but  because  no  other  seemed  to  present  an  open- 
ing to  a  poor  and  friendless  student.  The  Jena  lectures 
do  not  appear  to  have  done  much  for  him,  and  in  the  fol- 
lowing year  he  transferred  himself  to  Leipzig,  where  many 
of  his  Schidpforta  comrades  were  settled-  Here,  in  addi- 
tion to  certain  lectures  by  Schiitz  on  .^chylus,  the  course 
followed  by  him  with  greatest  attention  seems  to  have 
been  that  by  Petzold  on  systematic  theology.  Fichte's 
mind,  during  this  period,  evidently  dwelt  on  a  problem 
wliich  has  sorely  exercised  many  a  student  in  like  cir- 
ciunstances, — the  relation  between  divine  providence  or 
foreknowledge  and  the  voluntary  determination  of  human 
action.  Of  the  alternatives  offering  themselves  as  pos- 
sible solutions,  he  chose  with  resoluteness  and  complete 
conviction  that  which  we  call  technically  the  doctrine  of 
determinism.  The  idea  of  the  individual  will  as  but  a 
necessary  link  in  the  scheme  of  divine  government,  gave 
a  certain  consistency  to  his  thoughts,  and  was  expressed 
by  him  in  various  sermons  preached  in  villages  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Leipzig.     From  the  pastor  of  one  of 


1 6  FicJite. 

these  village  churches  he  first  learned  that  his  doctrine 
might  be  designated  by  the  hateful  title  of  Spinozism, 
and  from  the  same  friend  he  received  the  '  Eef utation  of 
the  Errors  of  Spinoza,'  by  Wolff,  through  which  he  came 
to  know  the  outlines  of  a  system  destined  to  play  a  most 
important  part  in  the  later  development  of  his  thought. 
On  the  whole,  there  seems  little  reason  to  doubt  that  so 
far  as  the  young  candidatus  theologicB  had  formed  opinions 
upon  speculative  and  critical  subjects,  they  accorded 
with  the  '  Ethics '  of  Spinoza  and  the  '  Anti-Goeze '  of 
Lessing. 

EARLY  STRUGGLES. 

The  three  years  spent  at  Leipzig  had  been  years  of 
bitter  poverty  and  hard  struggle,  which  strengthened, 
and  at  the  same  time  tended  to  harden,  Eichte's  proud 
and  reserved  spirit.  Even  severer  discipline  was  in 
store  for  him.  The  completion  of  his  regular  academic 
course  still  left  him  without  a  definite  profession.  Less 
and  less  inclined  for  the  clerical  life,  and  embittered  by 
the  reproaches  and  petulant  urgency  of  his  mother,  he 
spent  three  years,  eating  his  heart  out,  as  tutor  in  vari- 
ous families  around  Leipzig.  To  his  humble  petition, 
in  1787,  that  the  Consistory  of  Saxony  would  allot  to 
him  some  small  stipend  such  as  was  often  given  to  poor 
Saxon  students  of  theology,  in  order  that  he  might  com- 
plete his  theological  studies  and  present  himself  for  the 
licentiate  examination,  an  unfavourable  answer  was 
returned.  "Without  a  profession,  without  friends,  with- 
out means,  it  seemed  to  him  that  his  life  had  been 
wasted.  At  the  deepest  ebb  of  his  fortunes  he  obtained 
through  a  former  comrade,  Weisse,  an  unexpected  relief 


Early  Struggles.  17 

in  the  offer  of  a  house-tutorship  at  Ziirich.  Accepting 
joyfully,  he  set  out  on  foot,  and  traversing  for  the  first 
time  German  provinces  outside  his  native  Saxony, 
reached  Zurich  in  September  1788. 

His  pupils  at  Ziirich  were  the  son  and  daughter  of 
Ilerr  Ott,  the  proprietor  of  a  well-to-do  inn,  the  Gast- 
hof  zum  Schwerte.  Herr  Ott,  though  somewhat  sur- 
prised at  the  character  of  the  education  which  his  new 
tutor  proposed  to  bestow,  was  not  altogether  unwilling 
that  his  children  should  receive  a  training  superior  to 
their  station,  but  his  wife  bitterly  resented  all  attempts 
to  go  beyond  the  accustomed  routine.  Fichte  found  his 
task  no  easy  matter,  and  assuredly  the  means  he  adopted 
for  carrying  it  out  would  not  readily  have  occurred  to 
any  other  tutor  in  like  circxTmstances.  He  noted  with 
care  in  a  daybook  or  journal  all  the  errors  in  education 
committed  by  the  parents  of  his  pnpils,  and  submitted 
the  record  weekly.  His  strength  of  character  and  reso- 
luteness of  purpose  enabled  him  to  bear  doAvn  any  active 
opposition  to  his  plans  ;  but  the  situation  was  forced  and 
unpleasing,  and  at  Easter  1790  he  made  up  his  mind 
to  go. 

During  his  residence  at  Ziirich  he  had  busied  him- 
self with  many  literary  efforts,  without  in  any  one  of 
them  manifestly  finding  his  metier.  He  read  and 
translated  much  of  the  recent  French  literature, 
mainly  ]\Iontesquieu  and  Eousseau,  completed  a  trans- 
lation of  Sallust,  with  an  introductory  essay  on  the  life 
and  style  of  the  author,  and  wrote  a  rather  elaborate 
critical  paper  on  Biblical  Epics,  with  special  refer- 
ences to  Klopstock's  *  Messias,'  —  a  paper,  which,  at 
a   later  date,    was    timidly   refused   by   the   editor   of 

r. — IV.  B 


18  Fichte. 

the  'Deutsches  Museum,'  in  Leipzig.  At  various  times 
he  preached,  always  with  marked  success,  and  exerted 
himself  much  to  have  a  school  of  oratory  founded  at 
Ziirich.  For  this,  in  which  he  had  the  promise  of  sup- 
port from  Lavater,  he  drew  out  a  complete  plan,  and  the 
document,  published  by  his  son,  presents  many  features 
of  interest. 

More  important  for  his  after-career  than  these  literary 
efforts  were  the  friendships  formed  by  him  at  Zurich, 
especially  with  Lavater  and  with  Hartmann  Rahn,  the 
brother-in-law  of  Klopstock.  Eahn  was  a  highly  cul- 
tured man,  of  wide  experience  of  life,  and  his  house  Avas 
the  centre  of  the  literary  reunions  of  Ziirich  society. 
Fichte,  first  introduced  by  Lavater,  was  soon  received  as 
an  intimate  and  valued  friend.  Hartmann  Eahn's  wife 
had  been  dead  for  some  years,  and  his  household  affairs 
were  managed  by  his  daughter,  Johanna  Maria,  at  this 
time  some  thirty  years  of  age,  not  specially  distinguished 
for  beauty  or  talent,  but  full  of  womanly  gentleness  and 
tact.  Fichte  felt  himself  from  the  first  attracted  towards 
Fraulein  Eahn,  Avhose  sympathetic  nature  enabled  her 
both  to  understand  his  restless  and  impetuous  disposition 
and  to  supply  what  Avas  wanting  to  it.  Their  friendship 
gradually  gave  way  to  a  deeper  feeling  of  mutual  affec- 
tion and  esteem.  Secretly  at  first — for  Fichte's  pride 
made  him  think  that  an  obscure  tutor  had  little  right  to 
claim  the  daughter  of  a  wealthy  and  influential  citizen — 
they  unfolded  in  letters  their  feelings  for  one  another ; 
but  as  the  time  of  his  departure  from  Ziirich  drew  near, 
it  became  necessary  to  make  knoAvn  to  Hartmann  Eahn 
how  matters  stood.  "VNHien  Fichte  left,  he  was  formally, 
though  privately,  betrothed  to  Johanna  ]\Iaria.         ^ 


Early  Struggles.  19 

The  course  of  his  life  was  not  yet  clear  before  him, 
and  from  one  of  the  interesting  letters  to  his  betrothed 
which  has  been  published  by  his  son,  we  can  judge  that 
his  own  views  were  not  decided.  ^lany  plans  had  been 
debated,  and  on  the  whole  his  hope  then  was  to  obtain 
a  post  as  tutor  to  some  influential  person  at  one  of  the 
German  courts,  which  would  give  him  time  to  discover 
where  his  powers  were  most  likely  to  prove  successful. 

"  On  the  whole,"  he  writes,  "  what  I  think  about  it  is  this : 
the  great  aim  of  my  existence  is  to  obtain  every  kind  of 
education  (not  scientific  education,  in  which  I  find  much 
that  is  vanity,  but  education  of  character)  which  fortune 
will  permit  me. 

"  1  look  into  the  way  of  Providence  in  my  life,  and  find 
that  this  may  perhaps  be  the  very  plan  of  Providence  with 
me.  I  have  filled  many  situations,  played  many  parts, 
knowai  many  men  and  many  conditions  of  men,  and  on  the 
whole  I  find  that  by  all  these  circumstances  my  character 
has  become  more  fixed  and  decided.  At  my  first  entrance 
into  the  world,  I  wanted  everything  but  a  susceptible  heart. 
Many  qualities  in  which  I  Avas  then  deficient,  I  have  since 
acquired ;  many  I  still  want  entirely,  and  among  others  that 
of  occasionally  accommodating  myself  to  those  around  me, 
and  bearing  with  men  who  are  false  or  wholly  opposed  to 
my  character,  in  order  to  accomplish  something  great.  With- 
out this  I  can  never  employ  as  with  it  the  powers  which 
Providence  has  bestowed  upon  me. 

"  Does  Providence,  then,  intend  to  develop  these  capacities 
in  me  ?  Is  it  not  possible  that  for  this  very  purpose  I  may 
now  be  led  upon  a  wider  stage  ?  May  not  my  employment 
at  a  court,  my  project  of  superintending  the  studies  of  a 
prince,  your  father's  plan  of  taking  me  to  Copenhagen — may 
not  these  be  hints  or  ways  of  Providence  towards  this  end  ? 
And  shall  I,  by  confining  myself  to  a  narrower  sphere,  one 
which  is  not  even  natural  to  me,  seek  to  frustrate  this  plan  ? 


20  Fichte. 

I  liaA'e  too  little  talent  for  bending,  for  dealing  with  those 
who  are  repugnant  to  me.  I  can  succeed  only  with  good  and 
true  people  ;  I  am  too  open.  This  seemed  to  you  a  further 
reason  why  I  was  unfit  to  go  to  a  court ;  to  me,  on  the  con- 
trary, it  is  a  reason  why  I  must  go  there,  if  any  opportunity 
present  itself,  in  order  to  gain  what  I  am  deficient  in. 

"  I  know  the  business  of  a  scholar,  and  have  nothing  new 
to  learn  about  it.  To  be  a  scholar  by  profession  I  have  as 
little  talent  as  may  be.  I  must  not  only  think,  I  must  act ; 
least  of  all  can  I  think  about  trifles.  ...  I  have  but  one 
passion,  one  want,  one  all-engrossing  desire, — to  work  upon 
those  around  me.  The  more  I  act  the  happier  I  seem  to  be. 
Is  this,  too,  a  delusion  ?  It  may  be  so,  but  there  is  truth  at 
the  bottom  of  it."  ^ 

"With  many  plans,  and  full  of  hope  in  his  future 
career,  Fichte  departed  for  Leipzig  in  the  spring  of 
1790.  His  letters  of  recommendation  to  various  courts, 
however,  produced  no  result;  the  plans  which  he  en- 
deavoured to  realise  at  Leipzig,  mainly  the  establishment 
of  a  literary  journal,  came  to  naught ;  and  in  the  course 
of  a  few  months  he  was  again  reduced  to  a  state  of  Avant 
and  uncertainty  even  more  harassing  than  before  his 
journey  to  Ziirich.  JSTo thing  that  he  tried  seemed  to 
succeed-  His  Essay  on  Biblical  Epics  was  rejected,  as 
has  been  said,  by  the  timid  editor  of  the  '  Museum,'  be- 
caused  it  appeared  to  reflect  on  the  fame  of  the  great 
Klopstock;  and  for  the  other  literary  efforts  in  which 
he  engaged,  the  writing  of  a  tragedy  and  some  tales, 
he  had  assuredly  little  faculty.  A  last  effort  to  effect  an 
entrance  into  the  Church  was  equally  fmitless.  His 
essay  or  theme,  probably  an  expansion  of  the  '  Aphorisms 
on  Deism,'  printed  in  the  collected  '  Works,'  and  dating 

1  Leben,  i.  55-58.  The  whole  letter,  as  there  given,  is  translated 
by  Dr  Smith. 


Early  Stmggles.  21 

from  1790,  was  received  with  praise  by  the  President  of 
tlie  Consistory  at  Dresden,  but  at  the  same  time  with 
doubt.  The  worthy  theologian  thought  tliat  the  author 
was  fitter  for  the  professorial  chair  than  for  the  pulpit ; 
and  Fichte,  disgusted  with  the  narroAv,  jealous  domina- 
tion exercised  over  the  Saxon  clergy,  finally  gave  up  all 
hopes  of  carrying  out  his  early  purpose.  His  letters  to  Jo- 
hanna Eahn  during  this  troubled  period  sufficiently  shoAv 
the  distress  and  vexation  under  which  his  proud  spirit 
chafed-  Even  her  aff'ectionate  counsels  and  earnest  en- 
treaties to  return  to  Ziirich  brought  small  comfort  to 
him.  Towards  the  autumn  of  the  year,  however,  we 
note  a  sudden  and  surprising  change  in  the  tone  of 
his  communications.  He  had  begun  to  take  pupils  in 
various  subjects,  and  among  others  one  student  presented 
himself  to  obtain  assistance  in  reading  the  *  Critique  of 
Pure  Eeason.'  Fichte  had  made  no  previous  study  of 
this  work,  but  so  soon  as  he  entered  upon  the  new  line 
of  thought,  he  found  his  true  vocation.  From  this  time 
onwards  the  direction  of  his  thoughts  and  hopes  was 
fixed.  His  own  words  will  show  better  than  any  ex- 
ternal account  what  effect  the  Kantian  philosophy  had 
upon  him. 

"My  scheming  spirit,"  he  -w-rites  to  his  betrothed,  "has 
now  found  rest,  and  I  thank  Providence  that,  shortly  before 
all  my  hopes  were  frustrated,  I  was  placed  in  a  position 
which  enabled  me  to  bear  with  cheerfulness  the  disappoint- 
ment. A  circumstance  which  seemed  the  result  of  mere 
chance,  led  me  to  give  myself  up  entirely  to  the  study  of 
the  Kantian  philosophy, — a  philosophy  that  restrains  the 
imagination,  which  was  always  too  powerful  with  me,  gives 
understanding  the  sway,  and  raises  the  whole  spirit  to  an 
indescribable  elevation  above  all  earthly  considerations.     I 


22  Fichie. 

have  gained  a  nobler  morality,  and  instead  of  occupjdng 
myself  with  what  is  out  of  me,  I  employ  myself  more  with 
my  own  being.  This  has  given  me  a  peace  such  as  I  have 
never  before  experienced  ;  amid  uncertain  worldly  prospects 
I  have  passed  my  happiest  days.  I  shall  devote  at  least 
some  years  of  my  life  to  this  philosophy  ;  and  all  that  I 
write,  for  some  years  to  come  at  any  rate,  shall  be  upon  it. 
It  is  difficult  beyond  all  conception,  and  stands  greatly  in 
need  of  simplification.  The  principles,  it  is  true,  are  hard 
speculations,  with  no  direct  bearing  upon  human  life,  but 
their  consequences  are  of  the  utmost  importance  for  an  age 
whose  morality  is  corrupted  at  the  fountain-head  ;  and  to  set 
these  consequences  before  the  world  in  a  clear  light  would,  I 
believe,  be  doing  it  a  good  service." 

"  The  influence  of  this  philosophy,"  he  writes  to  his  friend 
Achelis,  with  whom  he  had  had  frequent  disputes  regarding 
the  necessity  of  human  actions,  "  and  specially  the  ethical 
side  of  it  (which,  however,  is  unintelligible  without  previous 
study  of  the  '  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason '),  upon  the  whole 
spiritual  life,  and  in  particular  the  revolution  it  has  caused 
in  my  own  mode  of  thought,  is  indescribable.  To  you, 
especially,  I  owe  the  acknowledgment  that  I  now  heartily 
believe  in  the  freedom  of  man,  and  am  convinced  that  only 
on  this  supposition  are  duty,  virtue,  or  morality  of  any  kind 
80  much  as  possible, — a  truth  which  indeed  I  saw  before,  and 
perhaps  acquired  from  you." 

The  letters  to  Friiulein  Eahn  now  begin  to  breathe  a 
new  tone  of  cheerfulness  and  happiness,  for  external 
circumstances  were  at  the  same  time  improving ;  indeed, 
so  joyous  do  they  become,  that  it  is  evident  the  tender 
heart  of  Johanna  suspected  a  formidable  rival  in  this 
strange  Kantian  philosophy.  She  was  not  altogether 
pleased  that  in  absence  from  her  he  should  laugh  at 
ill  health  and  abound  in  tlie  highest  spirits.  Friends 
at  Ziirich  did  not  think  much  of  the  Kantian  philosophy, 


Early  Stimggles.  23 

which,  was  to  them  a  thing  of  naught,  and  she  feared 
he  would  waste  his  time  on  utterly  unprofitable  study. 
Moreover,  the  scandalous  discoveries  regarding  life  in 
Leipzig  made  in  Bahrdt's  scandalous  '  Leben '  led  her  to 
distrust  the  influences  of  the  place.  With  gentle  per- 
sistence she  pressed  upon  Fichte  her  favourite  plan,  that 
he  should  return  to  Ziirich,  be  united  to  her,  and  trust 
to  fortune  to  open  a  way  whereby  his  talents  might 
receive  recognition.  Fichte  resisted  for  some  time, 
wished  to  establish  some  reputation  for  himself,  dreaded 
what  might  be  said  by  the  kindly  critics  of  Ziirich  if  he 
accepted  her  proposal,  but  ended  in  the  spring  of  1791 
by  yielding  assent  to  her  entreaties.  "At  the  end  of 
this  month,"  he  writes  on  the  1st  of  March,  "  I  shall  be 
free,  and  have  determined  to  come  to  thee.  I  see  noth- 
ing that  can  prevent  me.  I,  indeed,  still  await  the 
sanction  of  my  parents;  but  I  have  been  for  long  so 
well  assured  of  their  love — almost,  if  I  may  venture  to 
say  it,  of  their  deference  to  my  opinion — that  I  need 
not  anticipate  any  obstacle  on  their  part." 

Evil  Fortune,  however,  which  had  sorely  wounded 
Fichte  many  a  time,  had  still  another  arrow  in  her 
quiver.  The  failure  of  a  mercantile  house  where  a  large 
portion  of  Hartmann  Eahn's  possessions  was  invested, 
put  for  a  time  at  least  an  absolute  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  the  projected  marriage.  All  Johanna's  care  and  at- 
tention had  to  be  bestowed  upon  her  father,  now  ad- 
vanced in  years  and  feeble  in  health.  Fichte,  with  a 
brave  heart,  packed  his  knapsack,  and  set  off  for  War- 
saw, where  he  had  received  an  appointment  as  house 
tutor  in  a  noble  family. 

During  the  autumn  of  1790  he  had  been  busily  en- 


24  Fichte. 

gaged  in  the  first  of  his  philosophical  writings, — an  Eluci- 
dation or  Explanation  of  the  'Critique  of  Judgment;'  and 
he  had  been  in  hopes  that  the  publication  of  this  little 
work  might  have  preceded  his  proposed  journey  to 
Zurich.  But  publishers  seem  to  have  been  chary ;  and, 
after  much  sending  to  and  fro,  the  MS.  was  finally 
doomed  to  remain  in  its  original  unprinted  fonn.  It  is 
to  be  regretted  that  some  portions  of  this,  which  appear 
to  remain,  have  not  been  included  among  Fichte's  liter- 
ary remains,  for  the  account  of  the  aim  and  scope  of  the 
work  excites  some  interest  in  it.  Like  most  students  of 
Kant  who  have  really  penetrated  into  his  system,  Fichte 
saw  that  it  was  above  all  things  necessary  to  make  clear 
the  inner  connection  between  the  leading  ideas  of  the 
three  KHtiken.  In  the  most  difficult  and  yet  most  in- 
structive portion  of  the  '  Critique  of  Judgment,'  the  Intro- 
duction, Kant  had  himself  done  something  towards  this 
end ;  but  much  yet  remained,  and  as  Fichte's  later  philo- 
sophy is  in  essence  the  attempt  to  carry  out,  with  a  fresh 
and  original  method,  the  union  of  theoretical  and  practi- 
cal principles,  one  would  gladly  have  known  what  were 
his  first  impressions  on  the  subject.  For  posterity,  how- 
ever, as  for  contemporaries,  the  work  has  remained  in 
obscurity. 

At  Warsaw,  where  he  arrived  in  June,  after  a  pleas- 
ant journey,  the  incidents  of  which  are  narrated  with 
much  spirit  in  his  journal,  Fichte  found  an  impossible 
task  before  him.  His  patron,  the  Count  Platen,  was  a 
good,  easy-going  man,  though  heavy ;  but  the  Countess 
was  a  veritable  lady  of  rank,  who  viewed  all  tutors  as 
mere  servants,  and  whose  domineering  disposition  exacted 
the  most  servile  obedience  from  her  dependants.     She 


Visit  to  Kant.  25 

instantly  found  Fichte's  independent  nature  unbearable, 
and  his  French  accent  atrocious.  A  very  few  days  were 
sufficient  to  bring  matters  to  a  crisis.  The  Countess 
attempted  unsuccessfully  to  procure  for  the  objection- 
able tutor  a  post  in  some  other  family ;  and  Fichte, 
resolved  not  to  be  treated  like  a  chattel,  demanded  his 
dismissal  and  a  sum  for  compensation.  The  dismissal 
was  given  with  alacrity,  the  compensation  only  after 
threat  of  legal  proceedings.  With  provision  for  a  few 
months,  Fichte  then  carried  out  a  new  idea  which  had 
occurred  to  him.  He  resolved  to  visit  Kant,  and  set  off 
for  Kbnigsberg. 

KAKT   AND  THE    'CRITIQUE   OF   REVELATION.' 

On  the  1st  July  he  arrived  in  Kbnigsberg,  and  on  the 
4th  waited  upon  Kant.  As  might  have  been  expected, 
he  was  received  but  coldly  by  the  aged  philosopher, 
whose  disposition  was  anything  but  expansive,  and  who 
required  to  be  known  for  some  time  before  disclosing 
any  of  his  finer  and  more  genial  qualities.  Fichte  was 
disappointed  with  his  interview,  and  equally  dissatisfied 
with  the  result  of  attendance  upon  one  of  Kant's  lectures. 
He  could  not  recognise  in  the  professor  the  author  of  the 
'  Critique,'  and  thought  his  manner  of  lecturing  listless 
and  sleepy.  This,  too,  might  to  a  certain  extent  have 
been  expected,  for,  as  we  know,  Kant  was  invariably 
averse  to  introducing  in  his  lectures  any  of  those  pro- 
founder  speculations  which  characterised  his  published 
works.  Fichte,  however  disappointed  with  his  first 
reception,  resolved  to  bring  himself  before  Kant's  notice 
in  a  way  which  should  be  irresistible ;  and  in  the  soli- 
tude of  his  quiet  inn  laboured  incessantly  for  some  five 


.  26  Ficliie. 

weeks  on  an  essay  developing  in  a  new  direction  the 
principles  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  On  the  18th 
August  he  forwarded  his  manuscript  to  Kant,  and  at- 
tended some  days  later  to  hear  his  opinion  of  its  merits. 
Kant  received  him  with  the  utmost  kindness,  commended 
such  of  the  essay  as  he  had  managed  to  read,  declined 
with  his  accustomed  prudence  to  discuss  either  the  views 
of  the  essayist  or  the  principles  of  his  OAvn  '  Critique,' 
and  introduced  him  to  several  valued  friends  in  Konigs- 
berg — to  Borowski  and  Schulz.  By  this  time  Fichte's 
scanty  means  had  become  wellnigh  exhausted;  the 
fatigue  due  to  his  hard  labour  at  the  essay  had  made 
him  dispirited  and  gloomy;  and  there  seemed  no  prospect 
of  an  outlet  from  his  difficulties.  On  the  1st  September 
he  disclosed  to  Kant,  in  a  remarkable  and  most  charac- 
teristic letter,  the  state  of  his  affairs;  indicated,  as  ap- 
parently the  one  course  left  to  him,  a  return  to  his 
home,  where  he  might  study  in  private,  and  perhaps 
obtain  some  humble  post  as  village  pastor;  and  entreated 
that  Kant  would  furnish  him  with  the  necessary  loan 
for  carrying  out  this  resolve.  As  we  learn  from  Fichte's 
journal,  Kant  declined  to  accede  to  this  request,  but  in 
such  a  manner  as  in  no  way  lessened  Fichte's  feelings 
of  esteem  and  admiration  for  him.  He  recommended, 
through  Borowski,  the  "Essay"  to  his  own  publisher, 
Hartung,  and  did  his  utmost  to  promote  Fichte's  welfare. 
Hartung,  however,  was  then  absent  from  Kbnigsberg ; 
another  publisher,  when  applied  to,  declined  to  purchase 
the  MS.;  and  Fichte  was  compelled  to  accept  what  he 
had  resolved  against,  a  post  as  private  tutor.  Kant's 
friend,  Schulz,  obtained  for  him  an  appointment  in  the 
family  of  the   Count   von   Krockow,  near  Danzig,  by 


Kantian  Studies.  27 

whom  he  was  received,  as  a  protege  of  Kant's,  with  the 
most  distinguished  kindness.  It  was  during  the  period 
in  which  he  was  here  settled,  amid  more  genial  surround- 
ings than  he  had  ever  before  known,  that  the  surprising 
fate  of  his  adventurous  essay  opened  to  him  a  new  path 
in  life. 

The  problem  which  Fichte  had  selected  for  treatment 
according  to  Kantian  principles,  was  one  upon  which  as 
yet  the  author  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  had  made  no 
public  utterance.  Doubtless  the  question  of  religion 
had  appeared  in  all  the  three  *  Critiques,'  but  the  utter- 
ances in  each  of  these,  differing  slightly  from  one  another, 
had  not  been  drawn  together,  and  their  application  was 
limited  to  what  we  may  call  N'atural  Eeligion.  But,  that 
a  certain  form  of  belief  in  a  revelation  or  supematurally 
given  religion  actually  existed,  was  a  fact,  and  a  fact 
requiring  to  be  explained  after  the  Critical  Method,  In 
all  the  previous  essays  of  this  method,  the  plan  of  pro- 
cedure had  been  identical  Thus,  in  the  'Critique  of 
Pure  Reason,'  the  fact  of  cognition  being  assumed,  the 
conditions  under  which  this  fact  was  possible  were  the 
subject  of  investigation.  In  the  '  Critique  of  Practical 
Eeason,'  the  fact  of  morality  being  assumed,  the  condi- 
tions under  which  it  was  possible  were  considered ;  and 
in  the  'Critique  of  Judgment'  the  same  query  was 
answered  with  respect  to  the  correspondence  of  natural 
elements,  either  to  our  faculty  of  cognition,  as  in  aesthetic 
judgments,  or  to  the  idea  of  the  whole  of  which  they 
are  parts,  as  in  the  teleological  judgment.  And,  so  far  as 
religion  was  concerned,  the  following  results  had  been 
attained.  The  theological  aspect  of  religion, — i.e.,  the 
speculative  determination  of  the  existence,  properties. 


2S  Fickte. 

and  modes  of  action  of  a  supernatural  Being, — had  been 
shown  to  be  without  theoretical  foundation.  In  the 
forms  of  cognition,  no  theology  was  possible.  But  the 
necessary  consequences  of  those  conditions  under  which 
Morality  or  Eeason  as  practical  was  possible,  involved 
the  practical  acceptance  of  those  very  theological  prin- 
ciples of  which  no  theoretical  demonstration  could  be 
given.  The  practical  postulates  of  the  being  of  an  In- 
telligent and  Moral  Euler  of  the  world,  and  of  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  the  rational  element  in  human  nature, 
had  appeared  as  necessary  for  any  intelligence  conscious 
of  itself  as  Practical  or  Moral  Through  these  practical 
postulates  a  new  interpretation  was  given  of  the  world 
of  sense,  which  no  longer  appeared  as  mere  material  for 
cognitive  experience,  but  as  the  possible  sphere  within 
which  the  moral  end  of  a  Practical  Eeason  might  be 
realised.  The  possibility,  then,  of  a  I^atural  or  Rational 
Religion,  if  we  employ  terms  which  have  unquestionably 
a  certain  ambiguity,  had  been  sufficiently  shown,  and  the 
place  determined  which  such  a  religion  holds  in  the 
series  of  philosophical  notions.  But,  so  far,  no  result 
had  appeared  bearing  upon  the  possibility  of  a  Revealed 
Religion ;  and  those  fundamental  features  of  human 
nature  which  historically  have  always  been  connected 
with  the  belief  in  a  revelation,  the  consciousness  of  im- 
perfection, of  sin,  of  dependence  upon  Supreme  powers, 
apparently  found  no  place  in  the  Kantian  scheme. 
Here,  then,  was  an  opportunity  for  the  application  of 
the  critical  principles.  The  jDossibility  of  a  revelation 
might  be  investigated  in  the  same  fashion  as  the  pos- 
sibility of  cognition  at  all ;  the  form  and  content  of 
any  revelation  might  be  determined  by  an  analysis  of 


*  Critique  of  Revelation.'  29 

the  conditions  of  its  possibility,  just  as  the  form  and 
content  of  knowledge  had  been  determined  by  an  analy- 
sis of  its  conditions,  A  lacuna  in  the  Kantian  system 
would  thus  be  filled  up.  This  problem  Fichte  proposed 
to  himself,  and  his  essay  in  solution  of  it  was  sent  to 
the  author  of  the  Critical  Philosophy,  not  originally  for 
purpose  of  publication,  but  as  proof  of  ability  to  handle 
and  apply  the  critical  method.  Only  with  the  approval 
and  by  the  advice  of  Kant  himself  was  publication  re- 
solved upon,  and  the  work  revised  and  prepared  for  the 
public  under  the  title,  *  An  Essay  towards  a  Critique  of 
all  Revelation'  ('Versuch  einer  Kritik  aller  Offen- 
barung '). 

In  form  and  substance  the  '  Critique  of  Revelation ' 
is  purely  Kantian,  with  here  and  there  an  admixture 
of  those  additional  siibtleties  of  distinction  in  which 
Kantian  scholars  like  Eeinhold  were  already  beginning 
to  revel.  Starting  with  a  somewhat  dry  and  abstract 
treatment  of  the  conditions  of  moral  or  practical  reason, 
an  analysis  of  the  will  in  its  twofold  aspect  as  sensu- 
ous impulse  and  impulse  determined  by  reverence  for 
moral  law,  the  Essay  summarises  briefly  the  main  princi- 
ples of  the  Kantian  practical  theology,  laying  stress  upon 
the  fact  that  the  acceptance  of  these  theological  postulates 
is  not  equivalent  to  religion, — that  in  so  far  as  reverence 
for  the  moral  law  pure  and  simple  is  the  guiding  rule  of 
conduct,  no  room  is  left  for  recognition  of  any  binding 
force  attaching  to  such  law  as  the  expression  of  the  divine 
moral  order.  If,  however,  there  should  be  given  in 
human  nature  a  condition  of  the  practical  motives  such 
that  the  force  of  reverence  for  moral  law  is  weakened, 
then  it  might  be  possible  that  additional  strength  should 


30  Ficlite. 

be  given  by  some  indication,  otherwise  furnished,  that 
the  moral  law  is  veritably  the  utterance  of  the  divine 
wilL  In  such  a  case,  the  human  agent  would  be  con- 
strained by  reverence  for  the  divine  character  of  the 
moral  law,  and  such  constraint  is  religion  as  opposed  to 
theology.  In  this  condition  of  human  nature  is  found 
the  substratum  of  fact,  in  relation  to  which  a  revelation 
is  conceivable. 

How,  then,  could  the  human  agent  be  made  aware 
that  the  moral  law  is  of  divine  origin  1  Not,  ansAvers 
Fichte,  through  the  practical  reason  itself,  for  the  laws 
of  this  practical  reason  are  self-explanatory, — ^but  only 
through  some  evidence  supplied  by  the  world  of  sense- 
cognition.  Such  evidence  is  not  to  be  looked  for  in  the 
general  view  of  the  sense- world  as  the  sphere  within 
which  the  moral  end  is  to  be  realised,  for  this  follows 
simply  from  the  existence  of  the  moral  laAV  in  us,  but 
in  some  fact,  which  manifests  its  supernatural  origin, 
and  so  necessitates  the  conclusion  that  it  is  the  direct 
result  of  the  divine  activity.  A  religion  basing  itself 
upon  a  supernatural  fact  manifested  in  nature  is  a  Re- 
vealed Eeligion,  and  the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of 
such  a  supernatural  manifestation  are  the  conditions  of 
a  Eevealed  Religion. 

Such  a  manifestation  must  needs  be  an  a  jjosteriori 
fact ;  but  in  so  far  as  it  is  simply  an  a  posteriori  fact — 
i.e.,  so  far  as  the  form  of  the  manifestation  is  concerned 
— it  cannot  necessitate  the  conclusion  that  its  origin  is 
divine.  As  regards  matter  or  content,  the  manifestation 
must  be  a  supernatural  revelation  of  the  vioral  law  in 
nature, — a  revelation  possible  for  an  intelligent  agent  in 
v/hom  sensuous  impulses  have  overbalanced  the  rever- 


*  Critique  of  Revelation,^  31 

ence  for  moral  law.  By  such  a  revelation,  moral  feeling 
might  be,  as  it  were,  awakened  or  implanted  in  the 
heart ;  for  were  such  feeling  absent,  no  force  of  reason, 
no  play  of  sense-impulse,  could  create  it,  A  revelation, 
then,  is  possible,  if  the  human  agent  under  such  circum- 
stances can  regard  certain  facts  in  the  world  of  sense  as 
the  spontaneous  effects  of  the  divine  will,  and  as  mani- 
festing the  moral  purpose  of  the  divine  will.  This  in- 
terpretation of  the  manifested  fact,  which  is  neither 
reason  nor  sense,  but,  as  it  were,  midway  between  them, 
is  the  work  of  Imagination.  The  individual  believes, 
and  may  believe,  tliat  the  revealed  fact  is  not  explicable 
by  natural  laws ;  but  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  prove 
that  it  is  inexplicable  by  these  laws.  It  is  equally  im- 
possible that  scientific  proofs  should  be  advanced  that 
what  happens  according  to  natural  laws  is  altogether 
explicable  by  them.  Tlie  laws  of  the  manifestation  in 
itself  are  matters  of  indifference ;  for  the  revelation  is 
only  relative, — relative  to  the  disturbed  ro  chaotic  moral 
condition  of  the  individual  human  agent.  The  possi- 
bility of  a  revelation  thus  rests  upon  the  possibility  of 
a  particular  condition  of  the  moral  nature ;  and  as  this 
condition  is  not  in  itself  necessary,  a  revealed  religion 
cannot  be  regarded  as  necessary  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  the  forms  of  thought  or  the  postulates  of  practical 
reason  are  necessary.  If  there  is  a  revelation  at  all, 
its  contents  must  coincide  with  the  contents  of  the 
moral  law,  and  we  can  judge  of  any  professed  revela- 
tion according  as  it  does  or  does  not  satisfy  the  criteria 
deducible  from  these  two  conditions.  It  must  be  made 
to  those  who  are  in  the  morally  imperfect  state  just 
described :  it  must  hold  out  no  offers  which  are  not  in 


32  FicJitc. 

themselves  consistent  with  pure  morality  :  it  must  not 
effect  its  entrance  into  our  thought  by  means  which  con- 
tain anything  beyond  the  moral  principle  :  it  cannot 
give  theoretical  certainty  to  those  postulated  facts  which 
follow  from  the  moral  law.  Eevealed  religion,  then, 
rests  upon  the  possible  needs  of  the  human  individual 
in  the  course  of  his  development  towards  pure  morality. 
The  belief  in  such  revelation  is  an  element,  and  an  im- 
portant element,  in  the  moral  education  of  humanity, 
but  it  is  not  a  final  stage  for  human  thought. 

It  is  not  of  interest  at  the  present  stage  of  our  sketch 
to  consider  the  worth  of  the  treatment  of  a  difficult  pro- 
blem here  presented  by  Fichte,  for  his  view  of  religion 
as  a  whole  became  deeper  and  fuller  as  his  speculation 
slowly  worked  itself  free  from  much  of  the  Kantian  for- 
malism. What  is  remarkable  in  the  Essay  is  merely  the 
strength  with  which  the  requirements  of  pure  practical 
reason  are  held  as  the  criteria  for  estimating  the  possi- 
bility and  the  nature  of  any  revealed  religion-  Fichte, 
even  at  this  stage  of  his  philosophical  career,  was  begin- 
ning to  lay  stress  upon  the  practical  side  of  the  Kantian 
system,  as  yielding  the  only  complete  solution  of  the 
whole  speculative  problem. 

There  was  some  difficulty  in  getting  the  Essay  brought 
before  the  public.  Through  Borowski's  friendly  efforts, 
and  by  Kant's  recommendation,  Hartung  was  induced 
to  accept  the  manuscript,  and  forwarded  it  to  Halle 
for  printing.  It  thus  became  necessary  that  the  work 
should  receive  the  imprimatur  of  the  Halle  censor, 
who  was  Dean  of  the  Theological  Faculty.  But  the 
censor  hesitated  to  give  assent  to  the  publication  of  a 
work  in  which  it  was  explicitlj'  stated  that  the  divine 


*  Critique  of  Revelation'  33 

character  of  a  revelation  could  not  rest  upon  the  evi- 
dence of  a  supposed  miracle,  but  wholly  upon  the  nature 
of  its  contents.  Fichte  endeavoured,  but  in  vain,  to 
get  over  the  difficulty  by  declaring  that  his  book  was 
philosophical,  not  theological,  and  therefore  stood  in  no 
need  of  a  theological  impi'imatur.  With  his  usual  res- 
oluteness he  absolutely  declined  to  accede  to  the  request 
of  friendly  critics  that  the  offensive  passages  should  be 
expunged,  or  even  to  the  prudent  advice  of  Kant  that 
a  distinction  should  be  introduced  between  dogmatical 
belief,  which  was  not  in  question,  and  moral  faith  or 
religion  based  on  practical  grounds ;  and,  for  a  time,  the 
appearance  of  the  work  seemed  more  than  problemati- 
cal Fortunately,  at  the  critical  moment  a  change 
occurred  in  the  censorship  of  the  Theological  Faculty 
at  Halle.  The  new  dean,  Dr  Knapp,  had  no  scruples 
in  giving  his  sanction  to  the  publication,  and  the  Essay 
appeared  in  1792.  By  some  accident,  whether  of  pub- 
lisher or  printer  does  not  seem  to  be  known,  the  author's 
name,  and  the  preface  in  which  he  spoke  of  himself, 
were  not  given ;  and  the  accident  was  indeed  fortunate 
for  Fichte.  The  literary  and  philosophic  public,  long 
expectant  of  a  work  on  religion  by  the  author  of  the 
*  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,'  imagined  that  they  found  in 
this  anonymous  essay  the  clearest  evidences  of  the  handi- 
work of  the  great  thinker.  The  *  AUgemeine  Literatur- 
zeitung '  with  bated  breath  discharged  its  "  duty  to  the 
public  "  in  communicating  to  them  the  substance  of  *'  a 
work  which,  more  than  any  written  for  a  long  time,  was 
adequate  to  the  deepest  wants  of  the  time,  and  which 
might  truly  be  called  a  word  in  season."  "Just  at  the 
moment,"  the  notice  proceeds,  "  when  the  most  varied 
p. — IV.  0 


34  Fichte. 

parties  in  theology  are  contending  with  one  another,  it 
is  more  particularly  of  importance  that  a  man  pietate  ac 
meritis  gravis  should  come  forward,  and  show  to  each  in 
what  they  are  in  error,  what  they  exaggerate,  and  what 
they  assert  without  foundation.  And  in  what  manner 
is  this  essential  task  executed !  Assuredly  there  is  to 
be  found  here  much,  perhaps  all,  that  the  greatest  and 
most  deservedly  famous  theologians  of  all  ages  have 
uttered  regarding  revelation ;  but  so  closely  knit  together, 
so  thoroughly  wrought  into  unity,  so  accurately  de- 
fined and  justified  does  everything  appear  in  this  admir- 
ably constructed  system,  that  as  regards  the  fundamental 
propositions  nothing  is  left  to  be  desired."  The  review- 
er, after  modestly  indicating  his  joy  at  seeing  the 
thoughts  which  he  himself  had  long  excogitated  on  the 
same  subject  expressed  in  so  masterly  and  complete  a 
fashion,  proceeds  to  give  an  extract,  with  the  remark 
that  "  every  one  who  has  made  himself  acquainted  with 
even  one  work  of  the  great  author,  here  recognisable  be- 
yond possibility  of  error,"  will  imagine  that  much  more 
valuable  must  remain  unexcerpted ;  and  closes  with  an 
effusion  of  gratitude  to  the  great  man  "  whose  finger  is 
everywhere  traceable,"  and  who  had  now  placed  the 
keystone  in  the  arch  of  human  knowledge.  Other  crit- 
ics were  not  behind  in  their  notices.  The  Jena  coterie, 
already  distinguished  as  the  centre  of  a  progressive 
Kantianism,  commented  on  and  discussed  the  Essay  as 
veritably  the  work  of  the  master,  and  treatises  pro  and 
con  began  to  issue  from  the  fruitful  German  press. 

Kant  did  not  suffer  the  error  to  remain  long  uncor- 
rected. In  the  number  of  the  'Allgemeine  Literatur- 
zeitung '  following  that  in  which  the  just  quoted  notice 


Politiccd  Pamphlets.  35 

appeared,  ho  published  a  brief  statement,  giving  the 
name  of  the  author,  and  expressing  respect  for  his 
ability.  It  is  true  that  the  reviews  of  the  second  edition 
of  the  Essay  in  the  same  journal  exhibit  a  remarkable 
difference  of  tone,  but  none  the  less  Fichte's  literary 
fame  was  by  this  occurrence  raised  at  once  to  a  height 
such  as  years  of  labour  might  not  have  enabled  him  to 
attain.  He  was  marked  out  from  all  the  living  writers 
on  philosophy  as  the  one  who  seemed  able  with  strength 
and  capacity  to  carry  on  the  great  work  of  Kant.  His 
career  was  determined  for  him,  and  all  his  vague  plans 
and  projects  were  now  consolidated.  Henceforth  he  was 
a  philosopher  by  profession. 

THE  POLITICAL   PAMPHLETS. 

The  success  of  his  literary  venture  now  enabled  Fichte 
to  think  of  his  marriage  as  an  event  no  longer  to  be 
delayed  by  uncertainty  as  to  his  own  fortunes.  Some 
portion  of  Hartmann  Eahn's  property  had  been  saved 
from  the  general  wreck,  and  in  the  beginning  of  1793 
we  leam  from  his  letters  to  Johanna  that  at  last  all 
might  be  regarded  as  settled.  "  In  June,  or  at  the 
latest  July,"  he  writes  from  Danzig  in  the  spring  of 
1793,  "  I  shall  be  with  thee ;  but  I  should  wish  to  enter 
the  walls  of  Ziirich  as  thy  husband.  Is  that  possible  % 
Thy  kind  heart  will  give  no  hindrance  to  my  wishes ; 
but  I  do  not  know  the  circumstances."  The  circum- 
stances, as  it  happened,  were  adverse  to  his  wish. 
Ziirich  customs  exacted  from  foreigners  proposing  to 
marry  in  that  city  a  certain  duration  of  residence,  and  it 
was  not  till  the  2  2d  of  October  that  at  Baden  his  mar- 
riage with  Johanna  Eahn  took  place.     A  short  tour  in 


3G  Ficlite. 

Switzerland,  partly  in  company  with  the  Danish  poet 
Jens  Baggesen,  is  noteworthy  as  having  introduced 
Fichte  to  the  acquaintance  of  Pestalozzi,  whose  educa- 
tional ideas  were  destined  to  play  an  important  part  in 
the  after-life  of  the  philosopher. 

During  this  calmer  period  of  Fichte's  life,  the  great 
events  of  the  French  Eevolution  had  heen  rapidly  de- 
veloping themselves,  and  the  attention  of  thinkers  as  well 
as  of  the  public  had  been  drawn  to  the  principles  in- 
volved in  or  endangered  by  such  a  mighty  movement. 
Rehberg,  the  secretary  to  the  Hanoverian  Privy  Council, 
published  in  1792  a  work  entitled  '  Essays  on  the 
French  Eevolution,'  in  which  a  doubtful  and  timid  view 
was  expressed  as  to  its  principles,  and  the  worst  conse- 
quences were  predicted  as  Hkely  to  follow  from  them. 
This  book  seems  to  have  been  the  occasioning  cause  of 
Fichte's  anonymous  political  tracts,  the  first  of  which, 
'Reclamation  of  the  Freedom  of  Thought  from  the 
Princes  of  Europe,'  a  fiery  oratorical  piece,  was  com- 
pleted at  Danzig.  The  second  and  more  important,  '  Con- 
tributions towards  the  Correction  of  the  Public  Judgment 
on  the  French  Revolution,'  was  begun  at  Danzig,  and 
finished,  so  far  as  it  went,  at  Ziirich.  In  both  the  fim- 
damental  principle  is  the  same.  Defence  of  the  right  of 
remodelling  constitutional  forms  is  founded  on  the  inde- 
feasible and  inalienable  right  to  the  liberty  of  realising 
the  moral  end  of  humanity,  a  right  which  precedes  and 
underlies  all  others.  The  argument  is  in  substance  the 
translation  of  Rousseau's  '  Contrat  Social '  into  the  terms 
of  the  Kantian  ethical  system ;  and  as  the  whole  ques- 
tion of  Right  or  Law  ^  is  intimately  connected  with  the 

^  It  is  impossible  to  give  any  exact  single  equivalent  in  English  for 


Political  Pamphlets.  37 

very  essence  of  Fichte's  philosophy,  it  is  well  to  note 
how,  at  this  comparatively  early  stage  of  his  philosophic 
development,  he  expressed  himself  regarding  it.  As  in 
the  case  of  Kant's  '  Rechtslehre,'  so  in  these  essays,  the 
notion  of  an  original  contract  as  basis  of  rights  within 
the  state,  is  accepted  not  as  though  it  expressed  historic 
fact,  but  as  the  only  theoretical  foundation  for  a  union 
of  intelligent,  voluntary  beings.  AVithin  a  community 
founded  on  such  a  contract,  there  are  various  rights  and 
degrees  of  rights  assigned  to  the  several  individuals  or 
classes.  But  of  those  rights,  some  are  inalienable  or  in- 
defeasible, for  they  express  the  condition  in  the  absence 
of  which  the  moral  law,  the  supreme  rvile  of  conduct,  is 
of  no  effect ;  others,  rights  regarding  modes  of  action 
merely  permitted,  not  enjoined  by  the  moral  law,  are 
alienable,  and  may  be  resigned  by  the  individual  Among 
the  inalienable  rights,  that  which  is  all-comprehensive  is 
ethical  freedom  ;  but  in  one  acceptation  at  least,  freedom 
concerns  not  so  much  external  acts  as  internal  thoughts. 
Nevertheless  the  right  to  free  expression  of  opinion,  to 
free  communication  of  thought,  must  be  pronounced  an 
inalienable  or  indefeasible  right,  for  in  its  absence  the 

the  tenn  Recht,  which  in  different  references  may  mean  either  law  or 
the  rights  of  the  individual  about  which  law  is  concerned,  may  be 
either  an  abstract  or  a  collective  notion,  and  may  signify  either  posi- 
tive enactments  or  the  ultimate  ethical  foundation  for  such  enact- 
ments. In  Fichte's  writings  a  right  is  the  specific  mode  of  action,  or 
realisation  of  a  motive  in  external  fact,  which  is  indispensably  neces- 
sary under  the  supposition  of  a  common  ethical  law  or  supreme  ethical 
end.  Assuming  such  moral  end,  we  can  point  to  specific  modes  of 
action  which  must  be  approved  by  the  community,  unless  violence  is 
done  to  the  very  notion  of  ethical  law.  Alongside  of  this,  however, 
there  are  rights  which  are  mere  specific  modes  of  action  approved  by 
the  community  as  a  whole,  though  not  indispensable  for  the  realisation 
of  the  ethical  end. 


38  Fichte. 

possibility  for  acquiring  the  materials  of  thought  is  de- 
stroyed, ^o  spiritual  development  is  possible  without 
the  free  interchange  and  communication  of  thought,  nor 
is  it  given  to  any  man  or  body  of  men  to  pronounce  on 
the  wisdom  or  goodness  of  thoughts  with  such  confidence 
as  to  afford  foundation  for  a  supposed  right  to  suppress 
freedom  of  thought  on  the  ground  of  possible  danger 
from  errors  of  thinking.^ 

The  same  fundamental  principle,  that  the  ultimate 
foundation,  and  consequently  the  criterion,  of  all  state 
rights,  is  to  be  found  in  the  conditions  necessary  for  the 
realisation  of  the  ethical  end,  the  spiritual  development 
towards  moral  freedom,  gives  an  answer  to  the  more 
complicated  problem  of  the  right  of  revolution.  Con- 
stitutional forms  must  needs  be  alterable ;  they  cannot 
continuously  correspond  to  the  requirements  of  a  devel- 
oping moral  culture.  No  original  contract  can  be  of  a 
final  nature,  can  prescribe  limits  to  the  moral  and  legal 
development  of  a  community.  The  right  to  state  reform 
is  inalienable  or  indefeasible. 

^Nevertheless  the  dissolution  of  a  constitutional  form 
implies  withdrawal  from  the  original  state  contract,  and 
such  withdrawal  appears  almost  in  terms  to  contradict 
the  very  notion  upon  which  state  rights  are  founded." 
Fichte  boldly  faces  this  difficulty,  contends  that  in  all 
cases  withdrawal  from  contract  is  possible,  and  that  law 
or  justice  requires  only  compensation  for  such  breach  of 
pact,  not  unconditional  fulfilment  of  it.     If  injury  has 

1  Fichte's  argument  here  may  be  compared  with  the  fuller  and  more 
concrete  treatment  of  the  same  problem  in  J.  S.  Mill's  tract,  "  On 
Liberty." 

2  This  contradiction  is  left  as  a  kind  of  unsolved  problem  by  Kant 
(see  '  Rechtslehre,'  §  49,  '  Allgemeine  Anmerkung,'  A.) 


Political  Pamphlets.  39 

been  done  by  dissolving  the  contract  on  wliich  the  ex- 
isting form  of  state  government  rests,  let  due  compensa- 
tion in  kind  and  amount  be  rendered.  JN'ow  the  injury 
may  be  inflicted  on  the  state  itself,  or  on  certain  privi- 
leged classes  in  it.  So  far  as  the  state  itself  is  concerned, 
the  only  relations  of  life  in  respect  of  which  compensa- 
tion could  be  demanded,  are  those  which  rest  upon  or 
are  secured  by  the  assistance  of  the  state — e.g.,  rights  of 
property  or  right  to  development  of  one's  own  culture. 
But  the  smallest  consideration  enables  us  to  see  that 
these  rights  and  relations  are  prior  in  nature  to  state 
arrangements.  Tliey  do  not  spring  from  the  state,  but 
the  state  is  the  mechanism  Avhereby  they  are  protected 
and  regulated  !No  penalty,  therefore,  can  be  exacted 
by  the  state  in  consequence  of  the  withdrawal  of  one  or 
all  of  its  members  from  the  original  contract.  These 
dissentient  wills  may  combine  and  form  a  state  within 
the  state  :  this  is  the  essence  of  political  revolution.^ 

The  consideration  of  the  possible  injury  to  privileged 
classes  in  the  state,  consequent  on  revolution,  leads 
Fichte,  in  the  second  Heft  of  the  Beitrdge,  into  a  some- 
what elaborate  discussion  of  the  origin  of  privileges  in 
general  The  principles  of  social  economy  involved  in 
his  treatment  are  not  so  distinct  as  they  afterwards  be- 
came ;  and  as  in  dealing  with  his  later  ■writings  some 
attention  must  be  paid  to  them,  it  is  sufficient  here  to 

1  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Fichte  supports  his  argument  in 
favour  of  a  state  within  tlie  state,  by  pointing  to  examples  of  such 
dual  fonnations.  These  are  mainly  the  existence  of  Jews  in  a  Chris- 
tian community,  and  the  existence  of  a  military  class.  His  expres- 
sions with  regard  to  the  Jews  are  hardly  exceeded  in  bitterness  by  any 
of  the  modem  assailants  of  the  Semitic  element  in  Gennany.  See 
specially  'Werke,*  vol.  vi.  pp.  150,  151. 


40  Fichte. 

remark  that  he  subjects  to  the  most  trenchant  criticism 
the  grounds  for  the  privileges  of  the  nobiUty  and  the 
Church,  absolutely  rejects  these  as  theoretically  inde- 
fensible, and  foreshadows  the  semi-socialist  doctrine 
Avhich  is  worked  out  in  his  later  politico-economical 
treatises.^ 

These  political  writings,  breathing  the  warmest  enthu- 
siasm for  the  French  Eevolution,  not  unnaturally  drew 
attention  to  Fichte.  He  was  marked  as  a  dangerous 
political  character,  and  accused,  both  at  the  time  and 
afterwards,  of  democratic  tendencies.  The  influence  of 
this  feeling  regarding  his  political  sympathies  is  a  not- 
able fact  in  all  the  events  of  his  after-career.  As  we 
shall  see,  much  of  the  bitterness  that  was  poured  out 
against  him  at  Jena  on  account  of  his  theological  views 
had  its  root  in  hatred  for  his  advanced  political  doctrines. 
In  substance  the  pamphlets  are  still  interesting,  both  in 
themselves  and  as  indicating  the  strong  practical  bent  of 
Fichte's  thinking ;  in  form,  however,  they  are  somewhat 
hard  and  pedantic.  As  in  the  '  Critique  of  Revelation,' 
so  here,  the  language  is  full  of  Kantian  teclinicalities, 
the  structure  and  progress  of  the  argument  are  deter- 
mined by  the  abstract  forms  of  the  Kantian  system.  In 
both  works,  Fichte  had  advanced  to  the  limits  dra^vn  by 
the  Critical  Philosophy.  He  was  now  prepared  to  push 
beyond  them. 

1  Especially  tlie  '  Geschlossene  Handels-staat '  and  the  '  Staatslehre.' 


41 


CHAPTEE    III. 


THE   JENA   PROFESSORSHIP. 


The  winter  of  1793  was  passed  quietly  at  Zliricli  in 
constant  meditation  over  the  main  problems  of  the 
Kantian  pliilosophy.  Partly  by  his  own  reflection, 
partly  by  the  acute  criticisms  of  Schulz,  whose  '  ^nesi- 
demus '  had  appeared  in  the  preceding  year,  Fichte  had 
begun  to  see  with  clearness  where  the  main  difficulty  of 
the  Kantian  system  lay.  The  theory  of  knowledge  ex- 
pounded in  the  '  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason,'  was  not,  so 
far  at  least  as  Kant's  own  statement  extended,  a  per- 
fectly coherent  whole ;  nor  did  there  appear  to  be  a  con- 
sistent, logical  transition  from  that  theory  to  the  more 
metaphysical  notions  which  came  forward  in  the  Cri- 
tiques of  Practical  Eeason  and  of  Judgment.  Some 
assistance  in  working  into  system  the  parts  of  the  Kant- 
ian doctrine  was  doubtless  furnished  by  Eeinhold,  but 
with  his  method  Fichte  soon  became  dissatisfied-  It 
was  for  him  a  necessity  that  the  whole  of  philosophy 
should  manifest  a  single  principle,  that  the  theories  of 
knowledge  and  of  practice  should  be  deduced  from  one 
common  source,  and  that  the  fundamental  notions  of 
speculative  thought  should  be  developed  with  systematic 


42  Fichte, 

completeness.  In  one  or  two  occasional  reviews  dating 
from  this  period,  and  in  letters  to  his  friends,  he  gave 
brief  utterance  to  his  convictions  on  this  point ',  and,  as 
his  views  grew  more  matured  and  definite,  he  yielded  to 
the  request  of  some  Ziirich  acquaintances,  and  delivered 
during  the  winter  a  short  course  of  private  lectures  on 
philosophy  as  conceived  by  him.  The  formation  of  his 
speculative  doctrines  was,  however,  accelerated  by  the 
invitation,  which  reached  him  in  December  1793,  to  fill 
the  post  of  extraordinary  Professor  of  Philosophy  at 
Jena,  about  to  become  vacant  by  the  transference  of 
Eeinhold  to  Kiel.  Eeluctant  as  Fichte  was  at  first  to 
yield  immediate  assent  to  this  call,  he  could  not  refuse 
the  opportunity  of  entering  once  for  all  upon  the  career 
for  which  he  appeared  specially  marked  out,  and  after 
sending  in  his  acceptance  to  Privy  Councillor  Voigt,  he 
made  arrangements  for  beginning  his  course  at  Jena  in 
the  Easter  term  of  1794. 

The  University  at  Jena  was  then  at  the  very  height 
of  its  renown.  No  other  period,  in  all  its  brilliant  his- 
tory, rivals  the  first  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Above  all  other  universities  in  Germany  it  was  distin- 
guished as  the  very  centre  of  the  most  progressive  move- 
ments in  philosophy  and  literature.  The  near  neigh- 
bourhood of  Weimar — where  the  most  illustrious  names 
in  the  new  German  literature  congregated,  where,  under 
the  genial  care  of  a  noble  and  enlightened  prince,  arts 
and  letters  flourished  as  in  a  modern  Athens — gave  to  it 
additional  renown,  and  secured  the  most  watchfxd  super- 
vision over  the  studies  of  the  university.  More  espe- 
cially, however,  was  Jena  pre-eminent  as  the  university 
in  which  the  new  German  philosophy  had  been  most 


TJie  Jena  ProfessorsM'p.  43 

eagerly  accepted  and  most  fruitfully  applied.  Schlitz, 
known  in  classical  literature  for  his  editions  of  '  ^scliy- 
lus '  and  '  Cicero,'  made  it  his  boast  that  he  had  been 
the  first  to  introduce  the  youth  of  Jena  to  the  Critical 
Philosophy.  Hufeland,  an  eminent  jurist,  expounded 
the  principles  of  the  Kantian  ethics,  and  his  '  Hatur- 
recht '  is  still  one  of  the  best  expositions  of  philosophic 
jurisprudence.  Eeinhold,  who  by  his  'Letters  on  the 
Kantian  Philosophy '  had  won  the  approval  of  tlie  father 
of  criticism  himself,  had  begun  in  1787,  in  the  chair 
instituted  specially  for  him,  the  lectures  in  which  he 
endeavoured  to  improve  and  further  the  critical  system. 
Schiller,  called  to  the  Chair  of  History  in  1789,  had 
shown  how  philosophical  principles  might  be  fruitfully 
united  with  historical  research  and  artistic  production. 
Paulus,  Loder,  Ersch,  and  Schmid,  are  names  not  to  be 
forgotten  for  the  services  they  rendered  to  the  advance- 
ment of  German  thought.  Altogether,  the  University  of 
Jena,  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  exhibited  a 
degree  of  life  and  activity  which  raised  it  to  the  first 
place  among  the  academies  of  Germany.  The  history  of 
German  philosophy,  in  its  brightest  period,  is  in  a  great 
measure  the  history  of  the  Jena  University.  For  there 
as  teachers  we  find  Fichte,  ScheUing,  Hegel,  Fries, 
Krause,  and  Schlegel ;  as  scholars,  Herbart,  Schubert, 
Steffens,  Solger,  HUlsen,  Hblderlin,  Von  Berger,  and 
Oersted.  Among  the  students  the  fame  of  their  teachers 
was  reflected  in  a  peculiarly  open  and  vigorous  university 
life.  Nowhere  was  there  a  freer  or  more  enthusiastic 
academic  tone  than  in  Jena 

The  call  of  Fichte  to  Jena — not,  as  we  learn  from 
Goethe,  undertaken  without  some  hesitation  on  the  score 


ii  Fichte. 

of  his  pronounced  political  views — was  hailed  by  the 
university  with  the  keenest  joy.  Of  aU  the  adherents 
of  Kantianism,  he  alone  had  given  proofs  of  ability  to 
carry  forward  and  develop  the  great  thoughts  that  had 
already  begun  to  exert  their  Avonderful  influence.  "  In 
Jena,"  his  friend  Bdttiger  writes  to  him,  "there  has 
been  for  some  weeks  past  an  indescribable  joy  over  the 
triumvirate  of  professors  due  at  Easter, — for  in  addition 
to  you,  there  have  also  been  called  here  the  excellent 
Ilgen,  probably  the  most  learned  and  cultured  scholar 
in  Saxony,  as  Professor  Orientalium,  and  Woltmann, 
as  extraordinary  lecturer  on  History.  But  your  name 
resounds  above  all,  and  expectation  is  strained  to  its 
utmost — doubtless  in  part  because  you  are  regarded  as 
the  most  valiant  defender  of  the  rights  of  men,  whereon 
many  a  son  of  the  Muses  has  quite  peculiar  ideas.  This, 
however,  may  easily  be  put  to  rights." 

On  the  18th  May  1794  Fichte  arrived  in  Jena.  The 
preceding  months  had  been  spent  by  him  in  the  most 
arduous  and  careful  preparation  for  his  new  task.  It 
had  been  impossible,  in  the  short  interval  allowed  him,  to 
complete  what  he  had  desired  to  have  ready,  an  exposi- 
tion of  his  philosophic  views  which  might  serve  as  a 
handbook  for  his  prelections  ;  but  as  introductory  thereto 
he  had  drawn  out  and  published  the  short  tract,  '  On  the 
Notion  of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge  or  so-called  Philo- 
sophy,' ^  giving  a  preliminary  sketch  of  the  fundamental 

1  '  Ueber  den  Begriff  der  Wissenschaftslehre  oder  der  sogenaiinten 
Philosopliie,' 1st  ed.,  1794.  The  term  "Wissenschaftslehre,"  which 
we  here  translate  by  "  Theory  of  Knowledge,"  will  receive  more  de- 
tailed explanation  when  the  nature  of  Fichte's  philosophy  is  dis- 
cussed. As  no  equivalent  in  English  conveys  its  meaning  with  per- 
fect accuracy,  it  will  be  employed  hereafter,  without  translation,  as  a 
technical  term. 


The  JeTia  Frofessorsliif.  46 

ideas  to  be  embodied  in  his  philosophical  lectures.  The 
tract  is  written  with  wonderful  clearness,  but  its  con- 
tents amount  to  Httle  more  than  the  strenuous  expression 
of  the  need  for  unity  of  philosophical  conception,  toge- 
ther with  certain  formal  determinations  regarding  the 
first  principle  from  which  philosophical  thinking  must 
take  its  start.  The  somewhat  abstract  method  here  em- 
ployed was  never  afterwards  followed  by  Fichte,  and  it 
is  matter  for  regret  that  the  general  ideas  of  his  system 
have  been  mainly  drawn  from  this  early  pamphlet,  and 
contain  little  beyond  its  formal  statements. 

The  reception  accorded  to  the  philosopher  at  Jena  was 
of  the  most  gratifying  kind.  As  might  have  been  anti- 
cipated from  Fichte's  character,  it  was  his  constant  aim 
not  only  to  reach  the  truth  in  purely  metaphysical  specu- 
lation, but  to  make  philosophic  principles  living  rules  of 
action.  The  tone  of  his  mind  was  prevailingly  practical, 
and  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  remain  contented  with 
mere  exposition  of  speculative  doctrines.  Accordingly 
he  arranged  his  courses  at  Jena  into  two  series  :  the  one, 
more  elaborate  and  extended,  on  philosophy  as  a  whole ; 
the  other,  shorter  and  more  popular,  on  the  effects  of 
philosophic  culture  in  general  upon  character  and  life. 
The  first  course  was  given  to  the  students  of  philosophy 
in  particiJar;  the  second,  to  which  he  then  gave  the 
title  of  "  Ethics  of  the  Scholar,"  was  public,  and  intended 
for  all  the  members  of  the  academic  body.  In  both 
courses  his  success  was  immediate  and  pronounced.  Tlie 
great  hall  was  crowded  to  overflowing  when  his  public 
lectures  were  delivered,  while  the  enthusiasm  of  his  phi- 
losophic students  soon  made  the  technical  terms  of  his 
system  familiar  words  in  academic  circles  and  in  general 


46  FicMe. 

literature.  "Since  Eeinhold  left  us,"  writes  Forberg, 
then  a  2mvat-docent  at  Jena,  "liis  philosophy,  at  least 
among  us,  is  absolutely  dead.  Every  trace  of  the  "  Phi- 
losophy without  Mcknanie  "  ^  has  been  driven  from  the 
heads  of  our  students.  They  believe  in  Fichte  as  they 
never  believed  in  Eeinhold.  Doubtless  they  understand 
him  even  less  than  they  understood  Eeinhold,  but  they 
believe  aU  the  more  stubbornly  for  that  very  reason. 
Ego  and  non-Ego  are  now  the  symbols  of  the  philoso- 
phers, as  Matter  and  Form  were  then.  About  the  right 
which  either  party  has  to  dissolve  a  contract,  there  is 
just  as  little  doubt  now,  as  there  was  then  regarding  the 
manifold  character  of  matter." 

To  the  success  of  his  prelections  Fichte's  admirable 
philosophic  style  contributed  much.  He  had  a  mar- 
vellous faculty  of  riveting  attention,  of  compelling 
thought  to  dwell  upon  the  problems  presented  to  it,  and 
of  evolving  in  rigid  sequence  the  stages  of  a  complete 
argument  or  disputation.  All  his  -writings  bear  more 
or  less  the  character  of  lectures,  and  probably  his  own 
mode  of  speculative  reflection  was  that  of  the  expounder 
conscious  of  an  audience  to  whom  explanations  are  due, 
rather  than  that  of  the  pure  thinker,  intent  on  nothing 
but  the  notions  before  him.  He  was  a  bom  orator,  and, 
as  we  have  already  seen  in  his  early  life,  sedulously  cul- 
tivated the  oratorical  faculty  as  that  wherewith  he  could 
best  attain  his  great  end,  the  elevation  of  life.  His 
personality,  further,  combining  strength  and  obstinacy 

1  "  PMlosophie  ohne  Beinamen,"  as  Eeinhold  was  pleased  to  call 
his  rather  washed-out  reproduction  of  Kantianism,  in  order  to  indi- 
cate that  it  was  neither  critical  nor  dogmatic  nor  sceptical,  but  philo- 
sophy simply. 


TJie  JeTM  Professorship.  47 

■with  the  loftiest  moral  principle,  found  its  most  adequate 
expression,  and  was  capable  of  its  most  powerful  influ- 
ence, in  oratorical  efforts  rather  than  in  systematic  ex- 
position. In  Ficlite,  as  in  Schelling,  and  generally  in 
the  writers  of  the  Eomantic  period,  what  the  historian 
of  philosophy  notes  as  their  prevailing  characteristic  is  a 
certain  hot-headed  impetuosity  and  impatience,  which 
contrasts  unfavourably  with  the  calm  matureness  of  their 
great  predecessor  Kant,  and  which  almost  inevitably 
leads  to  a  sHght  distrust  of,  or  dissatisfaction  with,  their 
work.  Something  of  this  distrust,  as  we  shall  see  later, 
was  felt  by  Kant  himself,  who  always  dishked  and  de- 
preciated Genie-schwunge,  flights  of  genius,  and  trusted 
rather  to  solid,  patient,  methodical  work,  than  to  the 
efforts  of  enthusiastic  imagination. 

The  Jena  period  of  Fichte's  life  may  be  conveniently 
regarded  under  two  quite  distinct  aspects.  It  presents 
to  us,  in  the  first  place,  a  series  of  developments  of 
one  speculative  principle,  covering  the  whole  ground 
of  philosophy,  affecting  by  their  spirit  and  method  all 
contemporary  criticism  and  hterature,  and  bringing  the 
author  into  close  connection,  whether  friendly  or  polemi- 
cal, with  the  greatest  living  writers.  In  this  sense,  it  is 
simply  the  representation  of  the  active  results  of  Fichte's 
speculative  faculty.  But  speculative  faculty  was  only 
one  side  of  Fichte's  character,  and  when  we  consider 
the  several  incidents  of  pubHc  life  which  mark  the  Jena 
career,  we  find  rather  the  development  of  the  more  im- 
petuous temper  which  so  frequently  in  the  coxu^e  of  his 
life  led  to  imfortunate  collisions  with  his  surroundings. 
The  philosophical  and  the  practical  acttvity  may  thus  be 
regarded  apart  from  one  another. 


48  Fichte. 

As  respects  the  first,  a  brief  notice  of  the  successive 
works  in  which  the  new  speculative  system  was  laid  be- 
fore the  world,  will  here  suffice.  The  lectures  on 
'  Wissenschaftslehre,'  delivered  to  his  private  class 
during  the  first  semester  at  the  university,  were  printed 
in  sheets  as  soon  as  delivered,  and  from  these  sheets 
was  formed  the  first  systematic  exposition  of  the  new 
doctrine,  '  Foundations  of  the  whole  Wissenschaftslehre ' 
('Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissenschaftslehre,'  1st  ed., 
1794).  The  whole  field  of  philosophical  cognition, 
theoretical  and  practical,  was  surveyed  in  this  work ; 
but  Fichte  remained  unsatisfied  with  the  method  pur- 
sued, and  in  his  later,  more  mature  writings,  never  em- 
ploys the  abstract  forms  which  are  here  brought  forward, 
and  which  have  been  falsely  thought  to  be  essential 
elements  in  his  system.  In  quick  succession  he  put 
forward  detailed  expositions  of  the  several  portions 
briefly  discussed  in  the  'Grundlage.'  The  theoretical 
faculty  of  cognition  was  specially  handled  in  the  '  Out- 
line of  what  is  peculiar  to  Wissenschaftslehre'  (1795); 
the  practical  side  of  consciousness  in  the  two  important 
treatises, '  Theory  of  IS'atural  Law '  (' Grundlage des  Natur- 
rechts,'  1796-97)  and  'Theory  of  Morals'  ('System  der 
Sittenlehre,'  1798);  while  the  whole  philosophy  was 
expounded  in  a  fresh  form  in  the  '  Introductions  to 
Wissenschaftslehre,'  published  in  the  'Philosophical 
Journal,'  vols.  v.  and  vi.  (1797),  and  in  the  'Essay  to- 
wards a  I^ew  Exposition  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre,'  vol. 
vii.  of  the  same  periodical.  These  writings,  taken  in 
conjunction  with  the  important  '  Eeview  of  -^Eneside- 
mus'  (1794),  make  up  the  philosophy  of  Fichte  in  its 
so-called  earlier  form. 


TJie  Jena  Professorship.  49 

A  wonderful  impression  seems  to  have  been  made 
upon  his  contemporaries  by  the  boldness  and  systematic 
completeness  of  Fichte's  speculation.  Goethe,  little 
disposed  to  abstract  thinking,  and  probably  in  his  heart 
of  hearts  not  over  well  disposed  towards  an  eager  politi- 
cal theorist,  yet  found  "  nothing  in  the  first  sheets  of  the 
'  Wissenschaftslehre '  which  he  did  not  understand,  or  at 
least  thought  he  understood, — nothing  which  did  not 
harmonise  with  his  own  mode  of  thinking  about  things," 
laboured  hard  to  keep  pace  with  the  'New  Expositions' 
of  the  prolific  author,  and  in  general  extended  to  the 
metaphysician  a  cordial  and  respectful  admiration. 
With  Schiller,  whose  Kantian  sympathies  might  have 
led  to  a  warmer  interest  in  pure  |peculation,  Fichte 
never  seems  to  have  been  on  terms  of  unqualified  friend- 
ship. Despite  the  mutual  esteem  which  they  enter- 
tained for  one  another,  their  characters  were  too  pro- 
nounced to  admit  of  perfectly  unclouded  harmony ;  and, 
philosophically,  there  was  a  divergence  between  their 
views  which,  on  one  occasion  at  least,  led  to  an  unfor- 
tunate collision  between  them.  Fichte,  who  had  been 
invited  to  contribute  to  the  '  Horen,'  then  edited  by 
Schiller,  forwarded  for  this  periodical  an  Essay  'On 
Spirit  and  Letter,'  in  which  the  editor  fancied  that  he 
could  detect  a  parody  of  his  own  '  Letters  on  the  ^Es- 
thetic  Education  of  the  Human  Eace.'  The  parody  ex- 
isted only  in  Schiller's  over-sensitive  imagination,  but  a 
somewhat  bitter  correspondence  followed  his  suppression 
of  the  paper.  Eeconciliation  was  effected;  but,  if  we 
may  judge  from  the  tone  of  the  communications  which 
passed  between  Goethe  and  Schiller  at  a  later  date  re- 
garding  Fichte's   academic   troubles,  a   secret   distrust 

p. — IV.  D 


50  FicMe. 

and  dislike  continued  to  exist.  With  his  philosophic 
contemporaries  Fichte's  relations  were  of  even  greater 
interest.  His  increasing  fame  naturally  attracted  both 
adherents  and  enemies.  The  older  Kantian  scholars 
bitterly  criticised  the  new  effort  after  a  completeness 
of  system  which  had  been  foreign  to  Kant's  original 
method.  The  younger  and  more  impetuous  philosophic 
students,  among  others  Niethammer,  Forberg,  and 
Schelling,  with  equal  bitterness  accused  their  more 
cautious  predecessors  of  want  of  faith  in  their  OAvn  prin- 
ciples, and  declared  that  Criticism  proper  had  been  but 
0.  propcedeutic  or  introduction,  to  which  the  'Wissen- 
schaftslehre '  was  the  natural  and  necessary  supplement. 
The  antagonists  of  all  the  newer  philosophy,  pre-emin- 
ently Nicolai,  the  editor  of  the  '  Deutsche  Bibliothek,' 
eagerly  hailed  the  controversy  as  furnishing  evidence  of 
the  empty  and  contradictory  character,  and  of  the  evil 
tendencies,  of  the  so-called  metaphysics.  "With  Kant 
himself,  Fichte's  relations  gradually  became  hostile, 
though  no  open  declaration  was  made  by  the  aged 
philosopher  until  he  had  been  alarmed  by  the  accusa- 
tions of  atheism  brought  against  a  system  which  pro- 
fessed to  be  a  development  of  his  own  principles.  It 
does  not  appear  that  he  had  ever  fairly  entered  into  the 
spirit  of  Fichte's  works, — probably  he  had  not  even 
studied  them ;  but  in  the  Intelligence  sheet  of  the 
'Allgemeine  Literaturzeitung '  for  1799,  No.  109,  he 
published  a  formal  disclaimer  of  any  connection  between 
his  own  system  and  that  of  Fichte,  declaring  that  the 
'  Wissenschaf tslehre '  was  nothing  but  abstract  logic, 
valuable  therefore  as  methodising  thought,  but  contain- 
ing no  reference  to  reality,  and  bitterly  resenting  the  de- 


The  Jena  ProfessorsJiip.  51 

scription  of  his  own  critical  work  as  mere  propaedeutic  to 
a  system  of  reasoned  philosophy.  Fichte's  rejoinder, 
published  in  the  same  paper  in  the  form  of  a  letter  to 
Schelling,  was  pointed  and  severe.  He  rightly  drew 
attention  to  Kant's  frank  admission  that  his  disclaimer 
was  personal  in  character,  and  not  founded  on  thorough 
appreciation  of  the  new  philosophic  work,  and  indicated 
that  from  Kant's  position  it  was  not  unnatural  that  he 
should  regard  the  '  Critique '  as  final,  just  as  his  oppon- 
ents thought  the  '  Critique  '  a  worthless  and  unnecessary 
attempt  to  transcend  the  well-defined  and  sure  limits  of 
the  earher  systems.^ 

Kant's  disclaimer  came  too  late  to  he  of  any  service 
in  checking  the  rapid  current  of  speculation  which  had 
its  source  in  his  own  writings.  Eeinhold,  a  weak  and 
vacillating  thinker,  had  given  his  complete  adhesion  to 
the  '  Wissenschaftslehre ; '  the  Jena  '  Allgemeine  Liter- 
aturzeitung,'  once  the  organ  of  the  Kantians,  declared 
for  Fichte;  and  in  the  '  Philosophisches  Journal,'  of 
which  Fichte  was  co-editor  with  Niethammer  from  1795 
onwards,  the  new  school  possessed  an  official  organ  of 
their  own.  ScheUing's  early  works  gave  in  fresh  and 
attractive  form  expositions  of  the  *  Wissenschaftslehre,' 
applied  its  principles  to  the  more  profound  problems  of 
metaphysics,  and  called  attention  to  the  advance  effected 
on  the  critical  position.  Even  Jacobi,  strongly  opposed 
as  he  was  to  any  demonstrative  or  tlieoretical  meta- 
physic,  was  not  proof  against  the  attraction  of  the  new 

1  The  letters  between  Fichte  and  Schelling  on  the  subject  of  Kant'a 
declaration  ('Leben  und  Brief wechsel,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  301-308)  are  of 
great  interest,  as  indicating  their  views  on  the  relation  between  the 
•Critique'  and  Fichte' s  'Wissenschaftslehre.' 


52  Fichte. 

system,  or  its  apparent  coincidence  witli  his  own  views. 
His  correspondence  with  Fichte  is  of  the  highest  inter- 
est, as  throwing  light  on  the  philosophical  and  personal 
relations  of  two  eminent  thinkers ;  and  although  he 
could  not  bring  himself  to  see  the  similarity  between 
the  '  Wissenschaf tslehre '  and  his  own  doctrines,  on 
which  Fichte  laid  so  much  stress,  it  was  not  till  the 
accusation  of  atheism  had  been  brought  against  the 
Fichtean  system  that  he  declared  himself  against  it.  On 
the  whole,  during  the  important  period  from  1794  to 
1799,  the  philosophy  of  Fichte  was  in  the  ascendant. 
It  gave  a  new  impetus  and  direction  to  speculative 
thought,  and  powerfully  influenced  contemporary  litera- 
ture of  a  non-philosophical  kind.  If  we  can  discover 
philosophical  principles  at  all  in  the  literary  productions 
of  the  earlier  Romantic  school,  in  the  writings  of  Tieck, 
Novalis,  and  Fr.  Schlegel,  these  bear  unmistakably  the 
impress  of  the  Fichtean  system.  Doubtless,  this  sec- 
ondary effect  of  Fichte's  philosophy  gave  additional 
strength  to  the  feeling  gradually  roused  against  it. 

When  we  turn  to  the  consideration  of  Fichte's  public 
life,  his  professorial  career,  during  the  same  period,  we 
find  a  series  of  troubles  and  conflicts,  terminating  in  the 
severance  of  his  connection  with  the  University  of  Jena. 
Minor  annoyances  were  not  wanting  to  him,  even  on  his 
entrance  upon  his  public  duties  as  professor.  With  his 
colleague,  C.  C.  K  Schmid,  an  excellent  empirical  psy- 
chologist but  a  poor  philosopher,  his  relations  had  been 
hostile  even  before  the  call  to  Jena,  and  though  friend- 
ship appeared  to  be  established  between  them,  the  truce 
was  not  of  long  duration.  In  the  third  volume  of  the 
'  Philosophisches  Journal,'  Schmid  gave  utterance  to  a 


The  Jena  Professorship.  63 

critical  judgment  respecting  all  philosophy  which  pre- 
sumed to  go  beyond  the  facts  of  experience,  and  in  such 
fashion  as  to  indicate  that  he  had  in  view  the  '  Wissen- 
schaftslehre.'  In  the  last  number  of  the  same  volume 
Fichte  compared  Herr  Schmid's  system  with  his  own ; 
distinguished  with  the  utmost  clearness  the  problem  of 
psychology  from  that  of  transcendental  logic ;  showed 
that  of  the  nature  of  this  second  problem  Schmid  had 
no  conception  whatsoever ;  and  ended  with  the  declara- 
tion that  henceforth  not  only  everything  uttered  by 
Herr  Schmid  against  the  '  Wissenschaftslehre  '  should  be 
held  by  him  as  non-existent,  but  also  that  Herr  Schmid 
himself,  in  his  capacity  of  philosopher,  should  be  viewed 
as  a  nonentity.  This  satisfactory  result  certainly  could 
not  contribute  to  render  Fichte's  position  easier ;  it  is, 
indeed,  only  one  specimen  of  the  unyielding  temper 
which  he  throughout  displayed  in  all  the  actions  of  his 
Hfe,  and  which  created  enemies  for  him  in  all  quarters. 

Even  in  his  first  semester,  Fichte  found  that  his  evil 
political  reputation  was  productive  of  discomfort.  Some 
doubts  appear  to  have  been  raised  regarding  the  public 
lectures  already  alluded  to,  and  in  self-defence  he  pub- 
lished a  selection  from  them.^  Of  the  nature  of  these 
complaints  we  have  no  accurate  information,  but  the 
course  of  public  lectures  presently  led  to  a  more  serious 
trouble.  In  the  winter  semester,  1794-95,  Fichte  found 
that  no  hour  during  the  ordinary  week-days  could  be 
selected  for  lectures  open  to  all  the  students  of  the  uni- 


1  These  appear  in  the  sixth  volume  of  the  '  Werke,'  under  the  title 
' Einige  Vorlesungen  uher  die  Bestimmung  des  Gelehrten '  ('Some 
Lectures  on  the  Vocation  of  the  Scholar ').  They  are  more  formal 
than  the  lectures  under  a  similar  title  delivered  at  Erlangen  in  1805. 


54  Fichte. 

versity,  without  interfering  with  the  class  arrangements 
of  his  colleagues.  After  consultation  with  Schiitz,  he 
announced  the  lectures  for  Sunday  mornings,  between 
10  and  11  A,M.,  thereby  avoiding  collision  either  with 
the  special  service  held  for  university  students  or  witn 
the  general  public  church  service.  Hardly  had  this  been 
done  when  the  Consistory  of  Jena  raised  an  outcry 
against  him  for  endeavouring  to  suppress  the  public  ser- 
vice of  God ;  the  Over-Consistory,  of  which  Herder  was 
a  member,  repeated  the  cry,  and  appealed  to  the  Govern- 
ment at  Weimar;  while  a  malicious  journal,  'Euda- 
monia,'  which  scattered  its  mud  with  rare  impartiaHty, 
called  attention  to  the  connection  between  atheism  and 
revolutionary  politics,  and  boldly  asserted  that  the  demo- 
crats, under  the  leadership  of  Professor  Fichte,  were 
making  a  deliberate  attempt  to  institute  the  worship  of 
reason.  The  lectures  were  temporarily  suspended,  and 
the  senate  of  the  miiversity,  after  a  bitter  discussion,  in 
which  strong  opposition  was  raised  to  Fichte  on  grounds 
manifestly  personal,  forwarded  to  the  Government  a 
statement  of  their  reasons  for  holding  that  the  Sunday  lec- 
tures in  no  way  infringed  customary  rules,  recommending 
at  the  same  time  that  the  hour  selected  should  be  in 
the  afternoon.  The  Weimar  councU  gave  its  decision 
in  favour  of  Fichte,  absolved  him  from  all  blame  in  the 
matter,  but  significantly  cautioned  him  to  be  more  pru- 
dent in  the  future.  The  lectures  were  continued  from 
February  onwards  at  three  in  the  afternoon. 

This  first  trouble  was  scarcely  at  an  end  when  a  new 
storm  broke  out.  Fichte's  constant  aim  as  a  public 
teacher  was  the  moral  elevation  of  the  character  of  the 
students.     The  life  of  a  scholar  appeared  to  him  a  life 


The  Jena  Professorship.  65 

with  a  noble  end,  and  weighted  \\dth  responsibilities. 
But  to  all  his  efforts  towards  elevating  and  purifying  the 
tone  of  academic  life,  a  blank  wall  of  resistance  was 
presented  by  the  existence  of  the  so-called  Orders  or 
Societies  among  the  students.  Tliese  orders  had  their 
own  code  of  morals,  and  their  own  regulations  for  public 
and  private  action.  One  can  well  understand  how  en- 
tirely all  individuality  of  life  and  action  was  destroyed 
for  the  student  who  had  enrolled  himself  in  one  of  these 
societies.  He  could  not  escape  the  force  of  the  general 
judgment,  and  Avas  driven,  by  virtue  of  his  relations  to 
the  other  members,  to  assent  to  much  that  would  have 
been  abhorrent  to  him  in  his  private  capacity.  Fichte 
felt  very  keenly  the  evil  consequences  of  the  secret 
unions,  and,  both  by  his  public  lectures  and  by  private 
communications,  strove  to  effect  their  abolition.  It 
was  a  wonderful  evidence  of  his  personal  influence 
that  in  the  winter  of  1794-95,  the  three  orders  of 
the  Jena  students  made  overtures  to  him  regarding  the 
suppression  of  their  societies,  and  by  their  deputies 
requested  him  to  give  and  receive  their  oaths  of  dissolu- 
tion. Fichto  did  not  feel  that  he  was  entitled  to  con- 
clude the  matter  on  his  own  responsibility,  referred 
them  to  the  pro-rector,  and,  unfortunately,  undertook  the 
task  of  mediating  between  the  students  and  the  uni- 
versity authorities,  a  task  for  which  he  was  eminently 
unfitted.  Partly  from  Fichte's  unpractical  and  over- 
pedantic  fashion  of  carrying  on  the  affair,  partly  from 
the  natural  dilatoriness  of  a  government,  especially  of  a 
university  government,  the  happy  moment  Avas  allowed 
to  pass.  One  of  the  orders  withdrew  its  offer ;  the 
others,  who  had  placed  their  books  of  regulations  and 


56  Fichte. 

names  in  Fichte's  hands,  were  alarmed  at  the  idea  of  a 
Government  inquisition  into  their  doings,  and  began  to 
think  that  Fichte  was  playing  them  false.  An  inde- 
scribable tumult  was  occasioned  in  the  university.  The 
students  attacked  Fichte's  house  on  the  Ifew  Year's 
night  of  1795,  broke  his  windows,  and  insulted  him 
with  cries  and  hootings.  His  public  lectures  were  inter- 
rupted, his  wife  was  saluted  with  insults  in  the  streets ; 
and  so  serious  did  the  danger  appear,  that  in  the  spring 
of  1795  he  had  to  demand  protection  from  the  Govern- 
ment, and  finally,  permission  to  reside  out  of  Jena  for 
the  summer  of  that  year.  The  great  Ego,  as  Goethe 
and  Schiller  caU  him  in  their  letters,  took  up  his  resi- 
dence at  Ossmanstadt,  a  pleasant  little  town  a  few  miles 
from  Jena,  and  there  remained  until  the  storm  had 
blown  over. 

Two  waves  of  trouble  had  thus  disturbed  Fichte's 
pubHc  career  at  Jena ;  the  third  and  greatest  finally  dis- 
solved his  connection  with  that  university.  In  1798, 
Forberg,  then  rector  at  Saalfeld,  and  already  noted  as 
one  of  the  earliest  adherents  of  the  '  Wissenschaftslehre,' 
sent  in  to  the  editors  of  the  '  Philosophisches  Journal ' 
a  paper  entitled  "  Development  of  the  ISTotion  of  Eeli- 
gion."  With  the  argument,  and  in  particular  with  the 
tone  of  this  essay,  Fichte  was  but  little  satisfied,  al- 
though it  was  impossible  for  him  to  avoid  agreeing  with 
some  ideas  in  it.  He  was  extremely  unwilling  to  exer- 
cise the  editorial  right  of  suppressing  the  paper,  but 
desired  to  attach  to  it  certain  footnotes,  correcting  or 
amending  it  in  accordance  with  what  he  thought  the 
trutL  Of  this,  however,  Forberg  would  not  hear,  and 
Fichte  printed  the  essay  as  it  had  been  sent,  prefixing 


The  Jena  Professorship.  57 

to  it  a  short  exposition  of  his  own  views  on  the  same 
subject,  under  the  title,  "  On  the  Ground  for  our  Belief 
in  a  Divine  Government  of  the  Universe."  The  two 
papers  appeared  together  in  the  first  part  of  the  eighth 
volume  of  the  'Journal.'  It  was  certainly  a  misfortune 
for  Fichte  that  the  published  exposition  of  his  views  on 
so  fundamental  a  question  should  have  been  limited  to 
the  points  discussed  in  Forberg's  essay,  for,  to  one  who 
now  studies  these  documents,  that  essay  has  every  ap- 
pearance of  insincerity  or  irony.  Accepting  without 
reservation  the  Kantian  criticism  of  the  theoretical 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God,  Forberg  likewise  accepts 
the  doctrine  that  the  belief  in  a  divine  order  is  prac- 
tical, but  he  reduces  this  practical  belief  to  mere  strength 
of  moral  feeling,  identifies  it  with  virtue,  and  therefore 
draws  the  conclusion  that  it  is  perfectly  compatible  with 
speculative  atheism.  In  short,  the  essay  is  an  exagger- 
ation of  the  dismal  rationalism  into  which  the  weaker 
Kantians  drifted,  and  by  which  they  cast  such  discredit 
on  philosophy.  It  is  almost  a  parody  of  the  moderatism 
which  had  begun  to  appear  as  the  result  of  the  Kantian 
system  in  works  such  as  those  of  Tieftrunk  and  Hey- 
denreich.  The  element  of  speculative  interest  in  the 
critical  philosophy,  however,  which  was  entirely  over- 
looked or  reduced  to  a  nullity  by  Forberg,  was  precisely 
that  upon  which  Fichte  laid  stress.  His  essay,  there- 
fore, exaggerated  the  agreement  between  his  views 
and  those  of  Forberg,  and  gave  too  succinctly  the 
characteristic  difi'erence. 

Attention  was  drawn  to  the  papers  by  an  anonymous 
pamphlet,  circulated  gratuitously  throughout  Saxony 
towards  the  close  of  the  year  1798,  and  purporting  to  be 


68  Fichte. 

a  '  Letter  on  the  Atheism  of  Fichte  and  Forberg,  from  a 
Father  to  his  Son,  a  Student'  IS'either  name  of  pub- 
lisher nor  place  of  publication  was  given,  and  it  was 
more  than  hinted  to  those  who  accepted  the  tract,  that 
it  was  the  work  of  Gabler,  a  theologian  of  some  repute 
in  Altdorf.  Gabler,  however,  was  not  the  author,  and 
protested  publicly  against  the  insult  done  him  by  such  a 
statement.  The  real  author  has  never  been  known,  and 
the  tract  itself  was  a  malicious  and  unfair  selection  of 
certain  sentences  from  the  essays  of  the  accused  writers, 
without  reference  to  the  context,  and  with  such  com- 
ments as  unenlightened  pietism  has  always  indulged  in. 
Moved  by  this  pamphlet,  the  Over-Consistory  of  Dres- 
den brought  the  subject  before  the  Saxon  Government, 
who,  on  the  19th  !N"ovember  1798  published  a  Rescript 
directed  to  the  Universities  of  Leipzig  and  "Wittenberg, 
confiscating  the  '  Philosophisches  Journal '  on  the  ground 
of  the  atheistic  utterances  contained  in  it.  The  Rescript 
was  followed  by  a  circular  note,  addressed  to  the  neigh- 
bouring German  Governments,  praying  them  to  take 
similar  steps,  and,  in  the  case  of  the  Saxe-Weimar 
Dukes,  threatening  to  prohibit  Saxon  students  from  at- 
tendance at  the  Jena  University  if  investigation  were 
not  instantly  made  into  the  conduct  of  the  accused  pro- 
fessors, and  condign  punishment  inflicted  were  they  found 
guilty  of  the  charge  laid  against  them.  Fichte  had  thus 
a  twofold  charge  to  deal  with, — the  public  accusation  of 
atheism,  and  the  private  appeal  to  the  supreme  authori- 
ties of  the  university.  To  the  first  he  replied  in  his 
*  Appeal  to  the  Public  against  the  Accusation  of  Athe- 
ism,' a  copy  of  which  was  forwarded  in  January  1799  to 
the    Grand   Duke  of  Weimar;  to  the  second,   in   the 


The  Jena  Professorship.  59 

'Formal  Def&nce  of  the  Editor  of  the  Philosophical 
Journal  against  the  Accusation  of  Atheism,'-^  directed  to 
the  Pro-rector  of  the  University,  and  forwarded  to  the 
Grand  Duke  in  March  1799.  In  the  'Appeal,'  a  more 
detailed  exposition  was  given  of  the  views  contained  in 
the  accused  essay,  and  a  powerful  contrast  was  drawn  be- 
tween philosophical  religion  and  the  ordinary  theology ; 
in  the  'Defence,'  a  skilful  analysis  of  the  full  bearing 
of  his  theological  doctrines  precedes  a  bold  statement 
of  the  real  motives  which  had  led  to  the  accusation,  and 
a  demand  that  in  the  interests  of  university  freedom, 
decision  should  be  given  based  solely  on  the  merits  of 
the  question.  In  the  most  unqualified  fashion  Fichte 
declares  that  the  true  secret  of  the  enmity  against  him 
was  the  dread  of  his  political  opinions,  and  insists  that 
the  decision  of  the  matter  was  of  the  last  importance, 
not  only  for  his  own  activity  as  a  professor,  but  for 
the  academic  life  of  the  university. 

In  order  to  understand  the  course  of  events,  it  is 
needful  to  review  carefully  the  position  of  the  two 
parties, — Fichte  on  the  one  hand,  the  Saxe-Weimar  Gov- 
ernment on  the  other.  Fichte's  motives  are  clear  and 
unambiguous.  He  claimed  the  full  right  of  expound- 
ing his  philosophic  opinions,  a  right  essential  to  the 
very  existence  of  a  university  teacher.  He  felt,  as  every 
teacher  of  philosophy  must  feel,  that  the  results  of 
speculative  analysis  wUl  at  times  appear  to  conflict 
with  popular  ideas,  founded  for  the  most  part  on  unre- 

^  The  title  of  this  pamphlet,  '  Gerichtliche  Verantwortungs- 
schrift,'  would  be  more  exactly  translated  as  'Judicial  Defence  '  or 
'  Plea  in  Justification.'  "  Gerichtlich  "  implies  that  the  defence  was 
explicitly  directed  to  a  court,  by  whom  decision  on  the  merits  of  the 
case  should  be  given. 


60  Fichu. 

fleeting  eustom  or  on  radical  error,  and  tliat  if  popular 
opinion  is  to  be  the  criterion  of  judgment,  the  function 
of  an  investigator  is  destroyed.  Accordingly  he  de- 
manded, "with  all  the  earnestness  that  the  importance  of 
the  matter  required,  and  with  all  the  vehemence  that 
his  impatient  disposition  rendered  natural,  that  there 
should  be  no  compromise;  that  the  matter  should  not  be 
hushed  up,  or  conducted  to  its  conclusion  by  private 
negotiations  within  the  university  circle ;  and  that  as  the 
accusation  had  been  public,  the  decision  should  be  public 
also.  On  the  other  hand,  what  the  university  authorities 
above  all  things  desired  was  a  mode  of  settlement  where- 
by peace  might  be  secured  without  the  necessity  of  any 
public  declaration.  They  in  no  way  desired  to  limit 
the  freedom  of  teaching  in  the  university ;  and  as  the 
necessity  for  taking  cognisance  of  the  matter  at  all  had 
been  forced  upon  them  from  without,  they  wished  to 
deal  with  it  in  such  a  way  as  neither  to  offend  external 
powers  nor  endanger  their  own  position.  It  will  be 
readily  understood,  therefore,  that  Fichte's  movements 
caused  them  the  greatest  trouble  and  annoyance.  In  a 
letter  of  Schiller  to  Fichte,  written  after  the  Grand- 
Duke  had  received  the  'Appeal  to  the  Public,'  the  feel- 
ings of  the  court-party  are  expressed  without  reserve. 
That  their  intentions  were  friendly  is  stated  without  qua- 
lification. "  I  have  had  an  opportunity,"  says  Schiller, 
"  of  conversing  recently  with  those  who  have  a  voice  in 
the  affair,  and  on  various  occasions  with  the  Grand-Duke 
himself.  He  openly  declared  that  nothing  would  or 
could  be  done  to  limit  your  freedom  of  writing,  though 
doubtless  there  were  some  things  that  one  would  rather 
not  have  stated  from  the  professorial  chair.     Even  as 


The  Jena  Professorship.  61 

regards  the  latter  point,  however,  this  is  but  his  private 
opinion ;  his  public  judgment  would  impose  no  limita- 
tions even  in  respect  of  it."  But  as  Schiller  goes  on  to 
say,  the  Weimar  authorities  regretted  that  he  had  en- 
gaged in  discussion  of  the  matter  on  his  own  account, 
and  had  appealed  to  the  public,  when  his  business  lay 
solely  with  them.  Evidently  in  such  a  state  of  opinion  the 
•Formal  Defence'  was  a  most  embari'assing  document,  and 
from  the  expressions  of  aU  Fichte's  friends  regarding  it, 
we  can  see  that  they  unanimously  thought  him  grossly 
imprudent.  Eumours  of  all  kinds  were  prevalent,  and 
gradually  took  form  in  the  report  that  the  Weimar 
Government  intended  to  impose  a  censure  upon  Fichte, 
which,  as  coming  through  the  academic  senate,  must 
needs  be  of  a  public  character. 

It  was  apparently  mider  the  influence  of  this  rumour 
that  Fichte  was  induced  to  take  a  step  which  he  after- 
wards consistently  defended,  but  which  must  be  pro- 
nounced nothing  less  than  unfortunate.  On  the  22d 
March  1799  he  wrote  an  important  letter  to  the  Privy 
Councillor  Voigt,  explicitly  leaving  to  the  discretion  of 
his  correspondent  either  to  employ  it  further,  or  to  accept 
it  as  an  aid  in  forming  his  own  opinions.  In  this  letter  he 
declared  unreservedly  that  he  neither  would  nor  could 
submit  to  censure  given  through  the  senate.  Were 
such  to  be  imposed,  no  course  would  be  left  to  him  but 
to  reply  by  sending  in  his  resignation  and  publishing  the 
present  letter  in  explanation  of  his  motives.  The  letter 
concluded  with  the  statement,  that  many  important  mem- 
bers of  the  university  agreed  in  the  view  that  censure 
on  the  writer  woidd  be  infringement  of  their  academic 
rights  ;  that  the  same  members  had  engaged,  were  he  to 


62  Fkhte. 

resign,  to  resign  with  him,  and  had  permitted  him  to 
notify  their  intention.  With  him,  Fichte  added,  they 
looked  forward  to  find  in  a  new  university,  of  which 
there  was  rumour,  a  free  and  honourable  sphere  of  action, 
such  as  they  had  hitherto  enjoyed  in  Jena. 

The  new  university  referred  to  was  doubtless  that 
projected  at  Mainz,  regarding  which  Jung,  the  chief  of  the 
council  of  Mainz,  had  been  in  communication  with  Fichte 
during  the  preceding  year,  and  rumours  of  which  had 
been  alluded  to  by  Forberg.  The  plan  was  never  real- 
ised, and  the  colleagues  who  had  given  their  promise 
to  Fichte  did  not  redeem  it.  Paulus,  indeed,  to  whom 
the  letter  had  been  submitted,  by  whose  mediation  it 
was  forwarded  to  Voigt,  and  who  is  explicitly  included 
by  Fichte  among  the  said  colleagues,  afterwards  declared 
that  the  engagement  existed  only  in  Fichte's  imagina- 
tion ;  but  on  a  point  like  this  the  statements  of  Paulus 
are  worthless. 

It  was  this  letter  that  finally  decided  the  "Weimar 
Government,  and  the  member  of  the  council  whose 
warmth  overcame  all  hesitation  regarding  the  action  to 
be  taken  was  Goethe.  His  conservative  feelings  were 
roused  by  the  apparent  endeavour  to  threaten  the  Gov- 
ernment. "For  my  own  part,"  he  wrote  to  Schlosser 
some  months  later,  "  I  declare  that  I  would  have  voted 
against  my  own  son,  if  he  had  permitted  himself  such 
language  against  a  Government."  The  Rescript  of  the 
Weimar  authorities,  dated  29th  March  1799,  desired 
the  senate  to  censure  Professors  Fichte  and  Methammer 
for  their  indiscretion,  and  to  recommend  to  them  greater 
caution  in  bringing  essays  before  the  public.  But  to 
this  gentle  censure  there  was  appended  a  post-scriptum 


The  Jena  PrqfessorsM'p.  63 

referring  to  the  letter  to  Voigt,  accepting  Fichte's  dec- 
laration that  he  Avould  resign,  and  thereby  dismissing 
hina  from  his  office. 

Again  the  unfortunate  advice  of  Paulus  prevailed  on 
Fichte,  and  induced  him  to  make  a  false  step.  Fichte 
himself  was  of  opinion  that  the  letter  to  Voigt  should 
not  have  been  regarded  as  an  official  document ;  that, 
even  had  it  this  official  character,  it  should  have  been 
left  to  him  to  take  the  final  step  of  resignation ;  and, 
more  particularly,  that  it  ought  to  have  been  considered 
whether  the  condition  under  which  he  had  declared 
resignation  inevitable  was  fulfilled  by  the  Rescript  of 
the  Government.  Under  these  circumstances,  when, 
through  the  intercession  of  his  friends,  it  had  been 
arranged  that  the  publication  of  the  Rescrijjt  should  be 
delayed  for  a  few  days,  he  was  persuaded  to  forward 
through  Paulus  a  second  letter  to  Voigt,  in  which  he 
pointed  out  that  as  the  censure  imposed  in  no  way  limited 
his  freedom  of  teaching,  it  did  not  render  the  resignation 
of  his  office  imperative,  and  that  he  would  not  allow  the 
pubKc  to  think  that  he  had  voluntarily  laid  down  his 
office  on  account  of  this  censure.  The  letter  was  com- 
municated by  Voigt  to  the  Grand-Duke,  who  found 
"nothing  in  it  to  cause  him  to  alter  his  expressed 
opinion."  Nor  did  two  numerously  signed  petitions 
from  the  students,  first  to  prevent  the  dismissal  and 
then  to  obtain  the  recall  of  their  honoured  teacher,  alter 
the  position  of  affairs. 

Thus  Fichte's  connection  with  Jena  came  to  a  violent 
termination.  As  regards  the  rights  of  so  complicated  a 
matter,  there  is  little  ground  for  difference  of  opinion. 
Had  not  Fichte's  impatient  temper  betrayed  him  into 


64  Fichte. 

the  strong  expressions  contained  in  the  first  letter  to 
Voigt,  all  might  have  been  well,  for  the  Weimar  Gov- 
ernment, despite  their  indignation  at  his  impetuous  mode 
of  dealing  with  the  matter,  evidently  desired  to  retain 
him  in  the  university.  But  they  erred  in  making  such 
use  as  they  did  of  the  letter,  and  they  erred  doubly  in 
the  infliction  of  so  serious  a  wound  on  the  academic 
life  of  Jena.  For  many  years  the  efi'ect  was  felt ;  and  as 
Goethe  himself  notes,  within  a  comparatively  short  in- 
terval all  the  most  eminent  teachers  had,  for  one  cause 
or  another,  migrated  to  other  universities  :  Paulus,  Loder, 
both  the  Hufelands,  Ilgen,  Schelling,  and  Niethammer 
vanished  from  Jena.  'Eo  injury  is  so  great  to  a  univer- 
sity as  a  limitation  in  the  freedom  of  academic  teaching. 
No  mistake  is  so  serious  as  to  deal  in  diplomatic  and 
politic  fashion  with  matters  of  thought  and  reasoning. 


65 


CHAPTER    IV. 

BERLIN   AND   THE   WAR   OP    LIBERATION. 

The  expulsion  from  Jena,  and  the  sudden  termination  of 
his  public  career  as  an  academic  teacher,  exercised  a 
powerful  influence  not  only  upon  Fichte's  external  for- 
tunes, but  upon  the  development  of  his  philosophic 
system.  The  difficulties  which  had  been  raised  regard- 
ing his  utterances  on  the  supreme  philosophic  doctrine, 
the  being  of  God  and  the  nature  of  His  relation  to  the 
individual  thinking  subject,  compelled  his  attention  to 
that  aspect  of  his  system  in  which  it  was  as  yet  imper- 
fect or  incomplete.  From  this  time  onwards  the  '  Wis- 
senschaftslehre,'  as  it  had  been  expounded  in  the  works 
already  before  the  world,  began  to  be  incorporated  in  a 
wider  view  of  character  prevailingly  theological  or  even 
theosophicaL  The  whole  tone  or  manner  of  treatment 
was  at  the  same  time  altered ;  and  Fichte,  who  seemed 
ever  to  feel  that  it  was  next  to  impossible  to  present  his 
system  in  such  a  form  as  to  be  free  from  all  ambiguity 
or  danger  of  misconception,  entered  upon  a  series  of 
popular  expositions  of  his  philosophy,  which  later 
writers  have  had  some  difficulty  in  reconciling  with  the 
results  of  his  earlier  method.  A  more  precise  account 
p. — IV.  B 


66  FicUe. 

of  the  relations  between  the  earlier  and  later  forms  of 
his  philosophic  doctrines  will  be  given  when  the  Avhole 
system  is  reviewed ;  but  it  is  important  to  note  here,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  '  Critique  of  Eevelation,'  a  turning- 
point  in  Fichte's  career. 

At  Jena  Fichte  found  it  impossible  even  to  continue 
in  residence  :  all  prospect  of  literary  activity  there  was 
excluded  by  the  Rescrijjt  of  the  Saxon  Electorate.  iNor 
was  it  easy  for  him  to  find  any  refuge.  The  majority  of 
the  smaller  states  in  the  surrounding  district  had  pass- 
ively acquiesced  in  the  Saxon  mandate  :  even  from  the 
little  princedom  of  Rudolstadt,  where  he  had  hoped  to 
secure  a  quiet  retreat,  he  was  excluded  by  the  jealous 
surveillance  of  his  antagonists.  The  intense  excitement 
which  had  been  roused  by  the  discussions  preceding  his 
dismissal  from  Jena  had  spread  far  and  wide,  and  if  we 
may  judge  from  his  own  expressions,  his  personal  safety, 
in  many  quarters,  was  more  than  problematical  In  this 
uncertainty  a  slight  accident  determined  his  conduct. 
The  Prussian  minister  Dohm,  passing  through  Weimar, 
spent  a  few  days  at  Jena,  and,  as  was  natural,  conversed 
with  friends  regarding  Fichte's  case.  The  indignation 
he  expressed  at  the  treatment  to  which  Fichte  had  been 
subjected  was  coupled  with  the  significant  remark  that 
in  Prussia  no  such  calamities  were  to  be  dreaded  by 
thinkers  who  could  prove  themselves  good  and  worthy 
citizens.  Pichte,  acting  upon  the  hint  communicated 
to  him,  wrote  to  his  friend,  Friedrich  Schlegel,  then 
residing  in  Berlin,  and  was  by  him  assured  that  if  he 
could  make  his  way  to  that  city  in  such  a  fashion  as  not 
to  attract  undue  attention,  and  could  time  his  arrival  so 
as  to  have  his  case  brought  speedily  before  the  King  of 


Friends  at  Berlin,  67 

Prussia,  no  hindrance  need  be  feared.  Following  this 
advice,  Fichte,  in  the  early  days  of  July  1799,  suddenly 
left  Jena,  under  pretext  of  taking  a  journey  for  recovery 
of  his  health,  and  travelled  to  Berlin.  A  few  police 
inquiries  were  easily  satisfied,  and  when  the  matter  was 
brought  under  the  royal  notice,  it  was  disposed  of  in  the 
briefest  fashion.  "  If,"  said  the  easy-tempered  monarch, 
"Fichte  is  so  peaceful  a  citizen,  and  so  free  from  all 
dangerous  associations  as  he  is  said  to  be,  I  wiHingly 
accord  him  a  residence  in  my  dominions."  As  for  his 
religious  views,  these  were  dismissed  in  a  somewhat 
clumsy  paraphrase  of  Tiberius's  pithy  saying,  "  Deorum 
offensa  diis  curce." 

1.— FRIENDS  AND  LITERARY  ACTIVITY  AT  BERLIN 

(1799-1806) 

"Warmly  received  by  Schlegel,  and  introduced  by  him 
to  the  circle  of  friends  centring  mainly  round  Schleier- 
macher,  Fichte,  with  his  accustomed  impetuosity,  at 
once  began  to  form  new  and  extensive  plans  for  literary 
work.  It  appeared  to  him  that  his  narrow  means  would 
prove  more  than  sufficient  if  he  and  his  family  could 
unite  with  the  Schlegels  and  with  Schelling  in  forming 
a  common  domicile.  Against  the  feasibility  of  this 
scheme  there  was  doubtless  to  be  placed  the  unpleasing 
relations  of  Friedrich  Schlegel  with  Dorothea  Yeit,  who 
had  by  this  time  separated  from  her  husband  and  thrown 
in  her  lot  ^vith  Schlegel,  and  it  is  evident  from  Fichte's 
letters  to  his  wife  that  he  had  much  to  do  to  reconcile 
her  to  the  proposal.  At  the  same  time  he  contemplated 
the  foundation,  also  in  concert  with  the  above-named 
friends,  of  a  comprehensive  literary  journal,  which  should 


68  Fichte. 

apply  freely  and  boldly  the  principles  of  the  new  philo- 
sophy. There  seemed  to  be  need  of  some  such  organ, 
for  the  Jena  'AUgemeine  Literaturzeitung,'  fomierly 
devoted  to  the  Fichtean  ideas,  was  beginning  to  waver 
in  its  allegiance,  and  Nicolai,  in  the  '  I^eue  AUgemeine 
Bibliothek,'  and  in  many  a  dreary  satire,  was  prose- 
cuting, after  his  antiquated  fashion,  his  favourite  war- 
fare against  every  novelty  in  literature  or  philosophy. 
Fichte,  however,  had  deceived  himself  regarding  his 
relations  to  his  new  friends.  There  were  elements  pre- 
sent which  rapidly  led  to  discord  and  even  to  the  bit- 
terest animosity.  The  years  from  1799  to  1806  are 
characterised  by  the  gradual  overshadowing  of  the 
Fichtean  philosophy,  and  by  the  development  of  hitherto 
unsuspected  differences  of  view  in  the  circle  over  which 
that  philosophy  had  been  supreme.  To  understand  fully 
the  movements  of  this  period — a  period  of  painful  interest 
to  the  historian  of  literature — it  is  necessary  to  note  with 
some  care  what  were  the  main  currents  of  thought  and 
the  general  conditions  of  life  at  Berlin.  AYe  shall  find 
in  their  nature  the  key  to  much  of  Fichte's  later  work. 

Under  Frederick  the  Great,  Berlin  had  risen  rapidly 
from  a  position  of  provincial  obscurity  to  the  rank  of 
capital  city  in  an  important  kingdom,  and  had  gradually 
become  the  centre  of  the  comparatively  small  intellectual 
life  of  Prussia.  But  the  same  events  which  had  given 
it  importance  had  contributed  to  its  corruption.  The 
manners  of  the  Court  in  the  time  of  Frederick,  the  open 
devotion  of  that  monarch  to  the  French  "  Illumination," 
the  severance  which  his  strong  government  caused  be- 
tween the  interests  of  the  individual  subject  and  the 
wider  aims  of  political  and  civic  life,  had  combined  to 


Berlin  Society,  69 

give  a  quite  peculiar  character  to  the  society  of  Berlin. 
It  is  scarcely  possible  to  imagine  a  state  of  greater  or 
more  deeply  seated  social  corruption  than  that  presented 
by  Berlin  in  the  last  two  decades  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  strong  national  feeling  which  had  at 
least  been  fostered  by  the  power  of  Frederick  seemed  to 
die  out  under  the  feeble  and  vacillating  policy  of  his 
successor,  and  showed  no  signs  of  revival  in  any  of  the 
smaller  states,  where  intense  selfishness  prevented  any 
united  action  against  a  common  enemy.  The  corroding 
influence  of  the  narrow  rationalism  which  had  long  been 
preached  by  Nicolai  and  his  coadjutors  Engel  and 
Abbt,  left  nothing  which  could  resist  the  impulse  of 
the  new  romantic  principle  rapidly  acquiring  dominion 
over  the  younger  and  more  impetuous  spirits  in  Ger- 
many. Life,  divested  of  all  permanent  or  general 
interests,  lends  itself  readily  to  the  sway  of  mere  ima- 
ginative passion;  and  in  the  gospel  of  Tieck  and  Fr. 
Schlegel,  only  tliat  seemed  good  which  commended 
itself  to  the  sentimental  longings  of  the  individual, 
while  social  relations  appeared  as  mere  hindrances  to 
the  pure  poetic  development  of  human  fantasy.^  As 
might  be  anticipated  from  the  subjection  of  thought  and 
action  to  mere  sentimental  imaginative  longings,  the 
influence  of  women  began  to  be  the  most  prominent 

^  The  very  essence  of  this  mode  of  thought  is  expressed  in  the 
definition  of  the  Romantic  principle  by  F.  Schlegel,  in  his  '  Ge- 
sprach  iiber  die  Poesie'  (1800) :  "That  is  romantic  which  expresses 
matter  of  sentiment  (feeling)  in  fantastic  form — i.e.,  in  a  form  deter- 
mined throughout  by  imagination  only."  The  most  thorough  treat- 
ments of  the  Romantic  school  acre  those  of  Hettner,  '  Die  Romantische 
Schule'  (1850) ;  Brandes,  '  Hauptstromungen  der  Literatur  des  19ten 
Jahrhunderts, '  Bd.  II.  (1873);  Haym,  'Die  Romantische  Schule' 
(1870). 


TO  Fichte. 

feature  in  society.  In  Eerlin,  as  in  Weimar,  the  leaders 
and  directors  of  the  new  romantic  school  were  in  truth 
the  women  who  stood  in  such  close  and  ambiguous 
relation  to  the  better-known  men  of  letters.  Henrietta 
Herz,  Dorothea  Veit,  and  Karoline  Schelling,  were  the 
most  potent  factors  in  the  disturbed  chaotic  movements 
of  the  literature  of  the  time ;  and  the  dismal  quarreUings 
and  bickerings  of  men  Hke  Schlegel,  Schleiermacher,  and 
Schelling,  can  only  be  understood  when  their  relations 
to  these  leaders  are  taken  into  account. 

Thus,  when  Fichte  entered  Berlin  society,  there  ap- 
peared, as  the  two  most  important  currents  of  thinking, 
the  old  rationalistic  tendency,  with  at  least  a  substratum 
of  solid  political  feeling,  represented  by  Nicolai,  and 
the  new  romantic  literature,  of  which  the  manifesto  had 
just  been  made  in  Schlegel's  'Lucinde.'  At  first,  and 
naturally,  he  was  attracted  towards  the  party  with  whom 
for  some  time  he  had  been  in  sympathy,  and  whose 
principles  had  at  least  a  superficial  resemblance  to  the 
main  ideas  of  his  philosophical  system ;  but  it  was  not 
long*  before  the  radical  difference  in  their  views  made 
itself  apparent.  In  the  first  glow  of  friendship  he 
yielded  ready  assent  to  the  plan  suggested  by  F. 
Schlegel  of  taking  up  residence  with  him,  and  of  calling 
to  their  community  A.  W,  Schlegel  and  Schelling.  But 
it  soon  became  evident  that  such  a  plan  was  impracti- 
cable, partly  because  Fichte's  strong  ethical  personality 
was  in  itself  repulsive  to  the  Schlegels,  partly  because 
of  the  open  antipathy  between  Dorothea  Veit  and  the 
wife  of  A.  W.  Schlegel,  the  celebrated  Karoline,  married, 
after  her  divorce  from  Schlegel,  to  Schelling.  Tlie  pro- 
posed journal  for  literary  criticism  proved  equally  im- 


Berlin  Society.  71 

practicable,  Sclielling  was  now  beginning  to  cast  him- 
self loose  from  the  Fichtean  philosophy,  and  projected 
a  journal  of  his  o\vn.  The  Schlegels,  who  had  quan-elled 
bitterly  with  the  'Allgemeine  Literaturzeitung,'  had 
already  started  the  'Atheniium,'  and  manifestly  found 
themselves  less  and  less  in  harmony  with  Fichte,  whom 
they  pronounced  wanting  in  poetry  and  imagination. 
Schleiermacher,  finally,  who  had  for  Fichte  a  deep  dis- 
like, partly  from  personal,  partly  from  philosophical  dif- 
ference, reviewed  the  '  Bestimmung  des  Menschen,' 
which  appeared  towards  the  close  of  1799,  in  a  bitter 
and  contemptuous  manner.  Gradually  Fichte  withdrew 
from  the  society  into  which  he  had  at  first  been  cast, 
and  associated  himself  more  closely  with  men  like  Bem- 
hardi,  the  philologist;  with  Zeune,  lecturer  at  one  of  the 
gymnasia  in  Berlin,  a  man  excellently  skiEed  in  modem 
languages;  with  Huf eland,  the  Court  physician,  whom  he 
had  known  at  Jena ;  and  with  Fessler,  the  leader  of  the 
Freemason  movement,  which  was  then  attracting  atten- 
tion in  Germany.  I^or  was  he  without  more  powerful 
patrons.  "With  Beyme,  Struensee,  and  Von  Altenstein 
he  was  on  terms  of  friendship,  and  through  the  good 
offices  of  the  first  named  he  obtained  full  permission 
to  exercise  his  activity  as  a  lecturer  in  BerUn. 

The  development  of  his  philosophic  views  during  the 
same  period  made  more  clear  and  definite  the  funda- 
mental difi'erences  which  separated  him  from  the  Eoman- 
tic  school,  and  from  their  speculative  ally  Sclielling. 
For  although  the  stress  laid  in  the  early  expositions  of 
the  '  Wissenschaftslehre '  upon  the  "Ego"  or  self -con- 
sciousness as  the  ultimate  reality  in  cognition  and  in 
action  might  appear  to  indicate  an  agreement  between 


72  Fichte. 

Fichte's  doctrines  and.  those  of  his  qiwndarn  associates, 
yet  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  for  Fichte,  as  for  Kant 
and  for  Hegel,  tlie  unity  of  thought  was  never  the  indi- 
vidual with  his  empirical  personal  aims.  It  is  trite  that 
upon  the  relation  between  self-consciousness,  which  is  the 
essence  of  the  thinking  subject,  and  the  wider  sphere  of 
reality,  little  had  been  said  in  the  '  Wissenschaf tslehre ' 
itself,  but  the  problem  was  touched  implicitly  in  the 
'  Sittenlehre,'  and  came  to  the  foreground  in  the  religious 
controversy  preceding  the  expulsion  from  Jena.  Fichte's 
attention  seems  now  to  have  been  turned  entirely  upon 
those  general  elements  in  human  thought  and  action 
hitherto  allowed  to  remain  in  obscurity  in  his  theory ; 
and  while  in  his  popular  and  published  writings  he  gave 
forth  the  results  of  his  speculation  in  the  form  of  more 
or  less  completed  doctrines  of  morality,  theoretical 
politics,  history,  and  religion,  the  speculative  method  by 
which  these  were  attained,  and  the  connection  of  them 
with  the  earlier  treatment  of  the  'Wissenschaf tslehre,' 
were  expounded  in  repeated  courses  of  lectures.  The 
notes  of  many  of  these  lectures  have  been  published  by 
his  son,^  and  at  least  one  completed  exposition  of  the 
new  mode  of  contemplating  the  problems  of  philosophy, 
never  published,  but  dating  from  the  period  immediately 
after  the  flight  to  Berlin,  has  been  included  in  the  com- 
pleted edition  of  his  works.  ^  The  inner  connection  of 
these  writings  with  the  prior  stage  of  Fichte's  public 
philosophical  activity  will  be  discussed  at  a  later  point ; 
meantime  the  external  history  of  his  labours  must  be 
noted. 

^  In  the  '  Nachgelassene  Werke,'  3  vols.,  1834. 

-  'DarstellungderWissenschaftslehre'C  Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  1-163). 


Tlie  '  Vocation  of  Man!  73 

The  'Bestimmung  des  Menschen '  ('Vocation  of  Man'), 
published  in  the  early  part  of  1800,  gave  great  offence 
to  the  Schlegels  and  to  Schelling  by  the  deeply  relig- 
ious tone  which  prevailed  throughout  the  closing  and 
crowning  portion  of  it.  Schleiermacher,  as  has  just  been 
said,  wrote  a  bitterly  sarcastic  review,  and  could  hardly 
find  words  strong  enough  to  express  his  detestation  of 
it.  The  truth  is  that  Schleiermacher  never  advanced, 
philosophically,  beyond  Spinozisni,  the  principles  of 
which  are  only  disguised  under  the  mystically  pious 
tone  of  feeling  on  which  all  his  speculation  rested. 
Now  the  very  aim  of  the  '  Bestimmung  des  Menschen ' 
is  to  show  that  Spinoza's  position,  that  of  pure  natural- 
ism, is  transcended  in  ethical  idealism ;  and  that  between 
the  views  of  man  as  the  mere  product  and  flower  of 
nature,  and  of  nature  as  but  a  form  in  Avhich  infinite 
intelligence  makes  itself  manifest  in  finite  consciousness, 
the  opposition  is  radical  The  same  opposition,  it  is 
plain,  must  exist  between  idealism  as  conceived  by 
Fichte  and  the  Natur-^yhilosophie  to  which  Schelling 
Avas  now  advancing.  For  in  the  latter,  while  in  words 
Reason  is  made  the  supreme  unity  out  of  which  all 
flows,  in  reality  ^Nature  is  regarded  as  an  independent 
fact,  endowed  with  formative  powers,  and  giving  rise  to 
human  consciousness  as  we  know  it.  The  ultimate 
Ileason,  as  mere  Neutiitm  or  identity  of  Real  and  Ideal, 
can  have  specific  character  only  when  viewed  in  relation 
to  the  two  elements  which  dissolve  themselves  into  it 
If,  of  these  two  elements,  nature  be  conceived  as  the 
jwius,  and  thought  as  but  a  higher  form  of  natural  forces, 
then,  as  Fichte  would  have  said,  the  ultimate  Being  is 
not  living  thought,  but  dead  nature.     A  further  opposi- 


74  Fichte. 

tion  between  the  two  thinkers  arose  from  the  difference 
of  their  views  regarding  the  mode  of  treating  natural  or 
empirical  knowledge.  From  Kant,  Fichte  had  learned 
the  lesson  which  he  never  forgot,  that  a  priori  construc- 
tions of  nature  are  philosophically  worthless.  To  him, 
therefore,  the  exercises  of  Schelling's  "genial  imagin- 
ation," by  means  of  which  nature  was  interpreted  with- 
out experiment  or  observation,  appeared  to  be  absolute 
Mysticism,  mere  conceits  of  chance.^ 

With  these  elements  of  speculative  difference,  person- 
al harmony  was  not  likely  to  continue.  The  correspon- 
dence between  the  two  thinkers  during  the  years  1800 
to  1802 — accompanied  as  it  was  by  the  publication  of 
various  writings,  in  which  Schelling  not  only  brought 
forward  his  new  views,  but  called  attention  to  their 
advance  upon  the  Fichtean  position — exhibits  a  gradual 
cooling  of  friendship,  culminating  in  the  sharpest  accusa- 
tions of  mutual  misunderstanding.  Kor  did  the  con- 
troversy end  with  the  close  of  their  correspondence. 
In  the  lectures  of  1804,  '  On  the  Characteristics  of  the 
Present  Age,'  Fichte,  without  naming  Schelling,  deduces 
or  interprets  philosophically  Scliwdrmerei  and  Natur- 
pMlosophie  as  necessary  phenomena  of  a  corrupt  and 
unthinking  age ;  while  Schelling  not  only  criticised 
in  an  aggressively  personal  tone  the  Erlangen  lectures, 
to  be  mentioned  presently,  *  On  the  Vocation  of  the 
Scholar,'  but  in  1806  summed  up  all  his  enmity  against 
his  former  friend  in  the  biting  '  Exposition  of  the  True 
Relation  betAveen  Natur-iiliilosopliie  and  the  Amended 

1  See  generally  for  Fichte's  view  regarding  the  Natur-phUosophie 
of  Schelling,  the  8th  lecture  of  the  '  Characteristics  of  the  Present 
Age  '  (' Werke/  vol.  vii.  pp.  111-127). 


LUerary  Activity.  76 

Fichtean  Theory.'  Fichte's  final  Avord  remained  unpub- 
lished during  his  life,  but  it  now  appears  in  his  Col- 
lected "Works  in  the  tract  written  in  1806,  and  entitled 
*  Notice  regarding  the  Idea  of  Wissenschaf  tslehre,  and  of 
its  Fortunes  up  to  the  Present  Time.'^  Here,  without 
any  hesitation,  he  characterises  Schelling  as  "one  of 
the  most  muddled  heads  that  the  general  muddle  of  the 
age  has  produced,"  as  "an  utterly  incompetent  and 
bungling  sophist,"  and  subjects  two  of  his  writings,  the 
'Darstellung  meines  Systems'  and  the  'PhUosophie 
und  Eeligion,'  to  the  most  unsparing  criticism. 

With  Schleiermacher  there  had  been  no  open  breach 
of  friendship.  It  is  curious  that  Fichte  does  not  appear 
to  have  read  the  hostile  and  continued  criticism  of  his 
views  which  runs  through  the  *  Critique  of  the  Theories 
of  Morals  '^  Had  he  done  so,  it  would  certainly  not 
have  passed  without  notice.  But  with  another  of  his 
former  allies  he  was  presently  compelled  to  break.  Kein- 
hold,  who  never  seemed  capable  of  maintaining  a  posi- 
tion in  philosophy  except  by  attaching  himself  to  some 
more  vigorous  thinker,  had  suffered  his  grasp  of  Fichte 
to  slacken,  and  had  been  drawn  towards  a  new  luminary, 
Bardili  of  Stuttgard,  whose  'Grundriss  der  ersten  Logik' 
had  appeared  in  1800.  Of  this  work,  recommended  to 
him  in  the  warmest  manner  by  Eeinhold,  Fichte  wrote 
a  sharp  review  in  the  Erlangen  *  Literaturzeitung,'  the 
tone  of  which  contrasted  strongly  with  the  eulogy 
pronounced  by  Eeinhold  in  the  Jena  journal  A 
"Letter  to  Professor  Fichte"  ia  the  first  nimiber  of 
Eeinhold's  *Beytrage'  (1801)  was  followed  by  Fichte's 

1  *  Werke,'  vol.  viii.  pp.  361-407. 

'  '  Grundlinien  einer  Kritik  der  bisherigen  Sitteulehre '  (1803). 


76  Fichte. 

"  Reply,"  ^  a  powerful  piece  of  writing,  valuable  for  the 
light  it  throws  upon  the  '  Wissenschaftslehre,'  but  con- 
clusive as  regards  the  friendship  between  the  corre- 
spondents. 

iS'ot  content  with  philosophical  contention,  Fichte 
turned  upon  the  old  opponent  of  all  speculation,  F. 
Nicolai,  and  annihilated  hinj  in  the  '  Life  and  Singular 
Opinions  of  K'icolai.'^  All  Nicolai's  forms  of  criticism, 
his  likes  and  dislikes,  his  laborious  satire,  are  deduced 
with  logical  rigour  from  the  first  principle  of  his  nature, 
that  all  human  knowledge  was  summed  up  and  compre- 
hended in  him,  that  what  he  did  not  understand  was 
eo  facto  unintelligible  and  absurd,  and  that  the  mere 
expression  of  his  adverse  opinion  was  sufficient  to  put 
all  opponents  to  rout.  It  is  a  bitter  satire,  not  alto- 
gether undeserved,  but  doing  less  than  justice  to  merits 
which  Is'icolai  undoubtedly  possessed. 

The  early  years  of  residence  at  Berlin  were  unusually 
productive.  In  addition  to  lectures  and  to  the  writings 
already  noted,  we  have  during  this  period  the  work 
which  in  Fichte's  own  opinion  was  the  most  careful  and 
most  maturely  considered  of  all  his  productions,  'The 
Exclusive  Commercial  State.' ^  This  remarkable  work 
is  but  little  known,  and  yet  it  is  by  far  the  most  com- 
plete exposition  of  theoretical  socialism  in  modem 
literature.  By  an  exclusive  commercial  state,  Fichte 
understands  a  union  of  citizens  under  common  laws, 
in  which  no  international  trade  is  permitted.     Of  the 


1  'Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  504-534. 

2  '  Nicolai's  Leben  und  sonderbare  Meinungen,'  1801. 

3  'Der  geschlossene  Handels-staat '  (1800)  :  'Werke,'  vol.  ili.  pp. 
386-513. 


Economics.  77 

three  books  into  which  the  work  is  divided,  the  first 
traces  the  principles  of  such  a  state ;  the  second  com- 
pares them  with  the  actual  phenomena  presented  by 
communities  permitting  international  exchange ;  the 
third  considers  the  steps  by  which  a  state  as  now  organ- 
ised may  make  itself  exclusive.  The  fundamental  polit- 
ical doctrines  are  deduced  from  a  peculiar  view  regard- 
ing property.  The  right  of  property,  Fichte  thinks, 
does  not  extend  over  things,  but  only  over  modes  of 
action.  The  state,  therefore,  has  to  assign  to  each  of  its 
members  the  sphere  within  which  his  free  activity  may 
be  manifested.  Hence  it  is  requisite  that  the  state  should 
determine  the  distribution  of  the  citizens  into  the  three 
grand  classes  of  producers  of  raw  materials,  manufactur- 
ers, and  merchants;  should  regulate  the  scale  of  production 
and  consumption ;  should  fix  the  natural  ratios  of  value 
in  accordance  with  the  principle  that  the  intrinsic  worth 
of  a  thing  is  the  amount  of  its  life-supporting  property ; 
and  should  issue  a  money  of  its  own  which  could  be 
contracted  and  expanded  in  amount  so  as  to  cause  no 
detriment  by  fluctuations  of  prices.  In  the  second  book, 
where  the  actual  economic  conditions  of  communities 
are  considered,  the  ruling  ideas  are  those  so  commonly 
met  with  in  socialist  writings :  that  in  trade  left  to  its 
natural  course  one  party  benefits  at  the  expense  of 
another ;  that  the  use  of  money  confers  a  new  and  bane- 
ful power  on  some  classes  of  society ;  and  that  among 
interchanging  countries,  the  poorer,  to  its  certain  loss  and 
harm,  will  gradually  be  drained  of  its  metallic  wealth. 
In  the  tliird  book,  the  way  towards  the  exclusive  state 
is  shown  to  be  the  rejection  of  the  use  of  metallic  cur- 
rency, and  the  adoption  of  a  circulating  medium  which 


78  Fichte. 

shall  be  valid  only  within  the  community  itself.  From 
this  would  naturally  foUow  the  restriction  of  the  state  to 
its  o^vn  resources  and  the  fostering  of  its  own  industries. 
Fichte  has  evidently  no  doubt  regarding  the  power  of 
the  state  to  carry  on  these  elaborate  regulative  functions  : 
he  never  seems  to  have  contemplated  any  possible  dis- 
turbance of  the  balance  between  production  and  con- 
sumption, nor  to  have  considered  the  natural  influences 
which  determine  the  course  and  forms  of  industry.  The 
'  Exclusive  Commercial  State '  is  the  best  illustration  of 
his  total  neglect  of  experience  and  want  of  power  to 
bring  his  abstract  notions  into  connection  with  concrete 
historical  reality. 

The  lectures  at  Berlin  continued  to  gain  in  popularity 
and  in  influence.  The  most  eminent  citizens  and  states- 
men were  to  be  found  in  attendance  on  them,  and  it  was 
but  natural  that  the  idea  should  occur  to  reinstate  Fichte 
in  some  position  as  academical  lecturer.  In  1804  he 
was  invited  by  the  Russian  Government  to  the  newly 
organised  university  at  Charkow ;  in  the  same  year  he 
was  offered  a  chair  at  the  Bavarian  university  of  Land- 
shut.  The  first  invitation  he  declined,  because  he  felt 
that  the  foreign  surroundings  would  diminish  his  influ- 
ence and  activity;  the  second  he  likewise  refused, 
rather  from  dread  of  the  strong  ecclesiastical  feeling  in 
Bavaria  than  from  disinclination  to  the  university  there. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  same  year,  however,  Beyme 
procured  for  him  an  ofi'er,  which  he  gladly  accepted,  of 
the  Chair  of  Philosophy  at  Erlangen,  under  condition 
that  he  should  be  required  to  lecture  during  summer 
only,  and  might  reside  at  Berlin  during  the  winter 
months.    In  May  1805  he  opened  his  coiu^e  at  Erlangen, 


Lectures  at  Erlangen.  79 

was  received  with  distinction  by  his  colleagues,  and  here 
delivered  to  the  whole  body  of  students  the  lectures  on 
the  '  Xature  of  the  Scholar,'  which  were  published  in 
the  ensuing  year.^  Almost  simultaneously  there  appeared 
the  lectures  delivered  at  Berlin  in  the  winter  of  1804-5, 
'  On  the  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age,'  and  those 
delivered  in  the  winter  of  1805-6,  'The  Way  towards 
the  Elessed  Life,  or  Doctrine  of  Eeligion.'  ^  The  three 
sets  of  lectures  form  a  completed  whole :  the  first  part, 
the  '  Characteristics,'  analysing  the  present  state  of  cul- 
ture and  thought ;  the  second,  '  The  Nature  of  the 
Scholar,'  indicating  the  spirit  in  which  the  attempt  to 
rise  to  a  higher  stage  should  be  made ;  the  third,  sketch- 
ing in  bold  outlines  the  completed  reconciliation  of  life 
and  thought  in  religion.  In  them  the  results  of  Fichte's 
speculation  are  presented  in  popular  form,  and  they  are 
certainly  incomparable  specimens  of  the  union  of  vig- 
orous philosophical  thought  and  masterly  skill  in  expo- 
sition. 

The  fundamental  idea  of  these  works,  expressed  in 
various  forms,  has  been  made  familiar  to  English  readers 
through  the  teaching  of  England's  greatest  modem 
moralist  The  guiding  principle  of  all  Carlyle's  ethical 
work  is  the  principle  of  Fichte's  speculation,  that  the 
world  of  experience  is  but  the  appearance  or  vesture  of 
the  divine  idea  or  life ;  that  in  this  divine  life  lie  the 
springs  of  true  poetry,  of  true  science,  and  of  true  reli- 
gion ;  and  that  he  only  has  true  life  whose  spirit  is  in- 
terpenetrated with  the  realities  transcending  empirical 

1  '  Werke,'  vol.  vi.  pp.  347-448.  They  have  been  translated  by 
Dr  W.  Smith, 

2  The  "Grundziige,"  in  'Werke,'  vol.vii.  pp.  1-256  ;  the  "Anwei- 
sung,"  '  Werke,'  vol.  v.  pp.  397-580,    Both  in  English  by  Dr  Snuth. 


80  Fichte. 

facts,  who  is  willing  to  resign  his  own  personality  in  the 
service  of  humanity,  and  who  strives  incessantly  to  work 
out  the  ideal  that  gives  nobility  and  grandeur  to  human 
effort.^  By  slow  degrees  does  humanity  Avork  out  its 
aim,  the  perfect  ordering  of  life  according  to  Reason  and 
with  Freedom ;  and  the  period  of  construction,  in  which 
the  general  Eeason  moulds  and  fashions  the  thoughts 
and  practical  efforts  of  mankind,  is  preceded  by  the  de- 
structive period  of  individualist  criticism.  The  charac- 
teristics of  this  destructive  age,  the  principles  of  the 
Aufkldrung,  are  drawn  by  Fichte  with  a  master-hand, 
and  in  the  state  of  German  thought  and  society  he  had 
before  him  the  realisation  of  his  sketch.  The  present 
age  appeared  to  him,  in  its  lack  of  devotion  to  general 
interests,  in  its  cold  individualism,  mechanical  statecraft, 
and  selfish  morality,  the  condition  of  completed  sinful- 
ness. The  call  to  the  higher  life,  which  he  raised  on 
philosophical  grounds,  was  soon  to  become  the  passionate 
appeal  of  the  patriot,  Avho  saAV  in  the  degradation  of  his 
country  the  effects  of  a  false  system  of  thought  and 
ethical  principle. 

2. — FALL  AND  REGENERATION   OF   PRUSSIA  :   THE  BERLIN 
•UNIVERSITY. 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  between  France  and  Prussia 
in  1806  had  been  preceded  by  events  which  showed  all 

1  Mere  references  to  Fichte  are  numerous  enough  in  Carlyle  (see, 
e.g.,  '  On  Heroes,'  Lect.  vi.,  the  essays  on  the  '  State  of  Gennan  Lit- 
erature,' and  on  '  NovaJis '),  but  the  full  significance  of  the  relation 
between  them  can  become  clear  only  when  one  compares  the  thought- 
ful essay  entitled  'Characteristics,'  and  the  'Sartor  Resartus,' with 
Fichte's  popular  works  above  named,  specially  the  '  Grundztige  d. 
gegen.  Zeitalters.' 


Fall  of  Prussia.  81 

too  clearly  how  deep  was  the  disorder  and  corruption  of 
the  German  national  feeling.  The  selfish  and  vacillating 
policy  of  Prussia  had  rendered  it  possible  for  her  to  be 
the  isolated  object  of  l^apoleon's  hostility.  The  shame- 
ful Rheinhund,  completed  in  July  1806,  had  placed  the 
princes  of  Southern  and  Western  Germany  under  the 
headship  of  France,  and  had  separated  them  from  the 
German  empire.  Even  the  shadowy  bond  which  seemed 
to  unite  the  German  States  had  been  dissolved  by  the 
Austrian  emperor's  renunciation  of  the  Kaiserate,  while 
the  passive  attitude  of  Prussia  during  the  overthrow  of 
Austria  in  1805  had  alienated  the  two  great  German 
Powers.^  The  declaration  of  war  with  France  was  hailed 
with  joy  in  Prussia  as  the  one  evidence  yet  remaining  of 
life  and  independence  in  the  state.  The  great  triumphs 
of  the  Prussian  army  in  the  past  inspired  a  feeling  of 
confidence  which  unfortunately  had  no  ^oimd  basis.  The 
Berlin  circles  waited  eagerly  for  the  news  of  victories 
which  they  were  prepared  to  celebrate,  and  the  announce- 
ment of  the  terrible  calamities  of  Jena  and  Auerstadt 
came  like  thunder  from  a  clear  sky.  The  Prussian  power 
at  a  single  stroke  was  shattered.  The  army  was  driven 
into  fragments,  fortress  after  fortress  fell  without  resist- 
ance into  the  hands  of  the  conqueror,  and  Berlin  was 
left  without  defence.  Fichte,  with  his  friend  Hufeland, 
fled  beyond  the  Oder  to  follow  the  fortunes  of  the  de- 

^  An  admirable  picture  of  German  politics  at  this  period  is  given 
in  the  anonymous  pamphlet,  '  Deutschland  in  seiner  tiefen  Erniedri- 
gung,'  published  in  the  summer  of  1806,  for  the  printing  of  which  the 
unfortunate  bookseller  Palm,  of  Numberg,  was  shot  by  order  of  Na- 
poleon. The  more  extensive  historical  works  bearing  on  the  period, 
especially  the  lives  of  Stein  by  Pertz  and  Seeley,  give  more  copious 
information. 

P. — IV.  P 


82  FicUe. 

feated  king,  and  to  await  the  development  of  the  struggle 
in  East  Prussia,  where  Russian  aid  could  be  counted  on. 
His  wife  remained  to  protect  the  family  and  goods  of 
the  united  households. 

At  Stargard,  where  Fichte  first  halted,  he  found  to 
his  amusement  a  fxdl-grown  university  in  which  his 
name  and  fame  were  absolutely  imknown,  and  where  it 
was  necessary  for  him  to  inform  his  brother  professors  of 
the  subject  which  he  professed.  At  Konigsberg,  where 
he  took  up  residence  from  November  1806  till  June 
1807,  he  was  received  with  more  intelligent  apprecia- 
tion, was  nominated  temporary  professor,  and  delivered 
lectures,  both  publicly  and  in  private,  on  the  '  "Wissen- 
schaftslehre.'  Here,  too,  he  worked  diligently  at  the 
study  of  modern  languages,  which  he  had  begun  under 
Delbriick,  and  above  all,  at  Pestalozzi's  educational 
schemes,  in  whiijh  he  seemed  to  find  the  seeds  for  the 
regeneration  of  public  feeling  in  Germany.  The  fall  of 
Danzig  and  the  battle  of  Friedland  drove  him  from 
Konigsberg  a  few  days  before  the  conclusion  of  the 
melancholy  Peace  of  Tilsit.  After  a  stormy  sea-voyage 
he  reached  Copenhagen,  where  he  was  greeted  with 
warm  affection  by  his  former  scholar  Oersted,  now  a 
brilliant  and  successful  professor  at  the  Danish  univer- 
sity.    Not  till  August  1807  did  he  return  to  Berlin. 

The  calamities  of  Prussia  had  drawn  the  attention  of 
all  her  greatest  thinkers  to  the  causes  of  such  an  unex- 
pected collapse.  With  the  instinctive  feeling  of  a  great 
nation  still  fuU  of  vital  power,  it  was  seen  that  regener- 
ation was  as  possible  as  it  was  necessary,  but  that  such 
regeneration  must  spring  from  a  united  and  purified 
national  spirit.     The  old  mechanism  which,  when  ani- 


Condition  of  Prussia.  83 

mated  by  a  Frederick  II.,  had  been  powerful  and  fit  for 
great  ends,  must  be  set  aside.  The  antiquated  laws  that 
separated  the  people  into  distinct  and  hostile  classes,  and 
substituted  class  interests  for  public  sympathy,  must  be 
amended.  The  army,  which  had  become  an  imperium  in 
imperio,  so  hateful  that  even  the  defeat  of  the  nation 
could  not  repress  joy  at  the  overthrow  of  the  Junker- 
thum,  must  be  made  truly  to  represent  the  national  will 
and  force.  Above  all,  what  lay  as  positive  principle  at 
the  root  of  all  efforts  towards  amendment,  the  national 
education  must  again  become  a  training  through  which 
the  spiritual  powers  of  the  individual  might  be  strength- 
ened, and  the  feeling  of  corporate  unity  reinstated. 
Chaotic  enough  were  some  of  the  efforts  to  realise  these 
obscurely  felt  longings,  and  one  must  smile  at  the  good 
old  Jahn's  endeavour  to  regenerate  the  nation  by  convert- 
ing it  into  one  gigantic  Tuniverein  (gymnastic  associa- 
tion); but  nevertheless  Prussia  possessed  a  noble  band 
of  clear-sighted  and  strong-hearted  sons,  who  severally 
took  up  and  developed  the  ideas  which  converged  to- 
wards one  end,  the  reformation  of  the  national  mind. 
Stein  and  Hardenberg  bent  aU  their  energies  to  the 
destruction  of  the  old  land  laws  which  stiU  held  a  largo 
portion  of  the  people  in  the  state  of  villeinage,  to  the 
restriction  of  class-privileges,  and  to  the  institution  of  a 
system  of  local  government  which  might  knit  together 
the  several  members  of  the  stata  Schamliorst  under- 
took the  reformation  of  the  military  order,  and  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  system  which  has  made  the  German 
army  the  most  powerful  engine  of  war  the  world  has 
ever  seen,^  To  Fichte  fell  the  task  of  endeavouring  by 
1  It  is  quite  beyond  the  scope  of  tlm  sketch  to  give  any  more  de- 


84  Fichte. 

his  eloquence  to  turn  the  attention  of  the  nation  to  the 
need  for  a  new  spiritual  education.  Already  had  he  felt 
that  in  this  way  only  could  he  discharge  his  heartfelt 
duty  to  the  state.  On  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1806, 
he  had  proposed  to  Beyme  that  he  should  be  permitted 
to  accompany  the  army  as  lay-preacher,  and  had  received 
from  the  king  thanks  for  an  offer  which  was  not  ac- 
cepted. The  call  to  action  was  even  stronger  now  than 
formerly,  and  at  aU  hazards  it  was  obeyed.  On  succes- 
sive Sunday  evenings,  from  13th  December  1807  to 
20th  March  1808,  he  delivered  in  the  great  hall  of  the 
Academy  of  Sciences,  before  a  crowded  audience,  his 
famous  "  Addresses  to  the  German  Nation."  The  French 
were  still  in  occupation  of  Berlin :  well-known  spies 
frequented  the  lecture-hall,  and  fears  were  openly  ex- 
pressed for  the  safety  of  the  speaker.  But  to  a  spec- 
Tilative  treatment  of  patriotism  the  French  naturally 
attached  but  small  weight ;  the  '  Moniteur '  intimated 
that  a  famous  philosopher,  named  Fichte,  was  delivering 
a  course  of  lectures  on  reforms  in  education ;  no  steps 
were  taken  against  him  either  at  the  time  or  at  a  later 
date,  when  men  such  as  Schleiermacher  and  "Wolf  were 
cautioned  by  the  French  commandant,  Davoust.  One 
need  not  wonder  at  such  indifference,  for,  in  truth,  to 
many  of  his  own  countrymen  Fichte's  words  were  of  as 
little  weight  as  to  the  foreigner.  Contemporary  records 
preserve  a  quite  surprising  silence  regarding  the  'Eeden.'^ 

tailed  notice  of  these  great  works.  A  very  complete  survey  is  con- 
tained in  Hausser's  '  Deutsche  Geschichte  vom  Tode  Friedrichs  des 
Grossen,'  vol.  iii.  pp.  120-254.  The  land  reforms  are  stated  with  preci- 
sion in  Mr  Morier's  essay,  '  Systems  of  Land  Tenure '  (Cobden  Club), 
pp.  243-285. 
1  See  J.  Bona  Meyer.  '  Ueber  Fichte's  Reden  '  (1862).     The  notes 


*  Addresses  to  the  German  Nation!  85 

The  'Addresses'  link  themselves  naturally  to  the 
'Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age.'  In  the  latter, 
Fichte  had  depicted  the  times  as  the  "  age  of  completed 
sinfulness,"  and  had  refen-ed  them  to  the  third  great 
epoch  in  the  history  of  humanity,  the  period  when 
Reason  is  heginning  to  free  itself  from  instinct  and 
authority.  By  the  force  of  events  this  age  had  been 
brought,  for  Germany  at  least,  to  a  violent  close. 
Individualism,  with  its  selfish  morality  and  statecraft, 
had  been  shattered  by  a  blow  dealt  from  without.  The 
new  epoch,  that  of  the  conscious  recognition  of  Eeason, 
had  been  inaugurated,  and  it  remained  to  be  seen  how 
far  Germany  was  fit  to  enter  on  its  noble  inheritance, 
and  by  what  method  it  shotild  be  brought  to  take  pos- 
session. There  are  thus  in  the  '  Addresses '  two  leading 
trains  of  thought — a  survey  of  those  elements  in  the 
German  spirit  out  of  which  the  new  state  may  be  con- 
structed, and  an  exposition  of  the  mode  by  Avhich  they 
are  to  be  utilised. 

Moral  regeneration  of  a  nation,  the  education  of  the 
individual  to  the  great  general  interests,  is  only  possible 
when  there  is  a  free  and  living  national  spirit,  capable  of 
uniting  the  several  members  in  the  service  of  a  common 
end.  The  German  spirit  is  free  and  living,  for  the 
German  people  is  pure  and  unmixed,  and  its  history 
is  the  development  of  a  single  stock.  The  wonderful 
plasticity  of  the  German  language,  which  renders  it 
capable  of  expressing  in  vivid  and  pictorial  fashion  the 

to  this  little  pamphlet,  which  contains  an  excellent  treatment  of  the 
'Addresses,'  give  many  interesting  particulars  regarding  the  circum- 
stances under  which  they  were  delivered  and  the  impression  made 
by  them.    See  also  Seeley's  '  Stein,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  27-42. 


86  Fichte. 

profoundest  tliought,  is  in  itself  a  sufficient  proof  that 
the  German  people  has  the  stamp  of  originality.  The 
languages  of  the  Germanic  and  the  N'eo-Latin  races,  as 
compared  with  the  pure  German  tongue,  are  lifeless  and 
mechanical.  ^N'o  people  which  had  not  a  free  and  ori- 
ginal national  feeling  could  have  taken  up  and  worked 
out  to  a  glorious  termination  the  great  idea  of  the  Refor- 
mation. ISo  people  save  the  German  has  proved  its 
capacity  for  the  deepest  philosophical  speculation.  In 
its  language,  in  its  religious  depth,  and  in  its  philoso- 
phical power,  Germany  amply  proves  itself  a  free  and 
living  people.  For  Fichte,  indeed,  as  Kuno  Fischer  well 
says,  Germany  is  the  Ego  among  all  nations. 

There  lie,  then,  in  the  German  spirit  the  possibili- 
ties of  a  noble  ethical  life  for  the  individual,  of  a  pure 
and  rational  state,  of  a  religion  which  shall  penetrate 
the  life  of  humanity.^  How  shall  these  possibilities 
be  reahsed?  Not  otherwise  than  by  a  new  system  of 
national  education,  a  system  which  shall  have  as  its  aim 
the  perfection  of  the  moral  nature  of  the  individual,  and 
which  shall  at  every  step  draw  closer  the  links  that  bind 
the  individual  to  the  community.  The  groundwork  of 
such  a  new  education  had  already  been  laid  by  a  deep- 
thinking  German,  by  Pestalozzi ;  and  the  salvation  of  the 
people  is  to  be  looked  for  in  the  universal  adoption  and 
earnest  realisation  of  what  is  true  and  original  in  his 
methods. 

Fichte  proceeds,  then,  to  develop  at  some  length  his 
scheme  of  national  education  in  its  several  stages  of  in- 

1  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  FicMe  thinks  Germany  the  only- 
nation  that  has  shown  itself  lit  to  realise  the  ideal  of  a  republican 
constitution  ('Werke,'  vol.  vii.  pp.  357). 


Scheme  of  National  Education.  87 

fant  training,  of  school  and  university  discipline.  Like 
Pestalozzi,  he  lays  stress  on  the  necessity  of  beginning 
with  real  intuition  and  not  with  words  or  symbols ;  but 
he  subjects  to  acute  criticism  Pestalozzi's  method,  and 
substitutes  for  it  a  threefold  training  in  accurate  dis- 
crimination of  the  elements  of  sense  experience — i.e., 
feelings — of  the  intuitions  of  external  realities,  and  of 
bodily  movements.  So  soon  as  this  preparatory  disci- 
pline has  been  completed,  it  is  needful  that  children 
should  be  removed  from  the  many  home  influences  that 
corrupt  education,  and  reduce  the  efforts  of  instructors  to 
nullity.  Education  is  a  national  affair,  and  must  be 
conducted  by  the  nation  at  the  general  expense.  The 
state  must  support  a  body  of  teachers ;  and  a  common 
education,  embracing  along  with  the  culture  of  the  in- 
tellect an  adequate  technical  training,  must  be  provided 
for  all.^  By  this  means,  and  by  it  only,  the  common 
ethical  feeling,  the  sense  of  national  imity,  can  be  fos- 
tered and  made  productive.  Germany  must  become  an 
"exclusive  educational  state,"  and  patriotic  feeling  be- 
come the  mainspring  of  action.  A  united  Germany 
would  bo  the  best  safeguard  against  the  evils  of  the 
artificial  "  balance  of  •  power "  policy,  which  for  long 
had  been  the  bane  of  the  German  States.  It  might 
resist  the  evil  pressure  of  international  commerce,  which 
makes  the  poorer  country  a  natural  prey  for  the  more 
wealthy.  Above  all  things,  the  unique  richness  and 
depth  of  the  German  character  are  a  sufficient  demonstra- 
tion of  the  folly  of  these  dreams  of  universal  monarchy, 

1  With  Fichte's  idea  of  the  necessity  and  value  of  training  to  some 
mechanical  occupation,  one  may  compare  the  t&nia.sHc pcedagoghcm 
in  'Wilhelm  Meister's  Wanderjahre.' 


88  FicMe. 

Avhich  can  be  realised  only  at  the  cost  of  national  in- 
dividuality. 

To  this  great  work, — a  work  of  the  last  importance, 
not  for  Germany  alone,  but  for  humanity  at  large, — all 
ranks  and  classes  are  summoned.  On  the  present  age 
rests  the  task  of  carrying  forward  the  great  spirit  that 
has  animated  civilisation,  and  of  vindicating  the  noble 
place  that  has  been  held  by  the  German  people  in  the 
world's  history. 

"  In  these  addresses "  (thus  proceeds  the  fine  peroration 
of  Fichte's  last  lecture)  "  the  memory  of  your  forefathers 
speaks  to  you.  Think  that  with  my  voice  there  are 
mingled  the  voices  of  your  ancestors  from  the  far-off  ages  of 
grey  antiquity,  of  those  who  stemmed  with  their  own  bodies 
the  tide  of  Roman  domination  over  the  world,  who  vindi- 
cated with  their  own  blood  the  independence  of  those  moun- 
tains, plains,  and  streams  which  under  you  have  been  suffered 
to  fall  a  prey  to  the  stranger.  They  call  to  you, — '  Take  ye 
our  place ' — hand  down  our  memory  to  future  ages,  honour- 
able and  spotless  as  it  has  come  down  to  you,  as  you  have 
gloried  in  it  and  in  your  descent  from  us.  Hitherto  our 
struggle  has  been  deemed  noble,  great,  and  wise  ; — we  have 
been  looked  upon  as  the  consecrated  and  inspired  ones  of  a 
Divine  World-plan.  Should  our  race  perish  with  you,  then 
will  our  honour  be  changed  into  dishonour,  our  wisdom 
into  folly.  For  if  Germany  were  ever  to  be  subdued  to  the 
empire,  then  had  it  been  better  to  have  fallen  before  the 
ancient  Romans  than  before  their  modern  descendants.  We 
Avithstood  those  and  triumphed ;  these  have  scattered  you 
like  chaff  before  them.  But  as  matters  now  are  with  you, 
seek  not  to  conquer  with  bodily  weapons,  but  stand  firm  and 
erect  before  them  in  spiritual  dignity.  Yours  is  the  greater 
destiny, — to  found  an  empire  of  mind  and  reason — to  de- 
stroy the  dominion  of  rude  physical  power  as  the  ruler  of  the 
world.  Do  this,  and  ye  shall  be  worthy  of  your  descent 
from  us. 


'Addresses  to  the  German  Nation!  89 

"  With  these  voices  mingle  the  spirits  of  your  later  fathers 
— of  those  who  fell  in  the  second  struggle  for  freedom  of 
religion  and  of  faith.  '  Save  our  honour  too,'  they  call.  To 
us  it  had  not  become  wholly  clear  what  we  fought  for  ;  be- 
sides our  just  determination  to  suffer  no  outward  power  to 
control  us  in  matters  of  conscience,  we  were  also  impelled 
by  a  higher  spirit,  which  never  wholly  unveiled  itself  to  our 
view.  To  you  this  spirit  is  no  longer  veiled,  if  you  have 
vision  for  the  spiritual  world  ; — it  now  regards  you  with 
high  clear  aspect.  The  confused  and  intricate  mixture  of 
sensuous  and  spiritual  impulses  shall  no  longer  be  per- 
mitted to  govern  the  world.  Mind  alone,  pure  from  all 
admixture  of  sense,  shall  assume  the  guidance  of  human 
affairs.  In  order  that  this  spirit  should  have  liberty  to  de- 
velop itself,  and  rise  to  independent  existence,  our  blood  was 
shed.  It  lies  with  you  to  give  a  meaning  and  a  justification 
to  the  sacrifice,  by  estiiblishing  this  spirit  in  its  destined 
supremacy.  Should  this  result  not  ensue,  as  the  ultimate 
end  of  all  the  previous  development  of  our  nation,  then 
were  our  struggles  but  a  vain  and  forgotten  farce,  and  the 
freedom  of  mind  and  conscience  for  which  we  fought  an 
empty  word,  since  neither  mind  nor  conscience  should  any 
longer  have  a  place  among  us. 

"  The  races  yet  unborn  plead  with  you.  *  Ye  were  proud 
of  your  forefathers,'  they  cry,  and  proudly  ranked  yourselves 
in  a  noble  line  of  men.  See  that  with  you  the  chain  is 
not  broken.  Act  so  that  we  also  may  be  proud  of  you  ;  and 
through  you,  as  through  a  spotless  medium,  claim  our  de- 
scent from  the  same  glorious  source.  Be  not  you  the  cause  of 
making  us  revile  our  ancestry,  as  low,  barbarous,  and  slav- 
ish ;  of  causing  us  to  hide  our  origin,  or  to  assume  a  foreign 
name  and  a  foreign  parentage,  in  order  that  we  may  not  be, 
without  further  inquiry,  cast  aside  and  trodden  under  foot. 
According  as  the  next  generation  which  proceed  from  you 
shall  be,  so  shall  be  your  future  fame ;  honourable,  if  this  shall 
bear  honourable  witness  to  you  ;  beyond  measure  ignomini- 
ous, if  ye  have  not  an  unblemished  posterity  to  succeed  you, 
and  leave  it  to  your  concLueror  to  write  your  history.    Never 


90  Fichte. 

has  a  victor  been  known  to  have  either  the  inclination  or  the 
means  of  passing  a  just  judgment  on  the  subdued.  The 
more  he  degrades  them,  the  better  does  he  justify  his  own 
position.  Who  can  know  what  great  deeds,  what  excellent 
institutions,  what  noble  manners  of  many  nations  of  anti- 
quity, may  have  passed  away  into  oblivion,  because  their 
succeeding  generations  have  been  enslaved,  and  have  left 
the  conqueror  in  his  own  way,  and  without  contradiction, 
to  tell  their  story  ? 

"  Even  the  stranger  in  foreign  lands  pleads  with  you,  in 
so  far  as  he  understands  himself,  and  knows  aright  his  own 
interest.  Yes  !  there  are  in  every  nation  minds  who  can 
never  believe  that  the  great  promises  to  the  human  race  of 
a  kingdom  of  law,  of  reason,  of  truth,  are  vain  and  idle 
delusions,  and  who  therefore  cherish  the  conviction  that  the 
present  iron  age  is  but  a  step  towards  a  better  state.  These, 
and  with  them  all  the  after-ages  of  humanity,  trust  in  you. 
Many  of  them  trace  their  lineage  from  us  ;  others  have  re- 
ceived from  us  religion  and  all  other  culture.  Those  plead 
with  us,  by  the  common  soil  of  our  Fatherland,  the  cradle  of 
their  infancy,  which  they  have  left  to  us  free  ;  these,  by  the 
culture  which  they  have  accepted  from  us  as  the  pledge  of  a 
higher  good, — to  maintain,  for  their  sakes,  the  proud  posi- 
tion which  has  hitherto  been  ours,  to  guard  with  jealous 
watchfulness  against  even  the  possible  disappearance,  from 
the  great  confederation  of  a  newly  arisen  humanity,  of  that 
member  which  is  to  them  more  important  than  all  others  ; 
or  that  when  they  shall  need  our  counsel,  our  example,  our 
co-operation  in  the  pursuit  and  attainment  of  the  true  end 
of  this  earthly  life,  they  shall  not  look  around  for  us  in 
vain. 

"  All  ages, — all  the  wise  and  good  who  have  ever  breathed 
the  air  of  this  world  of  ours, — all  their  thoughts  and  aspi- 
rations towards  a  higher  good, — mingle  with  these  voices 
and  encompass  you  about  and  raise  suppliant  hands  towards 
you ; — Providence  itself,  if  we  may  venture  so  to  speak,  and 
the  Di\dne  plan  in  the  creation  of  a  human  race — which  in- 
deed exists  only  that  it  may  be  understood  of  men,  and  by 


'Addresses  to  the  German  Nation!  91 

men  be  wrought  into  reality — plead  with  you  to  save  theii* 
honour  and  their  existence.  Whether  those  who  have  be- 
lieved that  humanity  must  ever  advance  in  a  course  of  cease- 
less improvement,  and  that  the  great  ideas  of  its  order  and 
worth  were  not  empty  dreams  but  the  prophetic  announce- 
ment and  pledge  of  their  future  realisation  ; — whether  those 
— or  they  who  have  slumbered  on  in  the  sluggish  indolence 
of  a  mere  vegetable  or  animal  existence,  and  mocked  every 
aspiration  towards  a  higher  world — have  had  the  right, — this 
is  the  question  upon  which  it  has  fallen  to  your  lot  to  fur- 
nish a  last  and  decisive  answer.  The  ancient  world,  with 
all  its  nobility  and  greatness,  has  fallen — through  its  own 
unworthiness  and  through  the  might  of  your  forefathers.  If 
there  has  been  truth  in  that  which  I  have  spoken  to  you  in 
these  '  Addresses,'  then  it  is  you  to  whom,  out  of  all  other 
modem  nations,  the  germs  of  human  perfection  are  espe- 
cially committed,  and  on  whom  the  foremost  place  in  the 
onward  advance  towards  their  development  is  conferred. 
If  you  sink  to  nothing  in  this  your  peculiar  office,  then 
with  you  the  hopes  of  Humanity  for  salvation  out  of  all  its 
evils  are  likewise  overthrown.  Hope  not,  console  not  your- 
selves with  the  vain  delusion,  that  a  second  time,  after  the 
destruction  of  an  ancient  civilisation,  a  new  culture  will 
arise  upon  the  ruins  of  the  old  from  a  half-barbaric  people. 
In  ancient  times,  such  a  people  existed  fully  provided  with 
all  the  requisites  for  their  mission ;  they  were  well  known 
to  the  cultivated  nation,  and  were  described  in  its  literature ; 
and  that  nation  itself,  had  it  been  able  to  suppose  the  case 
of  its  own  downfall,  might  have  discovered  the  means  of  reno- 
vation in  this  people.  To  us  also  the  whole  surface  of  the 
earth  is  well  known,  and  all  the  nations  who  dwell  upon  it. 
Do  we  know  one,  of  all  the  ancestral  tribe  of  modem  Europe, 
of  whom  like  hopes  may  be  entertained  ?  I  think  that 
every  man  who  does  not  give  himself  up  to  visionary  hopes 
and  fancies,  but  desires  only  honest  and  searching  inquiry, 
must  answer  this  question — No  !  There  is,  then,  no  way 
of  escape  :  if  ye  sink,  Humanity  sinks  with  you,  ■without 
hope  of  future  restoration." 


92  Fichte. 

With  much,  that  is  over-strained  and  fantastic,  much 
that  is  indefinite  and  unpractical,  the  '  Addresses '  yet 
spoke  to  Germans  as  they  had  not  been  spoken  to  since 
the  time  of  Luther.  The  idea  of  the  unity  of  the  Ger- 
man people  began  in  them  to  be  detached  from  the  old 
ideal  of  the  Holy  Empire,  and  to  link  itself  on  to  the 
history  of  the  race,  and  above  all  to  the  history  of  the 
strongest  German  State,  to  the  history  of  Prussia.  The 
most  interesting  facts  in  the  troubled  narrative  of  this 
troubled  period  are  the  rise  and  growth  of  the  strong 
feeling  of  nationality,  and  the  development  of  a  more 
definite  opposition  between  the  older  forms  of  German 
imperial  union  and  the  new  conception  of  a  national 
unity, — an  opposition  practically  expressing  itself  in  the 
antithesis  between  Austria  with  the  Kaiserate  and 
Prussia  with  the  German  Confederation.  It  is  true 
that  the  smaller  German  States,  especially  those  of  the 
south  and  west,  remained  long  unafi'ected  by  the  new 
movement,  and  hence  it  becomes  intelligible  how  the 
old  history  of  internal  dissension  began  to  reappear  in 
Germany  so  soon  as  the  foreign  yoke  had  been  thrown 
ofi".  IsTevertheless  it  is  to  this  time  the  historian  must 
look  for  the  first  f  or  esh  ado  wings  of  the  form  of  German 
unity  which  has  slowly  been  wrought  out  in  the  later 
years  of  the  present  century. 

Shortly  after  the  delivery  of  the  '  Addresses,'  Fichte 
was  struck  down  by  the  first  illness  wh'ch  had  seriously 
aff'ected  him.  Even  his  iron  constitution  had  suff"ered 
from  the  fatigue  of  the  months  of  exile  from  Berlin,  from 
the  anxiety  and  distress  which  continuously  accompanied 
him.  The  public  lectures  on  philosophy,  for  which  he 
had  prepared  himself  in  the  spring  of  1808,  were  given 


The  Functions  of  a  University.  93 

up ;  and  for  some  months  he  resided  at  Teplitz,  where 
the  warm  baths  restored,  though  not  completely,  his 
shattered  health. 

During  this  time  an  important  step  in  the  regener- 
ation of  Prussia  had  been  under  debate.  When  the 
HaUe  University  had  been  closed  after  the  defeat  of 
Jena,  the  professors  made  jDroposals  to  the  king  that  the 
seat  of  the  university  should  be  transferred  to  Berlin. 
This  proposition  was  the  occasion  for  the  serious  and 
mature  consideration  of  the  advisability  of  having  in 
Berlin  a  national  university.  To  Beyme,  then  Minister 
of  Instruction,  the  commission  was  given  to  make  the 
preliminary  arrangements  for  such  a  step,  and,  on  his 
invitation,  Fichte  sent  in  an  elaborate  and  carefully 
constructed  plan  for  the  new  institution.^  Although 
the  university  as  it  was  eventually  organised  resembled 
in  little  or  nothing  Fichte's  ideal,  the  details  of  his 
scheme  present  some  points  of  interest. 

The  true  function  of  a  university,  according  to  the 
'Deduced  Plan,'  has  not  been  in  general  rightly  appre- 
hended. It  is  not  the  communication  of  knowledge  by 
means  of  lectures,  for,  were  this  the  aim,  university  work 
would  be  better  performed  by  a  large  collection  of  books. 
The  university  is  the  crown  or  apex  of  the  system  of 
education,  whereby  the  whole  powers  of  the  individual 
are  to  be  trained  to  their  highest  form  of  exercise.  A 
university  is,  in  brief,  a  school  for  training  in  the  art 
of  using  the  understanding  scientifically.     All  details  of 

1  "  Deducirter  Plan  einer  zu  Berlin  zu  erriclitenden  hciheren  Lehran- 
stalt,"  'Werke,'  vol.  viii.  pp.  95-204.  With  this  should  be  com- 
pared his  "  Ideas  on  the  Internal  Organisation  of  the  University  of 
Erlangen,"  '  Nachgel.  Werke,'  vol.  iii.  pp.  275-295. 


94  FicUe. 

the  organisation,  as  far  as  teaching  is  concerned,  follow 
from  this  general  principle.  Thus  the  lecture  method 
must  be  rehnquished  in  favour  of  combined  dialogue, 
examination,  and  practice  in  themes  or  theses.  The 
scholars,  who  are  destined  to  fulfil  a  high  aim  in  the 
state,  who  are  to  represent  culture  and  intelligence,  must 
be  carefully  prepared  in  the  preliminary  school-education, 
must  be  isolated  from  all  the  details  of  life,  and  must  have 
the  means  of  support  secured  to  them.  The  university 
will  itself  form  a  seminary  or  training-school  for  professors. 
From  this  general  conception  Fichte  proceeds  to  work 
out  the  details — first  as  regards  the  organisation  of  stu- 
dies in  a  university,  then  as  regards  the  distribution  of 
scholars  and  teachers,  their  economy  and  relation  to  the 
state,  and  finally  as  regards  the  mode  in  which  a  univer- 
sity so  constituted  may  actively  influence  the  scientific 
world.  In  his  treatment  of  the  first  subject,  we  have 
to  note  the  occurrence  of  an  error  extremely  frequent  in 
the  case  of  systematic  theorists.  Fichte  thinks  that  in 
all  branches  of  study  the  beginning  should  be  found  in 
a  kind  of  encyclopaedic  introduction;  and  that  for  all 
branches  of  study  at  a  university,  the  common  introduc- 
tion is  to  be  found  in  philosophy.  Accordingly,  the  first 
year  of  study  is  arranged  to  be  passed  under  the  care  of 
one  professor  of  philosophy,  who,  without  inculcating 
any  system,  shall  train  the  students  to  reflection  in  the 
nature  of  the  problems  of  thought  and  knowledge,  shall 
indicate  to  them  how  the  special  sciences  branch  off 
from  philosophy,  and  shall  give  literary  and  critical 
notices  by  way  of  introduction.  When  this  first  course 
is  completed,  the  studies  are  then  separated  according 
to  the  brocid  divisions  of  philology,  philosophy,  history, 


The  Functions  of  a  University.  95 

and  natural  science.  The  old  division  of  faculties  in  no 
way  corresponds  to  the  guiding  principle  of  university 
training,  that  it  shall  deal  with  the  scientific  use  of  the 
understanding.  Law,  e.g.,  is  on  the  one  side  professional 
merely ;  on  the  other,  when  it  has  a  scientific  aspect,  it 
falls  under  history  and  philosophy.  Medicine,  in  so 
far  as  scientific,  rests  upon,  and  should  be  included 
under,  natural  science.  Theology,  in  like  manner,  must 
be  distributed  partly  to  philology,  partly  to  philosophy, 
partly  to  history,  of  which  last  a  most  important  chapter 
ought  to  be  "  the  history  of  the  development  of  religious 
notions  among  mankind."  In  the  case  of  each  special 
line  of  study,  the  course  begins  Avith  an  encyclopaedic 
introduction,  and  passes  on  to  the  more  definite  and 
thorough  work  of  detail 

The  students  Fichte  regards  as  divisible  into  two 
grand  classes.  Those  who,  by  the  exercises  of  their 
first  course,  have  proved  themselves  fit  to  follow  out  the 
profession  of  the  scholar,  are  the  Regulars, — the  very  ker- 
nel of  the  university,  for  whom  and  by  whom  it  pecu- 
liarly exists.  They  are  to  be  distinguished  not  only  by 
the  economical  arrangements  for  their  maintenance,  but 
even  by  a  special  academic  garb.  From  their  ranks  are 
drawn  the  members  of  the  professoriate ;  and  Fichte,  it 
may  be  remarked,  is  emphatically  of  opinion  that  such 
members  should  be  young,  and  should  not  continue  too 
long  in  office.  All  other  students — those  who  use  the 
university  merely  as  an  addition  to  their  ordinary  civic 
life — are  called  Associates,  among  whom  some  may  be 
regarded  as  aspirants  to  the  dignity  of  the  Regulars,  and 
are  therefore  called  Novices. 

Into  the  arrangements  for  the  government  of  the  uni- 


96  FicUe. 

versity,  for  the  payment  of  teachers  and  the  support  of 
scholars,  Fichte  enters  at  great  length,  but  his  treatment 
presents  little  or  nothing  of  interest.  One  cannot  avoid 
a  feelmg  of  surprise  at  the  one-sided  vision  which  could 
see  no  possible  evil  in  the  reinstatement  of  a  cloister- 
life  as  the  substitute  for  the  freer  academic  air  of  a 
university.  More  attractive  is  his  discussion  of  the 
methods  whereby  the  scientific  training-school  is  to  in- 
fluence the  surrounding  world.  The  organised  force  of 
the  university  is  to  manifest  itself  in  the  continuous 
production  of  three  sets  of  records  or  Acta  :  first,  a  Jour- 
nal of  Scientific  Art,  in  a  peculiar  sense  the  Acta  lit- 
eraria  of  the  university,  in  which  the  produce  of  the 
university  work,  including  the  theses  of  the  students, 
shall  be  incorporated ;  second,  a  periodical  publication, 
containing  on  the  one  hand  abstracts  of  the  encyclopaedic 
surveys  which  form  the  propaedeutic  to  all  scientific 
teaching,  and  on  the  other  records  of  all  additions  to 
scientific  knowledge  made  in  the  university;  finally, 
a  critical  journal,  which  shall  serve  as  a  guide  to  all 
new  scientific  publications — a  journal  of  the  progress  of 
literature. 

Fichte's  scheme,  discussed  with  the  utmost  care  in 
Beyme's  house  by  a  circle  of  men  interested  in  the 
foundation  of  the  new  institution,  appeared  to  contain 
too  many  novelties  to  permit  of  its  acceptance.  His  old 
opponent,  Schleiermacher,  published  in  the  following 
year  (1808)  his  'Occasional  Thoughts  on  Universities  in 
a  German  sense,'  which  was  undoubtedly  intended  as  a 
counterpoise  to  the  '  Deduced  Plan ; '  and  the  organisation 
finally  adopted  more  nearly  resembles  Schleiermacher's 
suggested  modification  of  existing   arrangements   than 


The  Berlin  University.  97 

Fichte's  thoroughly  radical  and  comprehensive  scheme. 
For  some  years  the  carrying  out  of  the  intention  to 
found  the  new  university  was  delayed.  Stein,  when 
in  power,  was  unwilling  to  hurry  matters,  and  had, 
for  a  time,  some  objections  to  Berlin  as  the  seat 
of  an  academic  institution.  l^ot  till  1809  was  the 
affair  handed  over  to  W.  von  Humboldt,  with  instruc- 
tions to  have  it  carried  out.  Lectures  were  delivered 
in  that  year  by  Fichte,  Schleiermacher,  Savigny,  "Wolf, 
Klaproth,  and  others,  which  were  in  fact,  though  not 
in  form,  systematic  university  courses.  The  formal 
opening  Avas  made  in  the  autumn  of  1810,  and  Schmalz, 
formerly  of  Halle,  was  named  first  rector.  An  unusual 
number  of  the  most  eminent  men  in  literature  and  science 
had  been  collected  in  Berlin  during  the  preceding  years, 
many  of  whom — e.g.,  F.  A.  "Wolf  and  Buttmann — though 
not  actually  professors  in  the  university,  yet,  as  members 
of  the  Academy  of  Sciences,  contributed  by  lectures  and 
otherwise  to  the  success  of  the  new  undertaking.  Among 
the  great  names  associated  with  the  Berlin  University 
in  the  early  years  of  its  existence,  one  notes  Fichte, 
Schleiermacher,  Savigny,  L  Bekker,  Aug.  Bbckh,  Mar- 
heineke,  Neander,  Eichhorn,  De  Wette,  Solger,  Ideler, 
Klaproth,  Rulis,  Schmalz,  and  Rudolphi ; — altogether  a 
constellation  of  brilliant  stars,  shedding  lustre  on  the 
youngest  of  the  German  academies. 

In  1810  Fichte  opened  his  coui-se  with  the  important 
lectures,  first  published  in  1817,  on  the  'Facts  of  Con- 
sciousness.' ^  The  new  mode  of  viewing  the  system  of 
philosophy  which  is  there  presented  was  worked  out  in 
greater  completeness,  though  not,  one  must  confess,  with 

1  '  Werke,'  vol  ii.  pp.  541-691. 
P. — IV.  .  G 


98  Fichte. 

greater  clearness,  in  the  lectures  of  1812  on  'Wissen- 
scliaftslehre,'  and  on  '  Transcendental  Logic,'  ^  and  in 
those  of  1813  on  '  Wissenscliaftslehre,'  on  the  'Theory 
of  Law,'  on  '  Ethics,'  and  on  the  '  Facts  of  Conscious- 
ness,'^ In  these  lectures  one  finds  much  difficulty  in 
recognising  the  brilliant  expositor  of  the  earlier  '  Wissen- 
schaftslehre.'  Fichte  labours  with  harsh  and  forced  meta- 
phors to  make  clear  his  new  conception  of  the  whole 
intelligible  world,  of  which  knowledge  is  but  an  imper- 
fect fragment;  but  over  the  entire  exposition  there  hangs 
an  air  of  obscurity  and  mysticism  foreign  to  liis  original 
mode  of  thinking,  and  rendering  comprehension  of  his 
meaning  unusually  hard.  It  is  evident,  indeed,  from 
the  continuous  repetitions,  from  the  over -anxiety  to 
clear  up  fundamental  points,  that  the  system  itself  was 
not  in  all  precision  of  ovitline  before  the  mind  of  the 
author.  The  true  cause  of  this  obscurity  we  shall  after- 
wards have  to  consider;  but  it  must  be  said  that,  however 
important  are  these  lectures  in  the  development  of 
Fichte's  own  thought,  they  have  had  no  significance  in 
the  history  of  speculation  as  a  whole.  His  contributions 
to  the  progress  of  German  philosophy  must  be  looked 
for  in  the  works  published  by  him,  and  mainly  in  those 
of  the  Jena  period. 

As  at  Jena,  so  here  at  Berlin,  we  have  to  observe  how 
difficult  it  was  for  Fichte's  impetuous  temper  to  accept 
any  situation  save  that  of  supreme  ruler.  His  strong 
ideas  on  university  organisation,  in  particular  his  desire 
by  the  most  stringent  penalties  to  suppress  the  corrup-. 

1  '  Nachgel.  Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  317-492 ;  vol.  i.  pp.  103-400. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  i.  pp.  1-102;  vol.  ii.  pp.  493-652;  vol.  iii.  pp.  1-118; 
vol.  i.  pp.  401-574. 


Fichte  as  Hector.  99 

tions  of  student  life,  led  to  constant  and  unseemly  con- 
flicts witli  his  colleagues.  At  Michaelmas  1811  he  had 
been  elected  rector  of  the  university  for  the  ensuing 
year,  but  after  four  months  of  office  he  resigned,  finding 
it  impossible  to  deal  after  his  own  fashion  with  univer- 
sity affairs,  while  hampered  by  the  constant  opposition 
of  the  senate.  Tliat  the  fault  was  altogether  on  the  side 
of  his  colleagues  cannot  be  admitted.  Fichte's  natural 
impatience  was  probably  aggravated  by  ill  health,  for  he 
had  never  quite  recovered  from  his  one  serious  illness  ; 
and,  if  we  may  judge  from  a  passage  in  one  of  Sol- 
ger's  letters,  his  general  demeanour  was  little  calculated 
to  produce  harmony  in  an  academic  body.  "Fichte," 
writes  Solger,  "makes  our  very  existence  bitter  by  his 
mode  of  acting, — not  only  by  his  paradoxical  whims  and 
real  absurdities,  but  by  his  obstinacy  and  egotism.  Con- 
tinuously to  Overawe  by  declaring,  '  J^ot  I  as  an  indi- 
vidual say  or  desire  this,  but  the  Idea  which  speaks  and 
acts  through  me,'  is  certainly  a  fine  mode  of  speech,  in 
which  I  willingly  recognise  true  and  honest  zeaL  But 
when  he  proceeds  in  all  matters,  the  greatest  or  the 
least,  from  the  axiom  that  the  Idea  has  selected  but  one 
organ — viz.,  Herr  Fichte  himself — it  does  appear  to  me 
that  individuality  becomes  simple  despotism.  He  has 
no  measure  in  anything ;  for  the  smallest  fault  he  treats 
the  students  as  though  they  were  imps  of  helL  He  pays 
no  regard  to  the  spirit  of  any  law  or  regulation,  but  will 
have  the  very  letter,  of  which  his  interpretation  is  often 
most  ludicrous.  The  dementia  which  is  mingled  with 
his  ingenium  is  really  childlike.  On  the  other  hand, 
where  one  of  his  whims  is  in  question,  he  will  take  the 
most  astounding  liberties  with  either  letter  or  spirit  of  a 


100  Fichte. 

law.  Is  lie  out- voted  ]  he  will  not  carry  out  the  resolu- 
tion of  the  senate,  hunts  up  the  most  ridiculous  reasons 
in  order  to  find  some  formal  error,  and,  if  this  be  unsuc- 
cessful, appeals  to  the  Government.  Moreover,  he  has 
a  band  of  students,  his  devoted  scholars,  who  have  been 
infected  with  his  accursed  desire  to  regenerate  the 
world.  These  fellows  make  the  most  shameless  repre- 
sentations to  the  senate,  and  Fichte  transmits  them 
directly  to  the  department  without  communicating  them 
to  us  as  the  real  academic  government,  gives  on  his  own 
authority  an  answer  to  the  students,  and  justifies  them 
against  the  senate."  ^ 

3. — WAR  OF  liberation:  death  of  fichte. 

The  close  of  the  year  1812  was  a  notable  epoch  in 
European  history.  In  December  the  fragments  of 
Napoleon's  great  army,  broken  and  shattered  in  the 
Russian  campaign,  reached  "Wihia,  and  the  scattered 
bands  began  to  retrace  their  steps  through  German  ter- 
ritory with  a  Eussian  army  following  close  upon  them. 
The  magic  influence  of  the  great  conqueror  seemed  to 
have  received  its  death-blow,  and  throughout  all  Europe 
began  a  general  stir  and  commotion.  In  Prussia  more 
especially,  weak  and  dispirited  as  she  then  appeared  to 
be, — for  her  army  Avas  numerically  small,  her  fortresses 
and  chief  towns  still  in  the  hands  of  the  invader, — it  was 
felt  that  the  time  at  last  had  come  for  a  decisive  effort 
towards  independence.  An  indescribable  enthusiasm, 
hardly  to  be  restrained  from  premature  and  fatal  out- 
break, agitated  the  whole  people.  The  nation  and  the 
army,  in  the  most  eager  excitement,  waited  with  impa- 
1  From  Noack,  '  J.  G.  Fichte's  Leben,'  &c.,  pp.  541,  542. 


War  of  Liberation.  101 

tience  for  some  movement  on  the  part  of  their  sovereign. 
The  wisest  and  most  prudent  heads  perceived  how  neces- 
sary it  was  for  the  future  of  Prussia  and  of  Germany 
that  their  deliverance  should  not  be  left  passively  to  the 
exertions  of  the  Russian  power.  Only  by  vigorous  and 
iinited  action  could  Prussia  hope  to  regain  her  position 
among  the  Powers  of  Europe.  Events  had  been  to  a 
certain  extent  precipitated  by  the  independent  action  of 
some  of  the  leaders — e.g.,  by  Torek's  secession  from  the 
French  army  and  conclusion  of  the  famous  Convention 
of  Tauroggen ;  but  it  was  needful  that  the  Avork  should 
be  taken  in  hand  by  the  nation  itself,  and  that  the  king 
should  be  compelled  to  act  with  rapidity  and  vigour. 
The  flight  of  the  king  in  February  to  Breslau,  where 
he  was  in  comparative  freedom  from  French  control, 
was  the  first  decisive  step,  for  it  thus  became  possible 
for  him  to  assent  openly  to  the  alliance  Avith  Eussia, 
already  initiated  independently  of  him  by  Yorck  and 
Stein. ^  On  the  28th  of  the  same  month  was  con- 
cluded the  Treaty  of  Kalisch,  whereby  the  two  Powers, 
Russia  and  Prussia,  bound  themselves  to  carry  on  in 
concert  the  war  against  their  common  enemy.  On  the 
2d  March  the  Russians  crossed  the  Oder,  and  were  fol- 
lowed, on  the  10th,  by  the  Prussian  troops.  On  the  16th 
the  formal  declaration  of  war  was  made,  and  on  the 
ensuing  day  the  king  issued  his  famous  "  Summons  to 
my  people."  The  appeal  was  nobly  responded  to.  From 
every  quarter,  from  every  rank  of  society,  recruits  and 
vohmteers  poured  in.     The  universities  were  emptied  of 

^  The  troubled  movements  of  this  important  time  are  narrated  with 
great  fulness  and  precision  in  Seeley's  'Life  and  Times  of  Stein,'  vol. 
iii.  pp.  1-103. 


102  Fichte. 

their  students,  even,  the  gymnasia  sent  their  Pnmaner 
to  the  front.  Scharnhorst's  great  ■war-mechanism  began 
to  appear  in  its  true  form,  and  those  who  from  age  or 
other  cause  were  unable  to  serve  in  the  ranks,  enrolled 
themselves  in  the  Landsturm,  and  prepared  to  play  their 
part  in  the  struggle  for  national  independence. 

To  Fichte  this  wonderful  upheaval  of  the  Prussian 
people  presented  itself  in  its  great  historical  aspects  as 
the  typical  contest  between  the  principles  of  reason  and 
self-will,  and  as  the  means  by  which  the  long-desired 
imity  of  the  German  nation  might  be  achieved.  On  the 
19th  February  1813,  he  closed  his  winter  course  of 
philosophical  lectures  with  an  eloquent  address  to  the 
students,  encouraging  them  in  their  heroic  devotion,  and 
emphasising  the  noble  character  of  the  work  on  which 
they  were  about  to  enter.  ^  In  the  summer  of  the  same 
year  he  delivered  to  such  audience  as  could  be  gathered 
in  the  auditorium  of  the  university,  the  lectures  "  On 
the  idea  of  a  just  war  "  (afterwards  incorporated  in  the 
posthumous  '  Staats-lehre '),  in  which  he  characterised 
with  force  and  eloquence  the  significance  of  a  national 
war,  and  contrasted  the  idea  for  which  the  German 
people  Avas  about  to  contend  with  the  principles  of  their 
great  foe.^  By  this  contest,  it  appeared  to  him,  the 
unity  of  the  German  people  might  be  attained  sooner 
than  had  previously  seemed  possible.  For,  as  he  point- 
edly declares  in  tlie  remarkable  'Political  Fragment 
from  the  year  1813,'  "a  nation  becomes  a  nation  through 
war  and  through  a  common  struggle.  Who  shares  not 
in  the  present  war  can  by  no  decree  be  incorporated  in 

1  'Werke,'  vol.  iv.  pp.  603-610. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  iv.  pp.  401-430. 


War  of  Liberation.  103 

the  German  nation."  ^  As  was  natural,  his  tendency  to 
regard  Prussia  as  the  kernel  and  destined  head  of  the 
united  German  people  received  fresh  strength  from  the 
events  of  the  time,  for  Pnissia  alone  seemed  to  show  the 
genuine  enthusiasm  of  a  nation  struggling  for  its  exist- 
ence. In  brief  aphoristic  fashion  the  'Political  Frag- 
ment' passes  in  review  the  claims  of  the  several  chief 
states,  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Saxony,  to  the  headship  of 
Germany,  and  the  balance  is  inclined  strongly  towards 
Prussia.^ 

A  more  active  part  than  by  the  lectures  it  was  not 
permitted  to  him  to  take.  Again,  as  in  the  war  of  1806, 
he  proposed  to  the  Government  that  he  should  exercise 
his  oratorical  powers  on  the  army  directly,  but  again  his 
request  was  declined.  He  remained  in  Berlin,  practising 
the  military  exercises  in  the  Landsturm,  and  resuming, 
in  the  winter  of  1813,  his  ordinary  courses  of  lectures  at 
the  university. 

The  current  of  the  war,  which  at  first  threatened 
Berlin,  had  been  diverted  from  the  capital  by  the  vic- 
tories of  Gross-Beeren  and  Dennewitz,  but  the  numerous 
combats  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  city  had  left 
a  sad  legacy  in  hospitals  overcrowded  with  sick  and 
wounded.  The  civic  authorities,  unable  with  the  means 
at  their  disposal  to  cope  with  the  unusual  burden  im- 
posed upon  them,  appealed  for  aid  to  the  citizens,  and 
especially  solicited  the  assistance  of  women  for  the  work 
of  nursinff.     Among  the  first  who  offered  their  services 


1  'Werke,'  vol.  vii.  p.  550. 

-  Fichte's  view  on  this  interesting  point  is  noted,  but  given  some- 
what too  positively,  in  Von  Treitschke's  historical  eulogy  of  Prussia, 
'  Deutsche  Geschichte  im  19ten  Jahrhundert.'    See  Bd.  i.  p.  436. 


104  Fichte. 

was  the  wife  of  Fichte,  and  throughout  the  winter 
months  of  1813  she  laboured  incessantly  in  the  hospitals. 
On  the  3d  January  of  the  following  year  she  was  struck 
down  by  a  serious,  apparently  fatal,  nervous  fever.  Her 
husband,  then  opening  a  new  course  of  philosophical 
lectures,  attended  constantly  on  her  during  the  day,  and 
left  her  only  in  the  evening  for  his  class-room.  The 
crisis  had  hardly  been  passed,  and  hope  entertained 
of  her  recovery,  when  the  same  disease  struck  down 
his  strong  frame.  For  eleven  days  he  lingered,  with 
but  few  intervals  of  clear  consciousness,  his  sleep  be- 
coming ever  deeper,  till  on  the  night  of  the  27  th 
January  all  sign  of  life  gradually  vanished.  He  was 
buried  in  the  first  churchyard  before  the  Oranienburg 
gate  in  Berlin ;  at  his  side  now  lie  the  remains  of  Hegel 
and  Solger.  Five  years  later  his  wife  was  laid  at  his 
feet.  On  the  tall  obelisk  which  marks  his  grave  is  the 
inscription  from  the  Book  of  Daniel :  "  The  teachers 
shall  shine  as  the  brightness  of  the  firmament,  and  they 
that  turn  many  to  righteousness  as  the  stars  that  shine 
for  ever  and  ever." 

In  person  Fichte  was  short  and  strongly  made  ;  the 
head  massive,  with  pronounced  features,  keen  and 
piercing  eyes,  thick  and  dark  hair.  In  all  his  move- 
ments, as  in  his  actions,  he  was  quick,  impetuous,  and 
strong.  His  life  lies  before  us  as  the  manifestation  of  a 
powerful  and  heroic  spirit,  marked  by  clearness  of  in- 
sight and  resoluteness  of  conviction,  and  animated  by 
the  loftiest  ethical  feeling.  His  errors  are  tnily  the 
defects  of  these  great  qualities. 


105 


CHAPTEE    Y. 

GENERAL   IDEA   OF   PICHTe's   PHILOSOPHY. 

The  philosophy  of  Fichte  attaches  itself,  by  a  kind  of 
natural  necessity,  to  that  of  Kant,  of  which  it  is  an 
extension  and  development,  and  in  relation  to  wliich  it 
has  its  special  significance.  The  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  obtaining  a  summary  view  of  its  nature  and  tendency 
are  thus,  for  the  general  reader,  increased.  From  the  pecu- 
liar form  of  the  system,  it  is  not  at  all  possible  to  effect 
an  easy  entrance  into  it ;  bi;t  the  closeness  of  its  con- 
nection with  the  Kantian  philosophy  renders  it  necessary 
not  only  that  the  reader  shoidd  become  acquainted  with 
the  specific  character  of  the  critical  method,  with  tlie  point 
of  view  from  which  the  problems  of  speculative  thought 
are  reg<arded  in  all  later  German  systems,  but  also  that 
he  should  have  a  sufficient  grasp  of  the  details  of  the 
critical  philosophy  to  appreciate  what  is  peculiar  in 
Fichte's  advance  upon  it.  Of  these  fundamental  re- 
quisites for  comprehension  of  Fichte's  doctrine,  the  first 
is  the  more  important, — even,  one  may  say,  the  more 
essential.  The  English  student  who  has  been  accus- 
tomed to  the  analytical  and  psychological  method  of 
Berkeley,  or  Hume,  or  Mill,  or  even  to  the  more  de- 


106  Fichte. 

veloped  forms  of  recent  realistic  or  scientific  thinking, 
as  in  Spencer,  finds  himself,  as  it  were,  in  a  new  world, 
when  he  is  brought  into  contact  with  the  Kantian  and 
post -Kantian  speculations  —  a  world  in  which  at  first 
sight  all  appears  to  be  inverted  or  reversed.  Apparent 
inversion,  as  we  know,  may  arise  either  from  the  posi- 
tion of  the  things  themselves,  or  from  the  inverted  view 
of  the  observer ;  and  the  extraordinary  difiBrence  between 
the  English  and  the  later  German  philosophy  is  merely 
the  result  of  the  fundamental  difi'erence  in  point  of  view 
from  which  they  contemplate  philosophical  questions. 
The  problems  with  which  both  are  engaged  are  of  neces- 
sity the  same — no  philosophy  is  ever  new — but  the 
methods  employed  are  radically  divergent,  and  not  with- 
out careful  analysis  and  criticism  can  they  be  brought 
within  sight  of  one  another.  It  is  indispensable,  in 
attempting  to  give  a  systematic  account  of  one  phase  of 
German  speculation,  that  we  should  endeavour  to  make 
clear  the  characteristic  feature  which  distinguishes  that 
mode  of  thought,  and  we  can  hardly  do  so  without  com- 
paring it  to  some  extent  with  the  prevailing  type  of 
English  philosophy.  So  soon  as  the  point  of  view  and 
method  of  treatment  have  become  clear,  we  are  in  a 
position  to  consider  the  problems  to  which  the  specula- 
tive method  must  be  applied,  and  thus  to  obtain  a  pre- 
liminary outline  or  general  conception  of  the  whole 
system.  This,  in  the  first  instance,  is  what  we  propose 
to  undertake,  leaving  to  the  more  detailed  account  of  the 
system  the  second  introductory  subject — the  contents  or 
results  of  the  Kantian  philosophy. 

If  we  consider  what  is  involved  in  the  descriptive 
adjectives  which  have  been  applied  to  what  may  be 


The  Kantian  Philosophy.  107 

called  the  current  English  philosophy,  we  shall  be  able 
to  discover,  by  mere  force  of  contrast,  some  of  the  most 
important  characteristics  of  the  Kantian  method  of 
speculative  research.  Historically,  indeed,  the  Kantian 
method  was  an  attempt  to  revise  what  had  appeared  as 
the  final  result  of  English  philosophy ;  and  though  the 
later  post-Kantian  writers  make  little  or  no  reference  to 
EngHsh  thought,  the  connection  between  the  two  is  not 
to  be  overlooked-  A  more  fruitful  conception  of  the 
aim  and  function  of  speculative  thinking  is  to  be  ol> 
tained  by  working  towards  Kant  from  the  position  of 
Locke  and  Hume  than  from  that  of  Leibnitz,  important 
as  the  influence  of  the  latter  undoubtedly  was.  The 
English  philosophy,  wo  have  said,  may  be  distinguished 
as  prevailingly  analytical  or  psychological  in  method. 
In  other  words,  if  it  be  regarded  as  the  primary  and 
all-comprehensive  function  of  philosophy  to  render  in- 
telligible the  whole  of  experience,  to  give  a  systematic 
and  reasoned  account  of  all  that  enters  into  the  life  of 
the  human  thinking  being,  then  the  method  of  Locke, 
Berkeley,  Hume,  and  their  successors,  proposes  to  sup- 
ply answers  to  the  various  problems  into  which  this 
one  comprehensive  inquiry  divides  itself,  by  an  analysis 
of  the  conscious  experience  of  the  thinking  subject,  by 
a  complete  psychology  of  human  nature.  Conscious  ex- 
perience, that  of  which  the  individual  subject  becomes 
aware  as  making  up  his  existence,  is  regarded  as  material 
upon  which  the  processes  of  observation,  classification, 
analysis,  employed  to  good  purpose  in  physical  inquiries, 
are  to  be  directed.  At  first  sight,  indeed,  such  a  method 
appears  not  merely  natural,  but  the  only  possible  way  in 
which  a  philosophical  theory,  granting  such  to  be  feas- 


108  Fichte. 

ible,  can  be  constructed.  For  is  not  a  philosopliical 
theory  a  kind  of  knowledge  ?  And  how  otherwise  than 
by  investigation  of  the  contents  of  mind  can  we  arrive 
at  any  conclusions  regarding  the  nature  and  limits  of 
knowledge  1  "  It  surely  needs  no  argumentation,"  says 
a  distingviished  exponent  of  the  view,  "  to  show  that 
the  problem,  "What  can  we  know  1  cannot  be  approached 
without  the  examination  of  the  contents  of  the  mind, 
and  the  determination  of  how  much  of  these  contents 
maybe  called  knowledge."-^  Since  that  which  stands 
in  need  of  explanation  is  experience  itself,  we  evidently 
cannot  explain  it  otherwise  than  by  looking  at  it.  To 
look  beyond  experience  is  absurd ;  there  is  evidently 
nothing  left  but  the  examination  of  experience,  and  to 
this  philosophy  must  needs  be  confined. 

It  may  here  be  remarked  that  any  difference  between 
the  philosophical  methods  under  comparison  does  not 
arise  concerning  the  restriction  of  knowledge  to  experi- 
ence. Fichte  as  well  as  Kant  is  aware  that  philosophy 
has  only  to  thirik  experience,  that  it  in  no  way  adds  to 
experience,  and  that  it  must  contain  nothing  beyond 
experience.  "  I  declare,"  he  writes  in  one  of  the  most 
popular  of  his  expositions,  "  the  very  innermost  spirit 
and  soul  of  my  philosophy  to  be,  that  man  has  nothing 
beyond  experience,  and  that  he  obtains  all  that  he  has, 
from  experience,  from  life  only.  All  his  thinking, 
whether  vague  or  scientific,  whether  popular  or  tran- 
scendental, proceeds  from  experience  and  concerns  nothing 
but  experience."  ^     Any  divergence  arises,  not  from  dis- 

1  Huxley's  'Hume,'  p.  49. 

2  "  Sonnenklarer  Bericht,"  'Werke,'  vol.  ii.  p.  333.     Cf.  'Werke,' 
vol.  ii.  pp.  9, 10,  123,  395 ;  vol.  v.  pp.  340-344. 


The  English  Method.  109 

agreement  respecting  the  quite  empty  proposition,  that 
there  is  notliing  beyond  experience,  but  from  some  differ- 
ence in  conception  of  experience  and  in  the  method  of 
dealing  with  it.  Critical  examination  often  shows  that 
under  an  apparently  simple  question  or  statement  a  whole 
theory  lies  concealed,  and  that  the  inferences  drawn  fol- 
low not  from  the  fact  contained  in  the  query  or  proposi- 
tion, but  from  the  underlying  theory.  Thus,  in  the  case 
in  point,  the  restriction  of  philosophical  inquiry  to  expe- 
rience has  always  meant,  to  writers  of  the  English  school, 
that  phenomena  of  inner  and  outer  life  are  known  in  the 
same  way,  and  that  beyond  the  knowledge  thus  obtained 
there  is  nothing  standing  in  need  of  investigation  or 
capable  of  being  investigated.  "  Psychology,"  says  the 
writer  previously  referred  to,  "  differs  from  physical 
science  only  in  the  nature  of  its  subject-matter,  and 
not  in  its  method  of  investigation."^ 

English  philosophy  thus  starts  with  a  definite  concep- 
tion of  the  nature  and  limits  of  speculative  inquiry. 
Experience,  inner  and  outer,  is  equally  matter  for 
scientific  treatment ;  and  the  results  of  such  treatment 
form,  on  the  one  hand,  natural  science  strictly  so  called — 
on  the  other,  mental  science,  of  which  certain  generalised 
propositions  make  up  the  substance  of  philosophy.  It 
is  not  putting  the  matter  too  strongly  to  say  that  the 
categorical  rejection  of  this  psychological  method  is  the 
very  essence  of  the  critical  philosophy,  the  key-note  of 
the  critical  spirit  in  speculation.  For  Kant,  as  for 
Fichte,  psychology  is  a  science  or  doctrine  subordinate 
to  philosophy  proper,  involving  in  its  method  assump- 
tions which  it  is  the  very  business  of  philosophy  to  dis- 
1  Huxley's  '  Hume,'  p.  51. 


110  Fichte. 

cuss,  and  employing  notions  which  it  is  the  function  of 
philosophy  to  criticise.  So  far  from  speculative  prin- 
ciples being  generalisations  from  psychological  data,  they 
are  antecedent  to  the  establishment  of  such  data  as  facts 
of  experience.  The  naive  doctrine  that  since  cognition 
is  an  aspect  or  form  of  conscious  experience,  its  nature, 
extent,  and  validity  are  to  be  considered  by  investigating 
it  according  to  the  rules  of  scientific  method, — ^just  as  we 
should  investigate  an  object  presented  in  outer  experi- 
ence,— is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  truth  which  the 
most  metaphysical  thinker  acknowledges,  that  only  by 
thought  can  thought  be  tested  and  examined.  The 
special  lesson  of  the  critical  philosophy  is  that  the 
assumption  of  a  distinction  of  the  whole  field  of  experi- 
ence into  the  two  realms  of  objective  facts  and  of  sub- 
jective facts  itself  requires  examination  and  defence. 
We  must  consider  what  the  significance  of  such  a  dis- 
tinction is  for  the  conscious  subject  within  whose 
experience  it  presents  itself,  and  under  what  condi- 
tions it  can  be  recognised  by  him.  Were  we  to  begin 
our  philosophical  analysis,  as  psychology  must  begin, 
with  the  distinction  as  in  some  way  a  fact  given,  and 
assume  simply  that  the  thinking  subject  is  confronted 
with  two  orders  of  phenomena  to  be  interpreted  through 
the  same  notions,  we  should  commit  a  twofold  error. 
For,  on  the  one  hand,  while  in  words  we  appear  to 
assert  that  the  two  orders  of  facts  make  up  all  that  is, 
we  have  in  reality  placed  alongside  of  them,  in  a  quite 
inexplicable  fashion,  the  thinking  subject  or  mind,  a 
tertium  quid  which  certainly  stands  in  need  of  some 
explanation;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  qualities  and 
relations  discoverable  among  facts,  when  contemplated 


The  English  Method.  Ill 

as  matters  of  observation  for  the  thinking  subject,  are 
only  such  as  appear  to  a  supposed  external  observer, 
and  not  their  qualities  and  relations  for  the  intelligence 
whose  very  substance  they  compose.  "We  voluntarily 
abstract  from  the  essential  feature  of  the  problem,  the 
existence  of  the  conscious  subject  for  whom  the  orders 
of  facts  are  there  present,  and  must  therefore  recognise 
that  any  conclusions  from  investigation  of  the  facts  have 
validity  only  in  subordination  to  the  abstraction  from 
which  we  start.  Thus  psychology,  as  ordinarily  con- 
ceived— the  scientific  account  of  the  phenomena  to  be 
observed  in  consciousness,  the  description,  analysis,  and 
history  of  mental  phenomena — stands  on  precisely  the 
same  level  as  the  natural  sciences,  and  like  them,  leaves 
out  of  consideration  the  problem  with  which  philosophy 
as  such  has  to  deal  Even  the  analysis  of  mental  states, 
which  forms  a  portion  of  psychological  treatment,  is  the 
analysis  of  them  as  facts  of  observation, — that  is,  the  de- 
termination of  the  conditions  on  which  their  occurrence 
depends,  the  separation  of  simpler  and  more  complex 
states,  and  the  formulation  of  general  laws  of  coexist- 
ence and  succession,  not  the  analysis  of  their  significance 
as  elements  of  the  cognitive  or  moral  experience  of  a 
conscious  subject  Tlie  fundamental  notions  which  we 
apply  in  psychological  research  are  those  of  all  scientific 
method,  and  concern  objects — i.e.,  things  regarded  as 
existing  in  conjunction  and  mutual  interdependence. 
Their  very  applicability,  therefore,  depends  on  the  reso- 
lution of  the  prior  questions  as  to  the  significance  of 
knowledge  of  any  thing  or  object,  and  the  relations 
involved  therein.  Such  prior  questions  may  be  called, 
in  Kantian  phraseology,  transcendental,  and  the  whole 


'112  Ficlite. 

method  by  which  they  are  treated  the  transcendental 
method.  The  substitution  of  this  transcendental  method 
for  the  earlier  abstract  metaphysics,  and  for  the  prevail- 
ingly psychological  fashion  of  dealing  with  philosophical 
problems,  is,  in  brief,  Kant's  contribution  to  modern 
thought.^ 

The  fundamental  difference  between  the  psychological 
method  of  dealing  with  philosophical  problems,  the 
method  which  regards  the  states  of  mind  as  so  many 
definite  objects  for  a  conscious  observer,  and  the  tran- 
scendental method,  which  proposes  for  consideration  the 
conditions  under  which  knowledge  of  a  thing  is  possible 
for  a  thinking  subject  and  the  significance  of  such  know- 
ledge, appears  with  great  clearness  in  the  philosophical 
system  of  Berkeley — a  system  in  which  both  methods 
may  be  discerned,  though  neither  receives  precise  ex- 
pression, and  the  combination  seems  to  have  remained 
unobserved  by  the  author.  Berkeley's  thinking  is  in  so 
many  ways  typical  of  the  English  spirit,  his  idealism 
has  affected  so  much  of  current  speculation,  and  his 
position  in  the  general  development  of  modem  philo- 
sophy is  so  peculiar,  that  it  is  Avorth  while  here  to  scru- 
tinise somewhat  closely  the  principles  upon  Avhich  he 
proceeded. 

Beyond  all  question,  Berkeley  started,  in  his  philoso- 

1  The  term  transcendental  probably  has,  for  English  ears,  an  un- 
pleasant ring,  and  will  suggest  metaphysical  efforts  to  transcend 
experience.  It  must  be  understood,  however,  that  transcendental 
method  is  simply  the  patient  and  rigorous  analysis  of  experience 
itself.  For  any  question  or  theorem  which  might  pass  beyond  pos- 
sible experience,  Kant  reserved  the  term  transceyident ;  and  the  dis- 
tinction, if  not  the  mode  of  expressing  it,  is  accepted  by  all  his 
successors.  Neither  in  Kant  nor  in  Fichte  is  there  anything  in  the 
slightest  degree  resembling  what  is  commonly  called  metaphysics. 


The  System  of  Berkeley.  113 

pliical  analysis,  with  a  doctrine  which  in  terms  may  be 
regarded  as  identical  with  the  principle  of  the  transcen- 
dental method.  He  proposed  to  investigate  philoso- 
phical notions  or  terms  in  the  light  of  the  doctrine,  that 
no  fact  can  possibly  be  admitted  which  is  not  a  fact 
for  some  conscious  subject.  Every  metaphysical  theorem 
or  notion  must  be  subjected  to  the  same  test,  reduction 
of  its  terms  to  the  experience  of  a  thinking  being.  His 
attack  on  abstractions  is  thus  virtually  identical  with 
the  Kantian  criticism  of  things -in -themselves.  For 
Berkeley  an  abstraction  is  a  supposed  fact  of  experience 
which  from  its  nature  cannot  possibly  form  part  of  the 
experience  of  a  conscious  subject.  If  we  remove  from 
a  fact  those  relations  or  qualifications  through  which 
only  it  enters  into  and  forms  portion  of  the  conscious 
experience  of  some  subject,  we  have  as  result  an  ah- 
stractum  or  contradiction, — something  supposed  to  be  a 
possible  object  of  experience,  and  yet  at  the  same  time 
wanting  in  the  qualities  requisite  for  any  such  object. 
Material  substance  as  distinct  from  the  varied  and 
specificaUy  qualified  material  things,  unqualified  matter 
as  the  cause  of  objective  phenomena,  things  as  existing 
out  of  relation  to  conscious  intelligence,  abstract  ideas 
of  facts  of  experience,  are  instances  of  such  abstraction. 
Berkeley's  demand  that,  before  discussing  problems  as 
to  matter,  cause,  substance,  and  other  metaphysical  no- 
tions, we  shall  first  determine  what  they  mean  for  us, 
has  the  true  note  of  the  transcendental  method. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  beyond  doubt  that 
Berkeley,  under  the  influence  of  Locke's  philosophy, 
accepted  as  the  criterion  of  the  possibility  of  entrance 
into  the  conscious  experience  of  a  subject,  the  possibility 

p. — IV.  H 


lU  Fichte. 

of  forming  one  fact  of  observation  in  the  observed  sum 
of  states  making  up  conscious  experience.  In  his  view, 
as  in  that  of  Locke,  existence  for  a  self-conscious  sub- 
ject meant  individual  or  particular  existence  as  an  object 
of  internal  observation.  Thus  from  the  outset  he  united 
in  one  system  the  transcendental  and  the  psychological 
methods,  and  the  history  of  the  development  of  his 
thoughts  is  an  instructive  record  of  the  struggle  between 
the  two  principles.  The  manifold  inconsistencies  which 
criticism  discloses  in  his  doctrine  are  natural  residts  of 
the  attempt,  however  unconscious,  to  combine  two  radi- 
cally incompatible  views. 

Berkeley's  earliest  reflections,  those  contained  in  the 
'  Commonplace  Book,'  discovered  and  published  by 
Professor  Fraser,  are  dominated  throughout  by  the  in- 
dividualist notion  which  is  part  of  the  psychological 
method.  He  is  even  disposed  at  times  to  reject  his 
underlying  doctrine  of  the  necessary  implication  of  sub- 
ject and  object,  and  to  regard  mind  itself  as  but  a  collec- 
tion of  particular  ideas,  as,  indeed,  mind  necessarily  is, 
for  internal  observation.  In  the  first  formal  stage  of  his 
philosophy,  the  stage  represented  by  the  'Principles,' 
the  most  characteristic  features  are  due  to  the  steady 
application  of  the  individualist  criterion.  It  seems  evi- 
dent to  him  that  to  the  observer,  regarded  as  standing 
apart  from  conscious  experience,  nothing  can  be  pre- 
sented but  isolated,  single  states,  connected  externally  or 
contingently,  containing  in  themselves  no  reference  to 
underlying  substance  or  cause,  and  existing  only  as  facts 
for  an  observer.  The  result  is  one  aspect,  unfortunately 
almost  the  only  aspect  known,  of  the  Berkeleian  idealism. 
Existence  is  the  sum  of  states  making  up  the  experience 


Berkeley's  Idealism.  115 

of  the  individual ;  there  is  nothing  beyond  the  mind  and 
its  own  phenomena.  From  such  a  mere  subjective  fancy 
no  philosophical  aid  is  to  be  found  for  resolving  any  of 
the  harder  problems  of  thought.  As  the  matter  is  well 
put  by  Dr  Stirling  :  "  The  same  things  that  were  called 
without  or  noumenal,  are  now  called  tcithin  and  phenom- 
enal ;  but,  call  them  as  you  may,  it  is  their  systematic 
explanation  that  is  wanted.  Such  systematic  explana- 
tion, embracing  man  and  the  entire  round  of  his  experi- 
ences, sensuous,  intellectual,  moral,  religious,  sesthetical, 
political,  &c.,  is  alone  philosophy,  and  to  that  no  repeti- 
tion of  without  is  within,  or  matter  is  phenomenal,  will 
ever  prove  adeqiiate."^  In  short,  the  slightest  reflection 
enables  one  to  see  that  the  most  airy  subjective  idealism 
and  the  crassest  materialism  are  one  and  the  same.  In 
both  cases  we  are  left  with  the  mere  statement  that 
things  are  what  they  are,  and  it  matters  not  whether  we 
call  them  ideas  or  forms  of  matter. 

This,  however,  is  but  one  side  of  Berkeley's  so-called 
idealism.  Although,  while  developing  from  the  individu- 
alist principle,  he  coidd  arrive  at  no  other  conclusion  than 
that  experience  consists  in  the  isolated  states  of  the  in- 
dividual thinker,  yet  it  seemed  to  him  equally  clear  that 
the  conscious  subject  could  not  be  regarded  as  merely 
one  of  the  objects  of  internal  observation.  The  inde- 
pendent existence  and  activity  of  the  conscious  self  were 
therefore  admitted  by  him  as  somehow  beyond  experi- 
ence in  the  narrow  sense,  and  in  a  very  confused  fashion 
he  proceeded  to  ask  what  the  significance  of  experience 
could  be  for  such  a  self-conscious  subject  His  answer, 
given  briefly  and  without  adequate  investigation  of  its 

1  "  Annotations  "  to  Schwegler's  '  History  of  Philosophy, '  p.  419. 


116  FlcMe. 

real  ground,  was  practically  that  for  such  a  subject  con- 
scious experience  must  present  itself  as  a  conditioned 
and  dependent  fact,  as  a  series  of  accidents  of  which 
intelligence  or  mind  is  the  substance,  as  a  series  of  effects 
of  which  intelligence  or  mind  is  the  cause.  Thus  the 
psychological  idealism,  reached  by  application  of  the  one 
method,  was  transformed  by  application  of  the  other  into 
a  species  of  objective  or  theological  idealism.  The  con- 
ception of  a  mere  flux  of  conscious  states  was  converted 
into  the  more  complex  notion  of  an  intelligible  system 
— a  world  of  free  and  independent  spirits,  whose  modes 
of  action  and  passion  are  the  several  modifications  of 
actual  experience  as  known  to  us.  Finite  minds  are 
related  to  one  another  and  to  the  Infinite  Mind  by 
mutual  action  and  reaction.  The  course  of  nature  is  the 
result  of  the  operation  of  the  Divme  Mind  on  finite 
intelligences. 

A  notion  like  this  is  essentially  what  Kant  and  Fichte 
call  "dogmatic."-^  It  implies  or  starts  from  the  assumj)- 
tion  of  an  absolute  opposition  between  two  orders  of  real 
existences,  the  finite  and  the  infinite  mind,  and  endea- 
vours to  explain  their  reconciliation  or  conjunction  by 
means  of  a  conception  which  has  validity  only  for  the 
diverse  objects  of  one  conscious  subject.  A  conscious 
subject  can  only  think  the  objects  which  make  up  his 
experience  as  mutually  determining,  for  only  so  do  they 
compose  one  experience.  To  transfer  this  notion  to  the  pos- 
sible relations  of  infinite  and  finite  intelligences,  which 
by  supposition  are  not  mere  objects  for  mind,  is  to  make 
an  invalid,  or  technically,  a  transcendent  use  of  it.     jS"o 

1  See  for  Fichte's  vigorous  criticism  of  Berkeley,  'Werke,'  vol.  i. 
pp.  438,  439. 


Berkeley's  Idealism,  117 

ingenuity  can  render  a  finite  and  relative  notion  like  that 
of  causal  action,  or  of  mutual  determination,  adequate 
to  express  the  possible  connection  between  experience 
and  the  ground  of  all  possible  experience.  God  and  the 
world  are  not  to  be  thought  as  respectively  cause  and  effect. 
The  Berkeleian  theological  idealism  thus  yields  no  so- 
lution of  the  problem  it  was  intended  to  answer.  It  is 
simply  a  translation  into  the  language  of  idealism  of  the 
popular  view  that  the  experience  of  the  conscious  subject 
is  due  to  some  action  from  without ;  and  if  no  further 
analysis  be  given,  it  is  not  of  the  slightest  consequence, 
philosophically,  whether  we  say  that  God  is  the  cause 
of  the  varied  character  of  conscious  experience,  or  that 
things  in  themselves  are  the  cause.  In  both  cases  we 
have  started  with  the  conception  of  the  finite,  self- 
existent  mind,  and  explain  its  experience  as  communi- 
cated to  it  from  without.  Such  a  mere  fashion  of 
speech  makes  clear  neither  what  the  significance  of 
"  coming  from  without "  can  be  for  an  intelligence  pos- 
sessing only  subjective  states,  nor  how  the  notion  of 
"  without "  can  possibly  arise  in  its  consciousness,  nor 
how  it  comes  to  regard  itself  as  finite,  and  to  refer  for 
explanation  to  an  Infinite  Mind.^ 

^  One  of  these  unanswered  difBculties  suggests  the  reason  for  the 
close  similarity  which  has  been  found  hetwen  Berkeley  and  Leibnitz. 
From  Berkeley's  subjective  or  psychological  point  of  view,  the  crite- 
rion of  objectivity  is  want  of  consciousness  of  productive  power  on 
the  part  of  the  thinking  subject.  Now  evidently,  in  the  absence  of 
other  grounds,  objectivity  of  this  sort  might  be  accounted  for  by 
reference  to  unconscious  acts  of  production  on  the  part  of  the  sub- 
ject, as  well  as  by  action  from  without.  Experience  would  thus  be 
the  evolution  of  the  thinking  subject ;  inner  and  outer  would  imply 
only  differences  in  the  conscious  activity  of  the  subject ;  the  Berke- 
leian finite  mind  would  be  identical  with  the  Leibnitzian  monad. 


118  Fichte. 

The  later  stages  of  Berkeley's  thinking  show  the 
gradual  perception  on  his  part  of  the  deficiencies  in  his 
earlier  doctrine.  On  the  one  hand,  it  became  increas- 
ingly apparent  that  the  results  of  the  psychological 
method  required  to  he  qualified  or  limited  by  reference 
to  the  counter-conception  of  the  conscious  subject  as  in 
no  sense  a  possible  object  of  conscious  experience  :  on 
the  other  hand,  it  began  to  appear  doubtful  to  Berkeley'' 
how  far  any  worth  or  validity  could  be  ascribed  to  the 
psychological  method  He  had  assumed  throughout  his 
earHer  inquiry  that  to  the  supposed  external  observer, 
whether  our  own  mind  or  not,  the  facts  of  conscious  ex- 
perience would  present  themselves  as  a  contingent  series 
or  stream ;  but  it  now  occurred  to  him  that  in  so  doing, 
he  had  simply  cast  into  the  mind  of  this  external  ob- 
server all  that  was  required  to  render  knowledge  pos- 
sible, all  that  must  be  investigated  before  we  can  deter- 
mine what  knowledge  really  is.  Thus,  in  'Alciphron,' 
stress  is  laid  upon  the  fact  that  Self  is  not  an  idea — i.e., 
not  an  object  of  observation ;  and  on  the  analogy  of  this, 
the  wider  inference  is  rested,  that  many  intellectual  prin- 
ciples may  likewise  have  validity,  although  what  they 
refer  to  can  in  no  sense  be  reduced  to  ideas,  or  isolated 
individual  elements  of  conscious  experience.  In  '  Siris,' 
Berkeley  begins  to  point  out  that  the  stream  of  contin- 
gent facts  of  experience  is  not  a  datum  requiring  merely 
to  be  observed,  but  is  possible  material  of  knowledge 
only  for  an  intelligence  which  combines  the  scattered 
parts  in  relations  not  included  in  the  conception  of  them 
as  mere  objects.  In  fact,  in  the  latest  stage  of  his  philo- 
sophical development,  it  becomes  evident  to  him  that 
the  so-called  simple  ideas  of  Locke  are  really  concrete 


Tlie  Psychological  Method.  119 

and  complex  units  of  cognition ;  and  that  sense,  so  far 
from  furnishing  a  kind  of  knowledge,  supplies  only  ele- 
ments, which  for  a  thinking  subject  are  possible  mate- 
rial of  knowledge. 

Berkeley's  doctrine  has  been  considered  in  some  de- 
tail, partly  because  no  subsequent  English  philosophical 
thinking  seems  to  have  advanced  beyond  his  position, 
partly  because  one  can  discern  very  clearly  in  him  the 
principles  upon  which  English  philosophy  has  always 
proceeded-  The  results  of  his  work  will  probably  have 
made  intelligible  what  is  to  be  understood  by  the  psycho- 
logical method  of  treating  speculative  problems,  what  is 
the  precise  nature  of  the  assumptions  underlying  it,  and 
what,  on  the  whole,  must  be  the  characteristic  feature  of 
the  opposed  method.  The  psychological  method,  start- 
ing from  the  point  of  view  of  ordinary  consciousness, 
in  which  the  individual  subject  is  confronted  with  two 
dissimilar  series  of  facts,  inner  and  outer  experience, 
and  in  which  each  series,  as  it  presents  itself  separately, 
is  viewed  from  the  same  quasi  external  position,  proceeds 
to  treat  these  facts  by  the  help  of  the  familiar  category 
or  notion  of  the  thirig  and  its  relations  to  other  things. 
The  world  of  external  experience  appears  as  a  totality  of 
existing  things,  reciprocally  determining  and  being  de- 
termined, each  of  which  is  what  it  is  because  the  others 
are  what  they  are.  It  matters  not  that,  by  the  intro- 
duction of  some  subjective  analysis,  we  reduce  the  sup- 
posed things  to  more  or  less  permanent  groups  or  series  of 
sensations :  the  essential  fact  is,  that  they  are  thought  as 
making  up  a  mechanical  whole.  When  the  same  con- 
ception is  applied  to  inner  experience,  to  the  thinking 
subject,  his  states  and  relations  to  experience  in  general. 


120  Ficlite. 

tlie  only  logical  result  is  a  system  of  completed  deter- 
minism, or,  as  Fichte  calls  it,  dogmatism.  Even  without 
raising  the  question  as  to  the  legitimacy  or  validity  of 
the  notion  thus  applied  to  the  interpretation  of  things  in 
external  nature,  Fichte  points  out  that  the  same  concep- 
tion, the  same  method,  cannot  be  applied  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  life  of  the  conscious  subject.  For,  here, 
each  fact  is  to  be  regarded,  not  only  as  a  thing  standing 
in  relations  to  other  things, — relations  only  conceivable 
when  we  secretly  postulate  the  presence  of  some  mind 
which  relates  the  things  to  one  another, — but  as  a  fact /or 
the  conscious  subject.  They  are  not  external  to  him, 
but  form  part  of  his  very  being  and  substance,  and 
philosophy  has  specially  to  deal  with  their  significance 
for  him.  The  psychological  method  has  simply  thro^vn 
out  of  account  or  neglected  the  fundamental  fact,  that  of 
self-consciousness.  Mechanical  or  dogmatic  explanations 
of  mental  phenomena  may  be  adequate  as  statements 
of  the  conditions  under  which  these  phenomena  come  to 
be,  but  they  are  utterly  inadequate  as  explanations  of 
what  these  phenomena  are  for  the  conscious  subject 
Take  as  an  example  of  the  difference  between  the  modes 
of  treatment,  the  important  distinction  appearing  in  con- 
sciousness between  Ego  and  non-Ego,  self  and  not-self. 
The  psychological  theory,  if  it  is  wise  and  enlightened, 
begins  by  assuming  provisionally  the  existence  of  objec- 
tive conditions  under  which  specific  sensations  arise, 
and  points  to  the  variable  nature  of  these  conditions, 
and  the  variable  combinations  of  sensations  which  result 
— eg..,  the  constant  presence  of  motor  or  muscular  sen- 
sations with  different  groups  of  passive  sensations — as 
giving  the  key  to  the  origin  of  the  notion.     But  such  an 


The  Speculative  Method.  121 

explanation  tacitly  assumes  the  very  point  at  issue. 
Why  shoiild  either  passive  or  active  sensations,  or  any 
combinations  of  them,  appear  to  the  conscious  subject 
himself  as  limitations  %  If  we  represent  to  ourselves  the 
conscious  subject  as  a  thing  acted  upon  and  reacting, 
we  may  try  by  the  help  of  this  metaphor  to  render  in- 
telligible the  fact  that  some  states  of  his  experience 
appear  as  objective  and  determined,  while  others  are 
thought  as  subjective  and  relatively  undetermined ;  but 
our  explanation  extends  only  to  the  metaphor  and  not 
to  that  which  is  symbolised.  There  is  no  resemblance 
between  passive  and  active  sensations,  and  the  assumed 
actions  and  reactions  from  which  they  arise;  and  the 
only  problem,  how  the  consciousness  of  difference  arises 
out  of  the  sensations,  is  not  answered  by  reference  to 
actions  and  reactions  which  are  not  in  the  sensations 
at  all,  but,  if  in  consciousness  at  all,  are  added  by 
thought.  On  the  other  hand,  the  speculative  method 
proposes,  by  an  analysis  of  self -consciousness  and  of  the 
conditions  under  which  it  is  possible,  to  clear  up  the 
significance  for  the  conscious  subject  himself  of  those 
important  differences  which  characterise  his  experience. 
Nothing  must  here  be  assumed  which  transcends  self- 
consciousness,  but  nothing  must  be  accepted  as  solution 
which  is  not  for  self-consciousness.  The  distinction 
between  Ego  and  non-Ego  is  one  for  the  thinking 
subject ;  it  is  hopeless,  therefore,  to  look  for  solution  to 
hypotheses  which  lie  outside  of  the  thinking  subject. 
The  so-called  scientific  method  in  philosophy  is  emphat- 
ically the  method  of  metaphysical  assumptions,  for 
throughout  its  procedure  it  has  recourse  to  explana- 
tions which  transcend  experience. 


122  Fichte. 

Thus  the  philosophy  of  Fichte  starts  with  the  de- 
mand that  the  facts  of  experience  shall  be  examined 
as  facts  of  self- consciousness.  They  exist  only  for  a 
thinking  being,  and  their  significance  or  interpretation 
for  the  thinking  subject  is  the  substance  of  philosophy. 
Philosophy  is  thus  the  re-thinking  of  experience, — the 
endeavour  to  construct  by  rigid  and  methodical  analysis 
that  which  to  ordinary  consciousness  presents  itself  as  a 
completed  and  given  whole.  Speculation,  therefore,  in 
no  way  transcends  the  limits  of  experience ;  it  does  not 
extend  the  bounds  of  thinking;  it  intrudes  in  no  way 
into  the  province  of  natural  science,  which  is  but  an 
extension  of  ordinary  consciousness.  "  No  proposition 
of  a  philosophy  which  knows  itself  is,  in  that  form, 
a  proposition  for  real  life.  It  is  either  a  step  in  the 
system,  from  which  further  progress  may  be  made ;  or  if 
speculation  has  in  it  reached  a  final  point,  a  proposition 
to  which  sensation  and  perception  must  be  added,  as 
rationally  included  therein,  before  it  can  be  of  service 
for  life.  Philosophy,  even  when  completed,  cannot 
yield  the  element  of  sense,  which  is  the  true  inner 
principle  of  life  (or  actuality)."  ^  Philosophy  is  thus  the 
subjective  side  of  that  which  objectively  appears  or  pre- 
sents itself  as  reality,  in  ordinary  life.  The  experience 
of  the  finite  subject,  an  experience  in  which,  so  far  as 
cognition  is  concerned,  the  inner  and  outer  worlds  are 
distinct ;  in  which,  so  far  as  action  is  concerned,  sensuous 
impulse  and  reasoned  purpose,  personal  desire  and  gen- 
eral or  rational  will,  are  combined ;  in  which,  so  far  as 
the  whole  sphere  of  his  finite  existence  is  concerned,  the 
feeling  of  personal  independence  is  curiously  allied  with 
1  "  RuckeriimeruDgen,"  §  9,  '  Werke,'  vol.  v.  p.  343. 


His  Examination  of  Experience.  123 

those  strivings  after  infinite  being  in  which  independ- 
ence would  cease ; — this  experience,  in  all  its  diversity, 
is  the  matter  to  be  explained ;  and  while  philosophy  may 
divide  itself  into  various  branches  according  to  the  dif- 
ferent problems  proposed,  it  is  in  a  twofold  sense  a  unity. 
For  the  experience  to  be  interpreted  is  oiie,  and  the 
whole  interpretation,  is  but  the  exposition  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  experience  for  self-consciousness,  which  is 
also  one. 

If,  now,  we  call  any  fact  of  experience  which  presents 
itself  in  consciousness,  a  cognition  or  matter  of  know- 
ledge, and  every  systematic  account  of  any  series  or  class 
of  such  facts,  a  science  (Wissenschaft),  we  shall  be  pre- 
pared to  understand  why  it  was  that  Fichte  selected,  as 
title  for  philosophy  in  general,  the  term,  theory  of  science 
or  of  knowledge  (Wissenschaftslehre),  and  what  are  the 
formal  requirements  of  this  comprehensive  doctrine.^  It 
is  the  business  of  Wissenschaftslehre  to  develop  from  its 
first  principle  the  organic  plan  or  complete  framework 
of  human  knowledge.  "VVe  may  assume  hypothetically 
that  there  is  system  in  human  cognition,  and  if  so,  we 
assume  that  all  principles  can  be  shown  to  rest  upon 
some  one  comprehensive  absolute  principle — a  principle 
incapable  of  proof,  but  giving  the  ground  of  proof  to  all 

1  The  terms  theory  of  science  and  theory  of  knowledge  have  of  recent 
years  acquired  so  special  a  significance  among  German  writers  on 
logic,  that  either  would  lead  to  misunderstanding  if  applied  to  Fichte's 
philosophical  doctrine.  Theorie  der  Wissenschaft  has  been  taken 
to  mean  the  systematic  account  of  the  methods  actually  followed  in 
scientific  research — e.g. ,  observation,  experiment,  analysis,  &c. ;  while 
Erkenntnus-theorie,  or  theory  of  knowledge,  when  used  by  a  logical 
writer,  implies  that  he  brings  to  bear  upou  the  doctrines  of  formal 
logic  the  combined  results  of  psychology  and  general  philosophy. 
There  is  a  deplorable  want  of  consistency  in  the  use  of  the  terms. 


124  Fichte. 

other  principles.  Our  assumption  can  receive  justifica- 
tion only  in  and  by  the  course  of  the  development  itself, 
— i.e.,  wo  can  show  that  there  is  system  in  human  know- 
ledge if  we  develop  completely,  from  its  first  principle, 
all  that  is  contained  in  human  knowledge. 

Fichte's  earliest  systematic  work,  the  tract  "  On  the 
Xotion  of  Wissenschaftslehre,"  contains  a  number  of 
formal  determinations  regarding  the  new  science ;  but 
the  true  meaning  of  what  is  there  laid  down  becomes 
apparent  only  when  the  nature  of  the  doctrine  itself 
has  been  seen.  It  is  desirable  therefore  to  omit  all 
reference  to  this  tract,  at  least  until  the  system  has  been 
explained. 


125 


CHAPTEE   VL 

"  WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE "    IN   ITS   EARLIER   FORM. 

The  general  aim  or  spirit  of  the  "Wissenschaftslehre 
having  been  detennined,  it  becomes  necessary  to  consi- 
der more  particularly  the  nature  of  the  problems  present- 
ing themselves  for  solution,  and  the  method  by  which 
they  are  to  be  treated.  As  regards  both  points,  the  most 
valuable  writings  are  the  two  "  Introductions  to  Wissen- 
schaftslehre," and  the  "  Sonnenklarer  Bericht."^ 

1. — DOGMATISM   AND   IDEALISM. 

The  slightest  reflection  discloses  to  us  the  remarkable 
distinction  in  consciousness  between  two  orders  of  rep- 
resentations ^  or  phenomena,  which  we  call,  with  some 
vagueness,  inner  and  outer  experience.     "With  more  pre- 

1  'Werke,'  vol.  i.  pp.  419-518;  vol.  ii.  pp.  323-420. 

*  The  term  Vorstellung  is  used  by  Fichte,  as  indeed  by  all  German 
writers,  in  various  senses  ;  and  the  ambiguity  attaching  to  it  is  un- 
doubtedly one  of  the  main  causes  of  the  misunderstanding  of  his  doc- 
trine, as  of  the  Kantian  system.  Here  it  is  employed  simply  to  denote 
some  form  of  consciousness — something  of  which  the  subject  is  aware. 
Nothing  is  thereby  decided  as  to  the  vwde  of  existence  of  the  repre- 
sentation. It  is  not  meanwhile  to  be  regarded  as  a  subjective  state — 
i.e.,  as  a  modification  of  the  individual,  particular  Ego. 


126  Fichte. 

cision,  we  should  say  that,  while  some  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness present  themselves  as  evidently  the  products 
of  free  mental  activity,  others  appear  in  an  order  inde- 
pendent of  us,  and  are  characterised  for  us  by  the  accom- 
panying "  feeling  "  of  necessity  which  attaches  to  them, 
^ow,  the  problem  of  philosophy — i.e.,  of  Wissenschafts- 
lehre — is  to  explain  experience,  to  render  it  intelligible ; 
and  all  explanation  consists  in  rendering  a  reason  for  the 
phenomena  to  be  explained.  The  ground  of  experience, 
in  the  highest  sense,  is  not  to  be  sought  beyond  experience 
itself,  but  our  reflection  upon  experience  does  undoubtedly 
proceed  beyond  it,  since  it  regards  the  whole  as  matter 
to  be  accounted  for.  This  procedure  beyond  experience 
is,  in  fact,  the  process  familiarly  known  as  abstraction. 
Philosophical  theory,  having  presented  to  it  the  complex 
fact  of  the  coexistence  of  inner  and  outer  experience, 
abstracts  from  the  condition  of  coexistence,  and  selects 
for  isolated  consideration,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Ego  or 
conscious  subject,  on  the  other  hand,  the  non-Ego  or 
object  simply.  Whether  such  abstraction  is  a  legitimate 
process  may  remain  meanwhile  undetermined, — the  an- 
alysis of  the  problem  itself  will  throw  light  upon  the 
nature  of  the  thoughts  involved  in  it, — but  by  its  means 
we  reach  the  fundamental  opposition  of  philosophical 
systems.  Ego  and  non-Ego,  subject  and  object,  thought 
and  being,  are  separate  grounds,  to  which  the  whole  of 
experience  may  be  referred  for  explanation.  Do  we  ex- 
plain experience  as  the  product  of  the  non-Ego,  we  have 
the  system  which  may  be  called  Dogmatism ;  do  we 
explain  the  whole  as  springing  from  the  Ego,  we  have 
Idealism.  Of  the  one,  the  typical  example  is  the  system 
of  Spinoza,  in  which  the  order  and  connection  of  thoughts 


Dogmatism  and  Idealism.  127 

are  explained  by  reference  to  that  which  does  not  contain 
in  itself  the  element  of  self -consciousness, — where,  there- 
fore, the  Ego  appears  as  a  mechanically  determined  unit 
in  the  sum  total  of  things.  Of  the  other,  a  representa- 
tive may  probably  be  found  in  Leibnitz,  though  much  of 
the  later  Kantian  speculation  is  only  intelligible  as  a 
kind  of  half-understood  idealism.^ 

Which  of  these  counter-principles  has  right  on  its 
side  ?  Does  either  satisfy  the  requirements  of  philoso- 
phical explanation  1  It  is  evident,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
the  dogmatic  method,  if  true  to  itself,  must,  in  the  end, 
have  resort  to  an  absolutely  unknown  and  unknowable 
thing  as  the  non-Ego.  The  thing-in-itself  is,  in  fact, 
the  solution  ofi'ered  by  dogmatism ;  and  such  solution  is 
defective  in  two  Avays.  In  the  first  place,  while  for  a 
supposed  external  observer  the  existence  of  a  non-Ego 
might  furnish  explanation  of  what  presents  itself  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  subject — that  is  to  say,  of  the  limita- 
tion of  the  subject — no  such  explanation  is  possible  for 
the  subject  himself.  That  he  should  he  limited  may 
possibly  result  from  the  existence  of  a  non-Ego ;  that  he 
should  know  himself  as  limited  cannot  be  explained  from 
the  existence  of  the  non-Ego  simply.  In  the  second 
place,  the  assumed  non-Ego  is  for  the  thinking  subject 
non-existent :  no  possible  predicate  can,  by  the  subject, 
be  attached  to  it  which  does  not  imply  reference  to  the 
subject,    and    therefore    relative,    dependent   existence. 

1  Berkeley,  as  Fichte  rightly  notes,  is  a,dogmatist;  but  some  phases 
of  his  speculation,  and  much  of  the  philosophy  which  has  rested  itself 
on  Berkeley,  may  be  regarded  as  idealist.  Fichte  himself  does  not, 
in  this  reference,  adduce  Leibnitz  as  the  type  of  idealism, — and  there 
are  certainly  elements  in  Leibnitz  which  might  lead  one  to  class  him 
otherwise. 


128  Fichte. 

The  non-Ego,  as  such,  as  thing-in-itself,  is  not  in  con- 
sciousness, and  is,  for  the  Ego,  nothing. 

Dogmatism  thus  furnishes  no  explanation.  The  op- 
posed principle,  that  of  idealism  pure  and  simple,  has  at 
least  one  superiority :  it  selects,  as  ground  of  explana- 
tion, what  is  unquestionably  in  consciousness.  The  Ego, 
or  subject,  is  known  to  be.  But  when  the  Ego,  or  subject, 
is  taken  per  se,  and  the  attempt  is  made  to  deduce 
from  it  the  multiplicity  of  experience,  we  find  a  hiatus 
which  is  absolutely  impassable,  unless  our  method  is  at 
once  guarded  and  comprehensive.  An  imperfect  or  half- 
understood  idealism  regards  the  Ego  as  merely  subject, 
and  is  thus  driven  to  the  conception  of  self-consciousness 
as  somehow  one  of  the  facts  discoverable  in  intelligence. 
In  this  case,  whUe  it  may  be  possible  to  explain  that  the 
Ego  should  know  itself  as  limited,  it  is  quite  impossible 
to  explain  how  it  should  know  itself  as  limited  by  the 
non-Ego.  As  Fichte  rightly  puts  it,  "  In  vara  shall  we 
look  for  a  link  of  connection  between  subject  and  object, 
if  they  are  not  first  and  simply  apprehended  as  a  unity. 

.  .  The  Ego  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  subject  merely, 
but  as  at  once  subject  and  object"  ^ 

If  we  translate  Eichte's  reasoning  regarding  idealism 
into  other  terms,  it  might  be  expressed  thus.  Idealist 
speculation  has  sought  the  ground  of  explanation  in  con- 
sciousness,— in  that  which  is  immediately  and  directly 
known  to  us.  But  in  so  doing,  it  has  followed  the  same 
method  which,  when  dealing  with  the  thing-in-itself, 
gave  rise  to  dogmatism.  It  has  regarded  consciousness 
as  merely  so  much  to  be  known, — as  a  series  of  states, 
Vorstellungen,  from  which  nothing  can  possibly  be  ex- 
1  "  Versuch  einer  iieuen  Darstellung,"  '  Werke,'  vol.  i.  pp.  528,  529. 


Dogmatism  and  Idealism,  129 

tracted.  It  has  not  considered  how  consciousness  comes 
to  be,  what  conditions  are  necessarily  implied  in  its  ex- 
istence, what  are  the  laws  under  which  it  acts.  Thus 
idealism  drifts  easily  into  a  kind  of  psychological  doc- 
trine (as  in  Schmid,  and  later  in  Fries),  or  results  in  a 
sceptical  phenomenalism  (as  in  Mainion  and  in  Hume).* 
Only  one  idealist  system  has  really  gone  to  the  heart  of 
the  problem,  and  fairly  considered  how  it  is  that,  in  con- 
sciousness, there  appears  the  opposition  between  Ego  and 
non-Ego ;  for  only  one  philosophy  has  seized  the  principle 
that  consciousness  or  intelligence  as  a  whole  is  condi- 
tioned by  self-consciousness,  and  that  the  laws  under 
which  self-consciousness  are  realised  are  at  once  the  form 
and  matter  of  intelligence.  This  is  the  critical  or  tran- 
scendental idealism  of  Kant,  —  a  system  imperfect  in 
details,  easily  misunderstood,  and  requiring  to  be  remod- 
elled or  restated  before  it  can  be  made  to  yield  ade- 
quate solution  of  the  specxdative  problem. 

Thus  for  Fichte  there  are  historically  but  two  reasoned 
systems  of  philosophy  —  that  of  Spinoza  and  that  of 
Kant.  The  one  is  dogmatic, — that  is,  it  neglects  to  give 
due  weight  to  the  principle  of  self  -  consciousness,  and 
hence  endeavours  to  explain  existence  by  a  notion  which 
is  limited,  and  applicable  only  within  the  experience  of 
a  self-conscious  subject.  The  other  is  critical, — that  is, 
it  recognises  the  great  truth  that  all  consciousness  is  de- 
termined by  self-consciousness,  and  so  acknowledges  the 
due  limits  of  thought    If  Ave  were  to  express  in  a  single 

'  It  is  not  a  little  remarkable  how  slight  appears  to  have  been  Fichte's 
acquaintance  with  Hume's  writings.     Scepticism,  as  a  wliole,  indeed, 
plays  but  a  small  part  in  his  system  of  thinking,  and  is  generally  dis- 
missed with  a  species  of  contempt.     Cf.  *  Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  120  n. 
P. — IV.  I 


130  Fichte. 

word  the  characteristic  feature  of  Fichte's  system,  we 
should  describe  it  as  "  Spinoza  in  terms  of  Kant,"  That 
which  was  wanting  in  the  critical  philosophy,  systematic 
development,  is  predominant  in  Spinoza;  and,  as  will 
be  seen,  the  theoretical  part  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre 
is  nothing  but  an  inverted  or  idealistic  Spinozism,  It 
has  often  been  said  that  the  influence  of  Spinoza  over 
the  course  of  Fichte's  speculation  became  more  signifi- 
cant in  the  second  period  of  his  literary  activity;  but 
even  were  this  the  case,  one  must  not  forget  that  in  the 
earliest  expositions  of  Wissenschaftslehre,  comparison 
with  Spinoza,  and  recognition  of  similarity  with  his 
thoughts,  appear  throughout.  To  understand  the  sub- 
stance of  Fichte's  speculation,  some  note  must  be  taken 
of  these  historical  antecedenta 

2. — HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS:    SPINOZA  AND  KANT. 

To  any  one  acquainted  with  Spinoza's  system,  Fichte's 
description  of  it  as  essentially  "  dogmatic  "  must  at  first 
appear  erroneous;  for  by  a  dogmatic  system  Fichte  under- 
stands one  which  deduces  the  order  of  conscious  experi- 
ence from  a  supposed  order  of  things, — and  it  needs  but 
slight  knowledge  of  Spinoza  to  be  aware  that  for  him 
any  implied  contrast  or  relation  betAveen  the  order  of 
ideas  and  the  order  of  things  has  no  place.  It  is  neces- 
sary, however,  to  pass  beyond  the  mere  verbal  definition 
of  dogmatism  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  mere  state- 
ment of  Spinoza's  opinion  on  the  other,  if  we  are  to 
discuss  fairly  the  relation  between  them.  That  which 
characterises  dogmatism  as  a  philosophical  method  is 
not  simply  the  distinction  between  ideas  and  things,  but 
the  nature  of  the  notion  or  category  by  means  of  which 


Historical  Antecedents.  131 

either  ideas  or  things  are  made  comprehensible.  In  all 
cases  of  explanation,  "we  find,  as  the  residuum  of  analysis, 
some  fundamental  relation  or  thought  by  means  of  which 
the  facts  involved  have  become  for  us  intelligible.  Thus 
the  notion  or  relation  of  cause  is  involved  in  all  explana- 
tions of  physical  change,  and  itself  requires  to  be  criti- 
cally analysed  in  order  that  we  may  see  what  assumptions 
or  underlying  notions  are  implied  in  it.  N"ow  the  notion 
which  dogmatism  applies  to  explanation  of  experience 
is  briefly  that  of  mutual  determination, — what  Kant 
called  the  category  of  Eeciprocity.  Each  thing,  or  part 
of  real  experience,  has  its  definite  character  by  and  through 
its  relations  to  aU  other  things.  It  is  determined  to  be 
what  it  is,  by  virtue  of  the  determinations  of  other  things. 
A  notion  or  category  of  this  kind  is  evidently  highly 
complex;  and,  indeed,  as  one  might  conjecture,  it  may 
be  applied  with  much  variety  of  signification.  It  may 
remain  a  purely  mechanical  category,  implying  only  ex- 
ternal relations  of  the  things  which  compose  a  collec- 
tive or  aggregate  whole ;  or  it  may  be  elevated  so  as  to 
become  the  idea  of  a  systematic  whole,  in  which  the  rela- 
tions of  the  parts  are  not  mechanical-^  The  first  signifi- 
cance, however,  is  that  which  characterises  the  use  of  the 
notion  in  the  dogmatic  method.  For  here  things  and 
ideas  are  regarded  as  alike  in  one  respect,  as  being  alike 
finite  objects  of  possible  cognition.  Each  external  thing, 
each  idea,  is  finite  in  its  kind — i.e.,  is  capable  of  being 
limited,  determined  by  another.  Through  this  limitation 
by  others,  each  has  its  definite  being.  It  matters  not, 
then,  whether  we  regard  things  and  ideas  as  composing 

1  The  double  significance  of  this  category  is  very  apparent  in  the 
Kantian  system. 


132  Fichte. 

two  orders,  of  which  one  is  cause,  the  other  effect,  or  assert 
that  things  and  ideas  are  both  the  same,  looked  at  from 
different  points  of  view ;  in  either  case  we  subject  the 
facts  to  the  same  mode  of  explanation,  regard  each  as 
a  unit,  marked  off  from  others,  and  with  only  external 
relations  to  them,  and  explain  the  special  characteristics 
of  each  as  depending  on  the  coexistence  of  aU  the 
others. 

J^ow  this  notion  of  reciprocity  or  mutual  determina- 
tion is  fundamental  in  Spinoza,  and  is  that  by  which 
his  system  has  gained  its  greatest  influence  over  modem 
thought.  It  is  true  that  it  is  not  the  only  notion  used 
by  Spinoza, — in  fact,  the  difficulties,  even  incomprehen- 
sibilities, of  his  metaphysics  arise  mamly  from  the  con- 
junction of  the  notion  of  mutual  determination  with 
that  of  substance, — ^but  it  is  a  thought  which  is  involved 
in  scientific  procedure  as  such,  and  through  it  Si^inoza 
has  been  brought  into  the  closest  relations  with  modern 
scientific  work.  The  phrases,  more  or  less  commonplace, 
by  which  the  systematic  unity  of  things  is  expressed, — 
such  as,  the  order  and  uniformity  of  nature,  the  preva- 
lence of  laAV, — are  merely  expressions  of  what  is  contained 
in  this  notion  of  reciprocity.  It  is  evident,  further, 
that  if  we  apply  this  notion  to  the  explanation  of  expe- 
rience, we  must  regard  self-consciousness,  the  essence  of 
the  thinking  subject,  as  merely  one  phenomenon,  or  state, 
or  thing,  determined  by  relations  to  other  phenomena, 
and  assume  that  these  relations  are  of  an  external  kind. 
Thus,  for  Spinoza,  the  peculiarity  of  self-consciousness 
vanishes ;  and  even  if  we  interpret  liberally  the  obscure 
propositions  ('Ethics,'  ii.  Proj)s.  21  et  seq.)  in  which  the 
Idea  Mentis  is  treated,  it  is  evident  that  self-conscious- 


Spinoza.  133 

ness,  as  understood  by  him,  is  referred  to  that  which 
lies  outside  of  it  and  therefore  mechanically  deter- 
mines it. 

Fichte's  criticism  of  this  dogmatic  method  is  in  form 
and  spirit  identical  with  the  later  and  more  famous 
expression  of  Hegel.  He  has  to  point  out  that  Spinoza 
omits  altogether  criticism  of  the  notion  of  mutual  deter- 
mination— that  is  to  say,  omits  to  examine  the  nature  and 
validity  of  the  notion  for  our  thinking.  Had  such  criti- 
cism been  undertaken,  it  would  have  become  apparent 
that  a  category  like  reciprocity  is  entirely  inadequate  to 
express  the  relation  of  self-consciousness  and  the  expe- 
rience to  which  it  is  related ;  that  substance  and  mode, 
Spinoza's  supreme  forms,  are  limited  in  their  nature; 
and  that  there  is  no  philosophic  ground  for  procedure 
beyond  self  -  consciousness.  While  signalising  these 
favdts,  Fichte  nevertheless  recognises  the  high  ideal  of 
speculation  which  is  disclosed  in  Spinoza's  '  Ethics,'  and 
draws  largely  on  the  Spinozistic  method.  Many  of  his 
fundamental  principles,  both  in  the  earlier  and  the  later 
periods  of  his  thinking,  are  in  form  and  matter  identical 
with  those  of  the  '  Ethics.'  There  is  no  sufficient 
ground  for  asserting,  as  many  writers  have  done,  that  the 
influence  of  Spinoza  over  Fichte  increased,  and  that  in 
the  final  period  of  the  latter's  philosophising  liis  exposi- 
tion is  merely  a  mystical  Spinozism.  l^o  closer  connec- 
tion is  possible  than  that  between  the  theoretical  portion 
of  the  '  "Wissenschaftslehre '  and  the  principles  of  Spi- 
noza. The  later  works  accentuate  somewhat  the  reli- 
gious aspect  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  but  imply  no 
other  theory ;  and  however  close  in  forms  of  expression 
the  religious  doctrines  of  the  two  thinkers  may  be,  the 


134  Fichte. 

radical  opposition  in  their  point  of  view  is  not  to  be 
forgotten. 

This  radical  opposition  in  point  of  view  was  the 
natural  and  inevitable  consequence  of  the  critical  philo- 
sophy. To  understand  the  specific  problems  presented 
to  Fichte,  it  is  necessary  to  note  with  some  care  what 
the  Kantian  system  had  completed,  and  what  it  had  left 
undone. 

To  Kant  the  problem  of  philosophy  in  general  had 
presented  itself  under  special  aspects  determined  by  his- 
torical circumstances, — in  the  main,  however,  under  the 
aspect  of  a  question  as  to  the  possibility  of  knowledge. 
This  question  he  for  the  first  time  proposed  to  treat  in 
its  wider  issues,  as  independent  of  psychology  and  of 
metaphysical  assumptions.  Beyond  all  doubt  it  was  not 
given  to  Kant, — it  is  given  to  no  thinker, — to  free  him- 
self entirely  from  the  notions  and  phraseology  current  at 
the  time ;  and  so  it  has  come  about  that  the  *  Critique  of 
Pure  Eeason,'  the  work  in  which  the  dogmatic  method  of 
English  philosophy  and  of  Leibnitz  was  first  subjected 
to  examination,  shows  in  many  of  its  main  doctrines  un- 
mistakable traces  of  the  method  against  which  it  was 
directed.  Thus,  Avliile  Kant  is  making  clear,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  knowledge,  for  the  self-conscious  subject,  can- 
not be  explained  by  reference  to  a  world  of  things 
thought  as  out  of  connection  with  self-consciousness,  he 
stiU  allows  himself  ambiguities  of  speech  which  might 
be  interpreted  to  mean  that  the  special  content  of  knoAv- 
ledge,  the  matter,  is  explicable  by  reference  to  such 
things ;  and  while  he  makes  clear,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  the  conception  of  a  mere  stream  of  conscious  states, 
as  the  phenomena  of  an  individual  subject,  is  in  itself 


Kant.  135 

contradictory  and  absurd,  lie  yet  draws  distinctions 
which  might  be  taken  to  imply  that  the  difference  of 
subjective  and  objective  in  knowledge  is  one  of  kind, 
and  not  a  subordinate  form  to  be  explained  under  the 
more  comprehensive  synthesis  with  which  he  started. 

If,  then,  it  be  considered  what  was  for  Kant  the  fun- 
damental principle  of  philosophical  method,  and  how  far 
the  actual  results  of  his  system  correspond  with  the 
requirements  of  the  method,  a  summary  view  of  the 
problems  left  for  solution  to  the  post-Kantian  writers 
may  readily  be  obtained-  l!^ow  the  fimdamental  prin- 
ciple, disguised  under  many  strange  fashions  of  speech  in 
the  *  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason,'  is  that  already  described 
as  the  principle  of  self-consciousness.  All  knowledge, 
all  experience,  is  only  for  a  self-conscious  subject.  Such 
a  subject  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  an  individual,  for  the 
notion  of  individuality  implies  relations  of  a_  complex 
and  quite  distinct  kind.  It  is  the  common  element  in 
all  consciousness,  that  by  which  consciousness  is  what 
it  is.  If,  therefore,  the  explanation  of  experience  be 
proposed  as  the  problem  of  philosophy,  the  method  of 
procedure  may  be  either  an  investigation  of  the  idea 
of  self-consciousness,  the  determination  of  the  conditions 
under  which  it  is  possible,  and  the  evolution  in  strict 
sequence  of  the  elements  which  are  embraced  in  it ;  or 
by  an  analysis  of  knowledge,  of  experience,  as  it  pre- 
sents itself  in  ordinary,  empirical  consciousness,  and  the 
determination  of  the  features  in  it  due  to  the  presence 
of  this  central  unity.  The  second  method  was  that 
adopted  by  Kant,  and  the  result  has  been  somewhat  un- 
fortunate. For,  in  consequence  of  the  method  adopted, 
the   several   elements    composing  knowledge  were   dis- 


136  Flchte. 

cussed  in  isolation  from  one  another  and  from  their  central 
unity,  and  were  thus,  almost  of  necessity,  viewed  not  as 
elements  in  a  synthesis,  which  have  no  existence  save  in 
and  through  their  combination,  but  as  independent  parts 
of  an  integral  or  collective  Avhole.  Thus,  in  the  '  Critique 
of  Pure  Heason,'  the  problem  is  stated  in  an  ambiguous 
and  confusing  way;  and  in  the  '  -^sthetik,'  more  particu- 
larly, the  central  point  of  view  is  lost  sight  of  in  a  quite 
subordinate  issue.  Knowledge,  Kant  sees  clearly  enough, 
is  possible  only  as  a  synthetic  combination  in  the  xmity 
of  self-consciousness.  The  conditions  or  forms  of  such 
combination  determine  experience,  or  give  general  laws 
to  it,  but  such  detennination  is  merely  formal  No- 
thing can  be  presented  in  self-consciousness  which  contra- 
dicts or  is  out  of  harmony  with  these  conditions,  but  the 
specific  determination  of  this  matter  of  knowledge  is  not 
to  be  deduced  from  the  conditions  themselves.  Upon 
this  view  of  the  purely  formal  or  logical  function  of  the 
unity  of  thought  rest  the  Kantian  distinctions  of  the  a 
priori  and  a  x>osteriori  elements  in  cognition,  of  form  and 
matter,  of  sense  and  understanding,  of  empirical  and 
transcendent  reality,  of  phenomena  and  noumena.  So 
far,  then,  as  theory  of  knowledge  goes,  Kant,  while  bring- 
ing into  the  foreground  the  very  first  principle  of  cognition, 
fails  to  connect  therewith  the  subordinate  forms.  Space 
and  Time  are  shown,  on  special  grounds,  not  to  be  expli- 
cable by  reference  to  external  things  or  to  states  of  sub- 
jective experience,  but  they  are  placed  in  no  intimate 
relation  to  the  unity  of  self-consciousness.  The  conscious 
subject  is  receptive,  and,  if  receptive,  only  under  the  pure 
forms  of  space  and  time.  But  how  or  why  a  self-con- 
scious subject  should  appear  to  itself  receptive  ;  how  or 


Kant.  137 

why,  if  receptive,  it  should  be  so  in  the  forms  of  space  and 
time, — are  questions  entirely  unresolved.  So  when  Kant 
undertakes  the  discussion  of  the  key-stone  to  his  posi- 
tion, the  deduction  of  the  categories  or  exposition  of  the 
forms  of  combination  which  make  up  the  nature  of  the 
thinking  subject,  his  procedure  is  equally  external  and 
haphazard.  It  is  certainly  shown  that  categories  are 
implied  in  self-consciousness,  but  how  or  why  they 
should  be  so  implied — how  or  why  there  should  be  so 
many  of  them  and  no  more — how  they  are  connected 
with  one  another  and  form  a  system  in  human  know- 
ledge, —  these  questions,  likeAvise,  are  left  unsolved. 
Further,  Avhen  the  categories,  having  been  deduced  as 
the  fonns  of  the  activity  of  the  synthetic  Ego,  are 
brought  into  relation  with  the  forms  of  receptivity,  the 
results,  though  rich  in  consequences,  leave  much  to  be 
desired.  The  fusion  into  the  unity  of  knowledge  is  a 
merely  mechanical  one.  Categories  as  modes  of  imder- 
standing,  schemata  as  modes  of  productive  imagination, 
data  of  sense  as  modes  of  aflfection,  are  linked  together, 
and  appear  to  have  a  nature  and  existence  independently 
of  one  another,  and  of  the  synthesis  in  which  they  are 
combined.  The  final  result — the  world  of  sense-expe- 
rience determined  throughout  by  intelligence,  but  in 
itself  an  empirically  endless  series  of  finite,  limited 
objects — is  not  one  which  can  satisfy  the  demand  for 
unity  of  cognition.  The  constant  striving  to  transcend 
the  limits  of  this  world  of  experience,  to  reach  the  final 
synthesis  in  which  its  relation  to  self-consciousness  shall 
be  deduced,  is  what  Kant  calls  Reason.  So  far  as  cog- 
nition is  concerned,  the  one  result  of  reason  is  the 
empty  notion  of  the  thing  in  itself, — a  notion  which, 


138  Fichte, 

unfortunately,  was  by  Kant  so  expressed,  and  by  the 
Kantians  so  understood,  as  to  imply  much  of  the  old 
dogmatic  theory  which  it  had  been  the  business  of  the 
'  Critique '  to  explode.  Kant,  however,  is  not  to  be 
credited  Avith  all  that  has  been  drawn  from  his  specula- 
tions by  writers  who  had  never  grasped  his  fundamental 
principle.  For  him,  the  thing  in  itself,  the  expression 
of  the  infinite  striving  of  self-consciousness,  is  discover- 
able only  in  self-consciousness,  as  its  absolute  law.  The 
statement  of  this  absolute  law  is  certainly  approached  by 
Kant  from  the  empirical  point  of  view  or  by  an  analytic 
method,  and  the  position  assigned  by  him  to  the  cate- 
gorical imperative  seems  at  first  sight  to  sunder  Eeason 
entirely  from  the  world  of  experience.  Nothing,  indeed, 
can  make  the  Kantian  moral  theory  perfectly  coherent ; 
but,  with  especial  reference  to  Fichte  and  the  later 
German  philosophy,  it  must  be  stated  with  perhaps  un- 
necessary definiteness,  that  only  in  the  categorical  imper- 
ative does  the  notion  of  the  thing-in-itself  hold  any  posi- 
tion as  a  reality  in  the  Kantian  metaphysics.-^  The  final 
sjTithesis,  so  far  as  it  was  attempted  by  Kant,  appears 
only  in  the  '  Critique  of  Judgment,'  in  which,  by  means 
of  the  notion  of  End,  a  reconciliation  is  sought  between 

1  It  is  much  to  te  regretted  that,  almost  without  exception,  the 
best  English  expositions  of  Kant  restrict  themselves  to  an  account  of 
the  '  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.'  Nothing  but  error  and  confusion  can 
result  from  this  arbitrary  limitation.  It  is  much  as  though  one  were 
to  treat  only  the  theoreti^^al  portion  of  '  Wissenschaftslehre,'  and 
leave  untouched  the  fundamental  problems  of  the  practical  side.  That 
the  Kantian  theory  appeared  in  three  separate  books,  is  no  reason 
why  we  should  treat  it  as  three  separate  theories.  The  '  Critique  of 
Practical  Eeason,'  moreover,  though  simple  enough  in  its  details, 
stands  more  in  need  of  elucidation  and  commentary,  so  far  as  its 
principle  is  concerned,  than  the  '  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.' 


Kant.  139 

the  intelligible  or  moral  world,  the  realm  of  things-in- 
themselves,  and  the  world  of  experience,  of  phenomena. 
The  ethical  idealism  with  Avhich  the  Kantian  theory 
closes,  comes  nearer  to  the  Fichtian  position  than  can  be 
made  apparent  without  more  lengthy  analysis  of  Kant 
than  is  here  possible ;  but  even  in  it  we  find  the  same 
tendency  to  separation  which  is  the  harassing  feature  of  all 
the  Kantian  work.  Fichte,  it  must  be  held,  was  justified 
in  his  constant  complaint  that  in  Kant  there  were  really 
three  theories  which  are  never  amalgamated.  "  Kant," 
he  remarks  in  an  instructive  passage  in  the  '  I^achgelas- 
sene  Werke,'  "  had  three  absolutes.  ...  In  the  '  Critique 
of  Pure  Eeason,'  sense-experience  was  for  him  the  abso- 
lute (  =  a?) ;  and  in  regard  to  the  ideas,  the  higher,  intel- 
ligible world,  he  expressed  himself  in  a  most  depreciatory 
fashion.  From  his  earher  works,  and  from  hints  in  the 
'  Critique '  itself,  it  may  certainly  be  inferred  that  he 
would  not  have  halted  at  that  position  ;  but  I  will  engage 
to  show  that  these  hints  are  mere  inconsequences  of 
reasoning,  for  if  his  principles  were  consistently  followed 
oiat,  the  supersensible  world  must  vanish  entirely,  and 
as  the  only  noumenon  there  woi;ld  remain  that  which 
is  to  be  realised  in  experience.  .  .  .  The  loftier  moral 
nature  of  the  man  corrected  his  philosophical  error,  and 
80  appeared  the  '  Critique  of  Practical  Reason.'  In  it 
was  manifested  the  categorical  notion  of  the  Ego  as 
something  in  itself,  which  could  never  have  appeared  in 
the  '  Critique  of  Pure  Reason ; '  we  have  thus  a  second 
absolute,  a  moral  world  ( =  z).  But  all  the  phenomena 
of  human  nature  were  not  thereby  explained.  The  rela- 
tions of  the  beautiful,  of  the  sublime,  and  of  end  in 
nature,   which   palpably  were   neither   theoretical   nor 


140  Fichte. 

moral  notions,  yet  remained.  Moreover,  what  is  of  much 
greater  importance,  the  empirical  world  was  now  absorbed 
in  the  moral  world,  as  a  world  in  itself, — a  just  retribu- 
tion, as  it  were,  for  the  first  victory  of  the  empiricaL 
There  appeared,  then,  the  '  Critique  of  Judgment,'  in 
the  introduction  to  which — the  most  remarkable  portion 
of  that  remarkable  work — it  was  acknowledged  that  the 
supersensible  and  the  sensible  worlds  must  have  some 
common  though  undiscoverable  root,  Avhich  root  is  the 
third  absolute  {  =  ]/)■  I  say  a  third,  separate  from  the 
two  preceding  and  independent,  although  giving  unity 
to  them ;  and  in  this  I  do  Kant  no  "wrong,  For  if  this 
y  is  undiscoverable,  it  may  contain  the  other  two ;  but 
we  camiot  comprehend  how  it  does  so,  or  deduce  them 
from  it.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  comprehended, 
it  must  be  comprehended  as  absolute ;  and  there  remain, 
as  before,  three  absolutes."  ^ 

The  Kantian  philosophy,  while  definitely  formulating 
the  first  principle  of  speculation,  thus  left  unsolved  a 
whole  series  of  problems,  all  of  them  arising  in  connec- 
tion with  one  line  of  thought,  and  furnishing  the  mate- 
rial for  later  efforts  at  systematic  development  of  the 
l>rinciple  from  which  it  started.  "With  more  or  less 
clearness  the  thinkers  who  immediately  followed  Kant 
undertook  the  solution  of  these  problems,  and  their  work 
to  a  large  extent  determined  the  character  of  the  Fichtean 
system,  and  was  incorporated  into  it.  Thus  Eeinhold's 
constant  demand  for  unity  of  principle  is  recognised  by 
Fichte  as  an  attempt  in  the  right  direction,  though 
the  principle  selected  by  him,  that  of  representation 

1  '  Nacligelassene  Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  102-104.    See  also  '  Leben  tind 
Brief  wechsel,'  vol.  ii.  p.  177. 


Kant.  141 

( Vorsiellung)  as  the  fundamental  fact  of  consciousness, 
was  incapable  of  yielding  any  result  more  satisfactory 
than  had  been  presented  in  the  Kantian  philosophy, 
Reinhold  evidently  felt  the  difficulty  of  bringing  subject 
and  object  into  any  connection  whatsoever,  if  they  were 
assumed  as  originally  distinct.  He  therefore  proposed 
to  select  as  starting-point  the  existence  of  the  conscious 
state  or  representation,  in  which  subject  and  object  are 
contained  as  factors,  and  endeavoured  by  analysis  of  this 
fact  to  deduce  tlie  several  doctrines  which  in  a  less  co- 
herent form  had  been  brought  forward  by  Kant.  But 
in  the  first  place,  as  Fichte  points  out  in  the  *  Eeview  of 
./Enesidemus,'  ^  the  primary  datum  of  philosophical  con- 
struction cannot  be  a  fact  or  representation,  but  must 
be  the  simple  and  original  activity  by  which  the  fact  or 
representation  comes  to  be;  and  in  the  second  place, 
as  had  been  made  quite  apparent  by  the  sceptical  cri- 
ticism of  '  .^Jiesidemus '  (Schulze),  the  idea  of  Vorsiel- 
lung involved  that  doctrine  which  above  all  others  was 
a  stumbling-block  to  the  Kantians, — the  doctrine  that 
the  matter  or  definite  content  of  Vorsiellung  was  deter- 
mined ab  exira,  by  things-in-themselves.  So,  too,  Eeck's 
acute  restatement  of  the  Kantian  theory  had  brought 
into  the  clearest  light  the  gross  misconceptions  which 
might  readily  arise  from  Kant's  mode  of  stating  his 
doctrines.  To  many  of  the  Kantians,  indeed,  the  theory 
of  the  a  pi'iori  character  of  the  forms  of  perception  and 
thought  had  been  nothing  but  a  revival,  in  the  crudest 
sense,  of  the  old  doctrine  of  innate  ideas.  To  them 
Kant's  idea  of  self-consciousness,  as  conditioning  know- 
ledge, had  meant  that  the  individual  subject  was  some- 
1  'Werke,*  vol.  i.  p.  9.    Cf.  vol.  i.  p.  468. 


142  Fkhte. 

how  acted  upon  by  things,  and  that  in  consequence  of 
the  a  priori  or  innate  mechanism  of  consciousness,  the 
effects  of  such  action  took  of  necessity  the  forms  of 
space  and  time  and  the  categories.  Beck's  admirable 
discussion  of  the  Kantian  distinctions  between  analytic 
and  synthetic  judgments,  synthetic  a  priori  and  syn- 
thetic a  posteriori  truths,  intuition  and  thought,  pheno- 
mena and  things-in-themselves,  sufficiently  shoAved  that 
these  were  but  excrescences  on  the  Kantian  doctrine, 
merely  temporary  expedients  for  bringing  the  real  prob- 
lems into  light ;  while  the  definiteness  with  which  he 
expressed  the  cardinal  doctrine  of  Kant's  theory,  the 
original  synthetic  unity  of  self-consciousness,  threw  light 
on  all  the  subordinate  points.^  At  the  same  time,  Beck 
advanced  no  sufficient  grounds  for  the  original  posit- 
ing of  the  object,  which  according  to  him  is  the  very 
essence  of  the  activity  of  self -consciousness.  His  the- 
ory failed  to  explain  how  and  why  it  is  that  for  the  sub- 
ject there  is  necessarily  the  object,  the  non-Ego.  It 
left  still  in  isolation  the  separate  elements  which  had 
been  thrown  together  by  Kant.  Finally,  the  acute  criti- 
cisms of  !Maimon,  for  whose  talent  Fichte  expresses  un- 
bounded admiration,  had  shown  to  demonstration  how 
utterly  inconsistent  with  the  genuine  Kantian  doctrine 
was  the  commonly  received  view  of  the  thing-in-itsell 
He  too,  however,  misconceived  Kant's  idea  of  self- 
consciousness,  found  himself  perplexed  by  the  problem 
of  the  relation  between  the  categories  or  forms  of  thought 

1  Beck's  '  Einzig-mijglicher  Standpunckt  *  (Riga,  1796),  though  not 
■written  with  much  skill,  is  yet  one  of  the  best  and  most  instructive 
commentaries  on  the  '  Kritik,'  and  should  be  neglected  by'no  student 
of  Kant. 


Kant.  143 

and  the  given  matter  of  sense,  proceeded  to  accept  ex- 
perience as  consisting  of  a  given  series  of  phenomenal 
states,  with  the  attributes  of  space  and  time,  rejected 
therefore  all  a  pi'iori  truths  except  the  mathematical 
or  quantitative,  and  thus  left  untouched  the  deeper 
problems  raised  by  the  '  Kritik.' 

The  way  had  thus  been  prepared  for  Fichte's  endeav- 
our to  take  up  in  a  comprehensive  fashion  the  speculative 
question  as  it  had  been  formulated  by  Kant,  and  to  work 
into  an  organic  whole  what  had  been  left  by  Kant  in  a 
fragmentary  form.  The  artificial  and  sometimes  forced 
fashion  in  which  the  '  Wissenschaf tslehre  '  at  first  pro- 
ceeded must  not  disguise  from  us  the  genuine  nature  of 
the  task  Fichte  had  set  before  him,  or  the  principle 
which  underlies  it.  Firm  adherence  to  the  idea  of  the 
transcendental  method ;  determination  to  accept  nothing, 
whether  as  fact,  law,  or  notion,  which  is  not  deducible 
from  self -consciousness  and  its  necessarj'-  conditions, — 
such  is  the  spirit  of  the  Fichtean  philosophy,  and  from 
it  follows  the  demand  for  systematic  unity  of  conception, 
for  a  single  principle  out  of  which  the  multiplicity  of 
experience  may  be  deduced,  and  therefore  for  a  single, 
all-embracing  philosophical  science.  It  is  this  very  con- 
sistency which  renders  the  detailed  study  of  the  Fichtean 
system  a  matter  of  so  much  difficulty,  for  if  the  funda- 
mental idea  be  not  grasped, — and  as  Fichte  truly  says, 
his  philosophy  is  either  to  be  mastered  at  a  stroke  or  not 
at  all, — little  or  none  of  the  help  which  even  Kant 
affords  is  extended  to  the  student  The  familiar  psycho- 
logical distinctions  which  furnish  natural  divisions  in 
the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  are  entirely  want- 
ing in  the  'Wissenschaf tslehre.'     Sense,  xinderstanding, 


144  Fichte. 

reason,  are  not  assumed  as  rubrics  under  which  special 
kinds  of  knowledge  may  be  arranged,  but  are  regarded 
as  specific  modes  in  the  development  or  realisation  of 
self-consciousness,  and  appear  in  their  determined  posi- 
tion in  the  series  of  necessary  acts  by  which  self -con- 
sciousness is  realised.  The  notions  by  which  popular  or 
unphilosophical  thinking  manages  to  explain  to  itself 
the  nature  of  things — e.g.,  the  notion  of  cause  by  which 
we  think  the  relation  of  objects  to  the  variable  contents 
of  our  representations — are  not  accepted  or  permitted  to 
pass  until  they  have  been  deduced,  or  shown  to  arise  in 
the  development  of  the  necessary  conditions  of  self- 
consciousness.  The  Kantian  categories,  the  anoma- 
lous position  of  which  had  given  occasion  to  grave  mis- 
understanding of  the  very  meaning  of  the  system,  are 
not  in  any  way  assumed  as  pre-existing  forms  into  which 
matter  falls ;  but  object  as  formed  by  the  category,  and 
category  as  form  of  the  object,  are  deduced  together. 

If  Wissenschaftslehre  is  to  accomplish  its  object — 
the  systematic  evolution  of  all  that  enters  into  conscious- 
ness —  its  starting-point  must  be  found  in  that  which 
renders  any  consciousness  or  knowledge  possible.  Such 
starting-point,  by  its  very  nature,  cannot  be  a  demon- 
strable fact,  nor  can  it  be  comprehended  in  strict  logical 
fashion, — that  is,  brought  under  a  notion.  All  certainty 
rests  ultimately  on  immediate  evidence  or  intuition.  The 
first  condition,  therefore,  of  consciousness,  must  be  real- 
ised by  us  in  the  form  of  intuition.  But  the  said  first 
condition  of  consciousness  is  manifestly  the  conscious- 
ness of  self.  "  Along  with  whatever  any  intelligence 
knows,"  says  Terrier,  whose  statement  may  here  be  ac- 
cepted in  place  of  any  more  elaborate  treatment,  "  it  must, 


His  Starting  Point.  145 

as  the  ground  or  condition  of  its  knowledge,  have  some 
cognisance  of  itself."  To  the  speculative  inquirer,  en- 
deavouring to  reconstruct  that  which  is  immediately 
given  in  experience,  the  first  and  common  ground  for  all 
experience  is  the  result  of  that  act  whereby  the  Ego  or 
self  becomes  an  Ego  or  self.  Of  the  necessary  impli- 
cations of  this  fundamental  activity  and  its  product, 
nothing  requires  at  first  to  be  said ;  philosophy  is  simply 
the  attempt  to  give  a  systematic  and  complete  account  of 
them.  But  no  philosophy  can  transcend  the  fact ;  and 
any  problem  referring  to  that  which  is  absolutely  dis- 
severed from  the  result  of  the  fact,  must  be  dismissed  as 
in  terms  contradictory  and  absurd.  To  ask,  for  example, 
whether  the  activity  by  which  the  Ego  becomes  an  Ego 
does  not  presuppose  the  prior  existence,  in  reality, — in 
an  objective  fashion, — of  the  Ego,  is  merely  to  make  the 
"  wonderful  assumption  that  the  Ego  is  something  dif- 
ferent from  its  own  consciousness  of  itself,  and  that 
something,  heaven  knows  AA'hat,  lying  beyond  this  con- 
sciousness, is  the  foundation  of  it,"  ^  and  to  introduce 
notions  of  a  complex  and  hypothetical  character,  such  as 
existence  and  time,  into  the  explanation  of  that  with 
reference  to  which  only  have  such  notions  significance. 
Doubtless,  to  the  popular  consciousness,  thought  presents 
itself  as  merely  one,  and  probably  one  of  the  least  im- 
portant, of  the  facts  of  experience, — as  arising  from  and 
dependent  on  the  nature  of  things.  But  pliilosophy  and 
popular  thinking  move  on  difi'erent  platforms,  and  most 
of  the  gravest  errors  in  speculation  arise  from  the  trans- 
ference of  considerations  which  are  in  due  place  in  one 
of  them  into  the  other,  where  they  are  absolute  absurdi- 

1  '  Werke,'  voL  i.  p.  460. 
r. — IV.  K 


146  Fichte. 

ties.  The  philosophical  construction  of  the  world  of 
experience  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  world  of  expe- 
rience itself,  nor  is  it  to  be  taken  as  a  natural — i.e.,  psy- 
chological— history  of  the  development  of  the  individual 
mind.^  If  in  the  development  of  the  necessary  condi- 
tions of  self-consciousness,  it  is  shown  how  the  notion 
of  a  non-Ego  arises, — if  feeling  and  representation  are 
deduced, — it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  by  such  process 
of  deduction  these,  as  facts  of  experience,  are  produced. 
Production  and  genetic  construction  of  the  contents  of 
consciousness  are  totally  distinct.  Life,  as  Fichte  puts  it, 
is  non-philosophising,  and  philosophy  is  non-living. 

The  intuition  of  the  activity,  whose  product  is  the 
reflex  act  of  consciousness — an  activity  the  exact  nature 
of  which  will  presently  be  considered — Fichte  calls  in- 
tellectual intuition.  The  name  is  unfortunate,  both  as 
regards  his  predecessor  Kant,  and  as  regards  his  suc- 
cessor Schelling,  for,  in  their  systems,  the  same  term  is 
employed  to  denote  two  quite  diverse  facts.  In  the 
critical  philosophy,  intellectual  intuition  was  used  to 
indicate  the  supposed  mode  of  consciousness  by  wlxich  a 
knowledge  of  things-in-themselves  might  be  obtained, 
and  was  therefore  regarded  as  contradictory  of  the  very 
principles  of  the  system-  Fichte  has  little  difficulty  in 
shomng  that,  so  far  as  this  meaning  of  the  term  is  con- 
cerned, there  is  no  diff'erence  of  opinion  between  Kant 
and  himself ;  but  he,  at  the  same  time,  points  out  that 
the  whole  critical  analysis  rested  upon  the  fact  of  the 
unity  of  consciousness  (or,  as  Kant  called  it,  the  unity 
of  apperception),  and  that  for  this  unity  no  name  was 
so  appropriate  as  that  of  intellectual  intuition.  On  the 
1  '  Werke,'  voL  i.  pp.  397-399.    Cf.  vol.  v.  pp.  333  et  scq. 


Intellectital  Intuition.  14.7 

other  hand,  in  Schelling's  system,  intellectual  intui- 
tion was  employed  to  denote  the  consciousness  of  the 
absolute,  of  the  identity  betAveen  subject  and  object; 
and,  in  so  far,  there  is  a  certain  resemblance  between 
his  use  of  the  term  and  that  of  Fichte.  There  was, 
however,  a  fundamental  difference  betAveen  the  two 
thinkers  in  regard  to  this  identity  of  subject  and  object; 
and  in  his  later  writings,  Fichte,  to  emphasise  his  oppo- 
sition to  Schelling,  generally  employed  the  expression, 
free  activity,  to  denote  the  fundamental  act  and  product 
of  the  Ego. 

In  calling  the  consciousness  of  the  fundamental  activ- 
ity of  the  Ego  intuition,  Fichte  had  a  twofold  object 
He  desired  to  bring  into  prominence  the  fact  that  he  is 
not  starting  with  any  abstract  notion,  but  with  the  activ- 
ity of  the  Ego — an  activity  not  to  be  designated  thought, 
or  will,  or  by  any  other  complex,  and  therefore  mislead- 
ing, term ;  and  further,  to  indicate  from  the  outset  what 
was  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  general  method  of  Wissen- 
schaftslehre.  For  an  intuition  is  never  a  datum  which  is 
simply  received  in  experience.  It  is  invariably  the  pro- 
duct of  a  constructive  act.  The  intuition  of  a  triangle,  for 
example,  is  the  consciousness  of  a  definite  and  necessarily 
determined  procedure  of  construction  within  the  limita- 
tions of  space ;  and  in  this  process  of  construction  we  see 
intuitively  the  connection  of  the  elements, — we  see  how 
each  subsequent  portion  of  the  construction  is  determined 
by  what  has  preceded;  and  as  the  process  is  general, 
determined  only  by  the  conditions  of  space,  we  are  at  the 
same  time  aware  of  the  generality  of  the  result.  Intuitive 
knowledge,  therefore,  is  genetic,  and  "Wissenschaftslehre, 
the  systematic  consciousness  of  what  is  contained  in  the 


148  Fichte. 

fundamental  intellectual  intuition,  must  likewise  be 
genetic  in  method.  Wissenschaftslehre  will  show  *'  that 
the  fundamental  proposition,  posited  and  immediately 
known  as  existent  in  consciousness,  is  impossible  unless 
under  a  further  condition,  and  that  this  further  condi- 
tion is  likewise  impossible  unless  a  third  be  added, — 
until  the  conditions  of  the  first  are  completely  devel- 
oped, and  the  possibility  of  the  same  completely  com- 
prehended."^ It  wiU  "construct  the  whole  common 
consciousness  of  all  rational  beings  in  its  fundamental 
characteristics,  with  pure  a  priori  evidence,  just  as  geom- 
etry constructs,  with  pure  a  priori  evidence,  the  general 
modes  of  limitation  of  space  by  aU  rational  beings.  It 
starts  from  the  simplest  and  most  characteristic  quality 
of  self-consciousness,  the  intuition  of  the  Ego,^  and,  under 
the  assumption  that  the  completely  qualified  self-con- 
sciousness is  the  final  result  of  all  the  other  qualifica- 
tions of  consciousness,  proceeds  until  this  is  thoroughly 
deduced.  To  each  link  in  the  chain  of  these  qualifica- 
tions a  new  one  is  added,  and  it  is  clear,  in  the  direct 
intuition  of  them,  that  the  same  addition  must  take  place 
in  the  consciousness  of  every  rational  being.  Call  the 
Ego  A.  Then,  in  the  intuition  of  the  construction  of 
A,  it  is  seen  that  B  is  inseparably  connected  with  it. 
In  the  intuition  of  the  construction  of  B,  it  is  equally 
clear  that  C  is  an  inseparable  link,  and  so  on,  till  we 
reach  the  final  member  of  A, — completed  self -conscious- 
ness,— which  manifests  itself  as  complete  and  perfect."^ 

1  '  Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  446. 

2  Fichte's  expression,  Anschaung  der  Ich-heit,  is  more  exact,  but, 
I  think,  untranslatable  into  English. 

3  '  Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  379,  380. 


Completed  Self-consciousness.  149 

ISTo  commentary  upon  these  passages  seems  necessary, 
save  perhaps  on  the  expression,  "  completed  self-con- 
sciousness," of  which,  indeed,  the  system  itself  is  the  best 
explanation.  On  both  sides,  this  notion  of  completed 
self -consciousness  requires  to  be  guarded  or  defined — with 
regard  to  its  essence  as  seZ/^-consciousness,  and  with  re- 
gard to  its  completion.  To  popular  thinking,  self-con- 
sciousness is  identical  with  individuality,  —  with  the 
knowledge  of  self  as  a  personal,  active  being,  related  to 
others,  and  to  a  universe  of  things.  But  it  is  at  once 
evident  that  knowledge  of  individuality  in  this  sense  is  a 
complex  fact,  and  a  fact  of  which  the  ground  or  possi- 
bility must  be  sought  in  the  original  act  whereby  the 
subject  is  conscious  at  alL  "  The  Ego  of  real  conscious- 
ness is  always  particular,  and  isolated :  it  is  a  person 
among  other  persons,  each  of  whom  describes  himself  as 
an  Ego ;  and  Wissenschaftslehre  must  develop  up  to  the 
point  at  Avhich  such  consciousness  is  explained.  Totally 
distinct  from  this  is  the  Ego  from  which  Wissenschafts- 
lehre  starts ;  for  this  is  nothing  but  the  identity  of  the 
conscious  subject  Avith  that  of  which  it  is  conscious. 
Abstraction  from  all  else  that  is  contained  in  personal- 
ity is  necessary  in  order  to  attain  this  point  of  view."  ^ 
Self -consciousness,  in  fact,  is  the  common  element  in  all 
knowledge  and  action,  and  therefore  cannot  in  itself  con- 
tain that  which  is  special  and  particular  to  the  individ- 
ual. It  is  the  ground  of  individuality ;  for  without  it 
there  could  not  possibly  be  the  developed,  concrete  con- 
sciousness of  personality;  but  as  ground,  it  is  distinct 
from  that  which  is  conditioned  by  it.  We  may  call  it, 
if  we  choose,  the  pure  Ego,  or  form  of  the  Ego, — Fichte, 
1  '  Werke/  vol.  ii.  p.  382.    Cf.  '  Briefwechsel,'  p.  166. 


150  .  Ficlite. 

as  above  noted,  occasionally  employs  the  untranslatable 
term  Ich-heit, — but  under  whatever  fashion  of  speech, 
we  have  to  recognise  in  it  the  indispensable  condition 
of  all  consciousness.  Intellectual  intuition  lies  at  the 
basis  of  all  more  developed  modes  of  mental  action. 

What,  then,  is  to  be  understood  by  completed  self- 
consciousness  ?  Evidently,  the  realisation  in  conscious- 
ness of  all  that  can  be  shown  to  be  necessarily  implied 
or  involved  in  intellectual  intuition  as  such.  For  it  may 
very  well  happen  that  the  peculiar  activity  of  the  Ego,  in 
becoming  conscious  of  itself,  implies  a  number  of  inter- 
mediate stages, — such,  for  instance,  as  the  definite  sepa- 
ration of  subject  and  object,  self  and  not-self ;  the  definite 
representation  of  each  of  these  under  special  forms  ;  the 
recognition  of  a  plurality  of  individual  active  beings,  with 
rights  and  duties ;  and  all  of  these  may  speculatively  be 
exhibited  as  following  from,  and  dependent  on,  self-con- 
sciousness itself.  In  that  case,  completed  self-conscious- 
ness would  mean,  not  simply  the  abstract  moment  of 
self-identity,  but  the  consciousness  to  which  the  indi- 
vidual may  arrive,  that  he  occupies  a  place  in  an  ideal 
system  of  conscious  beings,  in  an  ideal  order ;  that  his 
finite  existence  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  continuous  efi"ort 
to  realise  what  is  implied  in  that  position ;  and  thus, 
that  his  individuality  is  lost  or  absorbed  in  the  univer- 
sal, rational  order.  All  knowledge  and  the  varied  forms 
of  law,  of  state  mechanism,  of  moral  duties,  of  religious 
beliefs,  would  thus  appear  to  consciousness  as  necessary 
elements  of  the  scheme  or  plan  of  the  ideal  world ;  and 
the  consciousness  of  this  ideal  system,  which  it  is  the 
business  of  speculative  philosophy  to  describe,  would  be 
completed  self-consciousness.     This  is,  in  substance,  the 


The  Ego  as  Idea.  151 

distinction  which  Fichte  indicates  between  tlie  Ego  as 
intellectual  intiiition,  and  the  Ego  as  idea.  "  The  idea 
of  the  Ego  has  only  this  in  common  with  the  Ego  as  in- 
tuition, that  in  both  the  Ego  is  thought  as  not  individ- 
ual,— in  the  latter,  because  the  form  of  the  Ego  is  not 
yet  defined  to  the  point  of  individuality ;  in  the  former, 
conversely,  because  the  individual  is  lost  in  thought  and 
action  according  to  universal  laws.  The  two  are  opposed 
in  this,  that  in  the  Ego  as  intuition  only  the  form  of  the 
Ego  is  to  be  found,  and  no  reference  can  be  made  to  any 
special  matter, — which  indeed  becomes  conceivable  only 
when  the  thought  of  a  world  arises  in  the  Ego — while,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  the  Ego  as  idea,  the  whole  matter  of 
the  Ego  is  thought.  From  the  first,  speculative  cognition 
proceeds,  and  to  the  latter  it  tends  :  only  in  the  practical 
sphere  can  the  idea  be  posited  as  the  ultimate  goal  of 
the  efforts  of  reason.  The  first  is  original  intuition, 
and  becomes  for  us,  when  treated  by  thought,  a  notion 
(Begriff)  :  the  latter  is  idea  only ;  it  cannot  be  thought 
in  a  determinate  fashion ;  it  can  never  exist  realiter,  but 
we  must  continuously  approximate  to  it."  ^  It  need  not 
surprise  us  that  Fichte,  at  this  period  of  his  philosophical 
reflection,  should  frequently  use  the  term  God  as  equiva- 
lent to  the  pure  Ego,  regarded  as  idea.  Such  a  doctrine 
can  appear  startling  only  if  we  identify  self-consciousness 
with  individuality,  and  if  we  fail  to  see  that  were  God 
not  involved  in  self-consciousness.  His  existence  must  be 
for  ever  contingent  or  unnecessary  for  thought.  We  have 
here  one  of  the  points  on  which  it  is  instructive  to 

i  '  Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  516.  The  distinction  here  taken  between 
Begriff  and  Idee  is,  on  the  whole,  Kantian.  The  passage  implies 
much  that  can  only  be  made  intelligible  through  the  system  itself. 


152  FicMe. 

note  the  difference  between  Fichte's  position  and  that 
of  Spinoza.  For  Spinoza,  as  for  philosophy  in  general, 
the  supreme  problem  is  to  connect  the  particular  with 
the  system  of  which  it  is  a  part, — a  problem  which  we 
may  call  the  reduction  of  the  many  to  one,  or  by  what 
phrase  we  please.  N'ow  the  one  and  the  many  are  defi- 
nitely described  by  Spinoza,  but  so  separated  as  to  ren- 
der transition  or  union  wellnigh  impossible.  As  in  the 
Eleatic  system,  so  in  that  of  Spinoza,  the  two  elements 
fall  asunder.  It  is  true  that  Spinoza  seems  to  have 
thought  the  problem  solved  by  pointing  to  the  impossi- 
bility of  thinking  the  particular  or  finite,  save  as  in  rela- 
tion to  the  infinite ;  but  his  treatment  of  this  necessity 
of  thinking  is  the  weak  point  in  his  system.  !Modes  of 
thought  become  for  him  so  many  finite  objects,  mutually 
determining  and  determined;  and  any  relation  to  sub- 
stance is  thus,  for  them,  impossible.  To  an  intellect 
regarding  finite  modes  from  without,  it  might  well  be 
impossible  to  think  of  them,  except  as  limitations  of  the 
infinite  substance ;  but  no  such  thought  is  possible  for 
the  finite  modes  themselves.  The  two  notions  with 
which  Spinoza  works — substance  and  mutual  determina- 
tion— are  irreconcilable ;  and  their  subjective  counter- 
parts, understanding  and  imagination,  are,  in  a  similar 
fashion,  left  standing  side  by  side.^  It  is  on  account  of 
this  failure  to  unite  the  two  elements  of  his  system  that 
Fichte  classes  Spinoza  as  a  dogmatist,  and  points  out  that 


^  Expositions  of  Spinoza  are  fi-equently  imperfect  from  laying  undne 
stress  on  one  of  these  elements.  Mr  Pollock's  recent  very  able  state- 
ment entirely  rejects  or  casts  in  the  shade  the  first  of  them.  Spinoza 
is  treated  throughout  as  -working  with  the  important  scientific  notion 
of  mutual  determination. 


First  Principles.  153 

his  own  doctrine,  on  the  speculative  side,  is  Spinozism, 
but,  as  containing  the  higher  synthesis,  an  inverted  or 
spiritualised  Spinozism.  The  same  criticism  is  con- 
tained in  Hegel's  pregnant  remark,  that  Spinoza's  error 
lay  in  regarding  God  as  substance,  and  not  as  spirit. 

Before  passing  to  the  more  explicit  statement  of  the 
development  of  self -consciousness — i.e.,  to  the  systematic 
portion  of  the  '  Wissenschaftslehre ' — it  may  be  remarked 
that  in  this  notion  of  the  Ego  as  both  abstract  unity 
and  concrete  fulness,  we  have  the  transition  from  the 
Kantian  to  the  later  philosophy  of  HegeL  For  Hegel  as 
for  Fichte,  philosophy  is  the  systematic  development  of 
thought  from  its  most  abstract  moment  to  the  fulness 
and  wealth  of  real  existence,  and  the  culminating  point 
is  the  complete  consciousness  of  thought  as  that  which, 
systematically  developed,  is  the  reality  of  existence.  In 
treatment  of  many  problems  the  two  thinkers  differ  ;  in 
matter,  and  to  a  large  extent  in  form,  they  are  at  one, 

3. — FIKST  PRINCIPLES   OF    'WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE,' 

As  science  of  science,  or  theory  of  that  which  is  pre- 
supposed in  all  consciousness,  Wissenschaftslehre  must 
take  its  origin  from  that  which  is  in  itself  unsusceptible 
of  proof.  Its  first  principle  cannot  be  a  proposition  for 
which  reasons  can  be  advanced ;  it  cannot  even  be  the 
expression  of  a  fact  which  is  given  in  experience  ;  but  it 
must  express  that  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  experi- 
ence, of  aU  consciousness.  The  matter  of  the  first  prin- 
ciple must  therefore  be  unconditioned,  and  equally  so 
the  form.  We  may  indeed  assume  that  alongside  of 
this  absolutely  unconditioned  first  principle,  two  other 
propositions  may  be  given,  two  expressions  of  necessary 


154  Fichte. 

acts  in  the  development  of  self-consciousness, — the  one, 
unconditioned  in  form  though  determined  as  regards 
matter ;  the  other,  unconditioned  in  matter,  thougli 
determined  as  regards  form.  More  than  these  three, 
there  cannot  be  assumed ;  all  other  propositions  in  the 
theory  of  consciousness  must  be  deducible  from  them. 

What,  then,  is  the  first  principle  of  the  "Wissenschafts- 
lehre  1  Evidently,  from  the  exposition  already  given  of 
the  nature  of  this  science,  the  first  principle  can  be  no- 
thing but  an  explicit  statement  of  the  very  innermost 
nature  of  self-consciousness.  For  all  consciousness,  and 
therefore  all  experience,  is  determined  by  self-conscious- 
ness, and  stands  under  it  as  its  supreme  condition.  The 
first  truth  must  therefore  be  the  express  statement  of 
that  fundamental  activity  by  Avhich  consciousness  comes 
to  be.  Beyond  all  doubt  this  fundamental  activity  is 
not  to  be  thought  as  an  object  in  consciousness,  as  one  of 
the  facts  which  we  may  discover  by  inner  observation. 
As  opposed  to  all  the  mechanical  necessity  under  which 
facts  appear  for  us,  this  activity  is  freedom  as  such, — pure 
action,  which,  indeed,  is  or  has  being,  but  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  being. 

The  explicit  statement  of  this  fundamental  activity  is 
reached  in  Fichte's  first  systematic  work,  the  '  Grandlage 
des  Wissenschaftslehre,'  by  a  somewhat  artificial  method ; 
and  unfortunately,  the  few  pages  containing  the  appli- 
cation of  this  method  not  only  exhaust  the  ordinary 
student's  knowledge  of  the  system,  but  supply  almost  all 
that  is  given  of  Fichte's  doctrine  in  the  ordinary  histories 
of  philosophy.  To  this  cause  one  must  refer  much  of 
the  misunderstanding  which  has  undoubtedly  existed 
regarding  the  true  nature  of  Fichte's  speculative  work. 


First  Principles.  155. 

The  method  is  certainly  artificial,  but  as  the  activity  in 
question  is  absolutely  unconditioned,  there  is  not,  as  it: 
were,  any  one  defined  road  by  which  it  is  to  be  ap- 
proached. Fichte,  accordingly,  proposes  to  take  an  un- 
deniable fact  of  ordinary,  empirical  thought,  and  by  cri-. 
ticism  to  show  what  is  impHed  in  it.  The  fact  selected 
is  the  well-known  logical  or  formal  law  of  identity, — A 
is  A.  A  is  A;  that  is,  independently  of  all  material 
considerations  as  to  what  A  may  be,  this  at  least  is  true, 
that  it  is  itself, — it  is  A.  But  such  a  purely  formal 
proposition  makes  no  assertion  regarding  the  positing  or 
affirming  of  A  It  asserts  merely  that  if  A  is  posited, 
then  it  is  =  A :  in  other  words,  it  asserts  the  absolute 
and  unconditioned  validity  of  a  certain  nexus  or  bond 
=  x.  The  nex%is  or  bond,  the  law  according  to  which 
we  judge  that  A  is  A,  is  only  in  consciousness,  is  only 
for  the  Ego ;  consequently  the  proposition  A  =  A  may  be 
expressed  thus :  A  is  for  the  Ego  simply  and  solely  by 
virtue  of  being  affirmed  or  posited  in  the  Ego ;  and  the 
nexus  (x),  the  ground  of  this  identity,  is  the  affirmation 
of  the  existence  of  the  Ego,  /  am.  Only  in  and  for  a 
consciousness  that  is  aware  of  its  own  identity,  can  the 
law  A  =  A  have  validity.  The  unity  and  identity  of 
self-consciousness  thus  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  empirical 
consciousness,  for  all  empirical  consciousness  falls  under 
the  rule,  A  =  A.  But  if  the  proposition  A  =  A,  valid  for 
all  empirical  consciousness,  has  validity  only  because  it 
is  grounded  on  the  fact  of  the  identity  of  self-conscious- 
ness. Ego  =  Ego,  this  identity  must  be  the  pure  act  of 
the  Ego  itself,  the  mere  expression  or  product  of  the 
activity  by  which  the  Ego  is  the  Ego  at  all  Self-affir- 
mation, then,  is  given  simply,  unconditionally,  as  the 


156  Fichte. 

being  of  the  Ego.  The  Ego  is,  because  it  posits  itself 
as  being ;  it  posits  itself  as  being,  because  it  is.  The 
fundamental  activity  of  all  consciousness  is  thus  the 
affirmation  of  itself  by  the  Ego.  '*  The  Ego  posits  origi- 
nally and  simply  its  own  being."  ^ 

The  method  of  arriving  at  this  first  proposition,— one 
absolutely  unconditioned  in  matter  as  in  form,  for  the 
Ego  is  the  common  condition  of  all  matter  of  conscious- 
ness in  general,  and  the  affirmation  of  its  self-identity, 
the  form  of  the  proposition,  is  not  prescribed  to  it  from 
without, — is  otherwise  given  by  Fichte  in  his  later  ex- 
positions.^ In  them  the  reader  is  called  upon  to  make 
the  experiment  of  thinking  any  given  object,  and  then  of 
thinking  the  Ego.  In  the  first  act,  the  characteristic 
feature  is  the  definite  and  recognised  distinction  in  con- 
sciousness between  the  subject  thinking  and  the  object 
thought.  In  the  second,  it  is  equally  plain  that  the 
Ego  thought  and  the  Ego  thinking  are  one  and  the  same. 
The  activity  of  thought  is  reflected  x:pon  itself,  and  in 
this  reflection  upon  self  consists  the  very  essence  of  the 
Ego,  or  of  self -consciousness.  "  The  procedure  of  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  is  the  following :  it  requires  each  one  to 
note  what  he  necessarily  does  when  he  calls  himself,  I. 
It  assumes  that  every  one  who  really  performs  the  re- 
quired act,  will  find  that  he  affirms  lilmself,  or,  which 
may  be  clearer  to  many,  that  he  is  at  the  same  time  sub- 
ject and  object.     In  this  absolute  identity  of  subject  and 

1  '  Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  98. 

^  lu  the  two  " Introductions  to  Wissenschaftslehre,"  in  the  'New 
Exposition,'  and  in  the  '  Sonnenklarer  Bericht.'  The  posthnmous 
"Exposition  from  the  year  1801"  ('  Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  1-162)  con- 
tains in  its  first  part  (§§  1-29)  a  most  elaborate  but  excessively  com- 
plicated and  obscure  analysis  of  the  same  fundamental  condition. 


First  Principles.  157 

object  consists  the  very  nature  of  the  Ego.  The  Ego  is 
that  which  cannot  be  subject,  without  being,  in  the  same 
indivisible  act,  object — and  cannot  be  object,  without 
being,  in  the  same  indivisible  act,  subject ;  and  con- 
versely, whatever  has  this  characteristic,  is  Ego ;  the  two 
expressions  are  the  same."  ^ 

Thus  the  first  proposition  is  the  explicit  statement 
of  that  which  underlies  all  consciousness, — of  the  act 
whereby  consciousness  is  possible.  It  is  the  same  propo- 
sition which  implicitly  had  appeared  in  the  critical  philo- 
sophy under  the  term  unity  of  apperception ;  but  the 
full  significance  of  it  had  not  been  developed  by  Kant. 
Beyond  this  truth  no  philosophy  can  go,  and  all  true 
philosophy  depends  upon  the  recognition  of  it.  Any 
metaphysical  theorem  which  assumes  an  origin  or  cause 
for  consciousness  transcending  this  first,  primitive  afiir- 
mation  of  the  Ego  by  itself,  is  self-convicted  of  incom- 
pleteness and  absurdity. 

It  is  perhaps  needless  to  note  that  the  Ego  referred  to 
is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  individual  or  person. 
Each  individual  or  person  has  in  common  the  conscious- 
ness of  self,  without  which  he  exists  not  at  all ;  but  to 
be  individual  or  person,  more  is  required  than  is  con- 
tained in  self-consciousness.  Accordingly,  as  we  shall 
later  see,  although  Fichte  will  not  deny  to  God  self- 
consciousness  in  the  sense  her^  analysed,  he  wiU  not 
admit  that  God  is  personal  or  individual  To  identify 
any  one  thing  or  person  with  self  -  consciousness  is 
absurd.  Self-consciousness  is  not  a  thing  or  fact  to  be 
observed ;  just  as  little  is  God  one  among  the  objects  of 

1  'Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  441,  442.     Cf.  'Werke,'  vol.  i.  pp.  522,  523, 
629. 


158  Fichte. 

experience  to  be  thought  of  as  coexisting  with  finite 
spirits,  conditioning  or  determining  them,  and  in  turn 
conditioned  or  determined  by  them.  There  is,  and  can 
be,  from  the  position  of  pure  thought,  no  God  except 
the  ideal  system  which  is  involved  in  self-consciousness, 
and  in  which  finite  spirits  have  a  definite  place  and 
function. 

The  fundamental  mode  of  activity,  the  position  of  the 
Ego  by  itself,  if  regarded  in  ahstracto,  is  the  logical  law 
of  identity — i.e.,  no  identity  of  object  can  be  thought 
apart  from  the  identity  of  the  thinking  self.  If  regarded 
as  in  application  to  objects,  it  is  the  category  of  reality. 
AU  reality  is  in  and  for  the  Ego.  The  categories  are 
merely  the  necessary  modes  of  action  of  self-conscious- 
ness viewed  objectively,  or  in  relation  to  the  object. 

Alongside  of  this  first  principle,  which  is  uncondi- 
tioned both  in  matter  and  in  form,  there  may  be  placed 
for  the  purposes  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre  two  further 
principles,  one  unconditioned  in  form  but  conditioned 
in  matter,  the  other  conditioned  as  to  form  but  uncondi- 
tioned as  to  matter.  By  an  artificial  procedure  resem- 
bling that  adopted  in  the  case  of  the  first  principle, 
Fichte  brings  forward  the  second,  on  the  nature  and 
position  of  which  the  greatest  misconception  has  pre- 
vailed. 

As  certainly  as  the  proposition,  A  =  A,  appears  in  em- 
pirical consciousness,  so  certainly  appears  the  allied  but 
distinct  proposition,  N"ot-A  does  not  =A.  This  propo- 
sition is  not  to  be  taken  as  a  mere  reduplication  in  nega- 
tive form  of  the  rule  of  identity ;  it  is  not  equivalent  to 
the  judgment,  Not-A  =  N'ot-A.  For  there  is  implied  in 
it  a  new  element,  N"ot-A,  and  a  totally  new  and  distinct 


First  Principles.  169 

act,  that  of  opposing  to  A  its  negative,  Xot-A.  So  far 
as  matter  is  concerned,  the  proposition  is  determined ;  for 
if  there  is  to  be  op-positing  at  all,  that  which  is  opposed 
to  A  can  only  be  !Not-A.  But  the  form  of  the  proposi- 
tion, the  act  of  negation,  is  not  conditioned  by  the  form 
of  affirmation.  Now,  if  we  treat  this  proposition  as  we 
treated  the  first,  resolving  it  into  its  ultimate  terms,  we 
have  as  result  the  opposition,  in  the  Ego,  of  Ego  and  non- 
Ego.  In  the  Ego,  the  non-Ego  is  opposed  to  the  Ego. 
This  second  proposition  is  fundamental  in  the  Eichtean 
philosophy,  but  at  the  same  time  its  significance  is  not 
immediately  evident.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  clear  what 
is  not  to  be  imderstood  by  the  non-Ego  in  question.  The 
non-Ego  is  not  the  thing-in-itself.  It  is  impossible  and 
contradictory  that  the  Ego  should  affirm  for  itself  the 
being  of  that  which,  by  definition,  is  not  for  the  Ego, 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  yet  plain,  and,  ^ndeed,  it 
only  becomes  plain  from  much  later  developments  of  the 
system,  what  is  the  precise  nature  of  the  act  of  op- 
positing  or  negating.  The  obscurity  which  rests  over 
the  proposition  arises  from  two  sources.  In  the  first 
place,  Fichte  accepts,  as  given,  a  fact  of  empirical  con- 
sciousness, the  fact  of  difference  or  opposition,  and  shoAvs 
that  for  a  self-conscious  subject,  the  ultimate  gi'ound  of 
all  difference  is  the  distinction  of  self  and  not-self.  !No 
opposition  or  difference  in  empirical  knowledge  is  con- 
ceivable, if  the  Ego  has  not  in  itself  the  moment  of 
difference.  As  mere  abstract  statement  of  what  is  im- 
plied in  real  consciousness,  the  proposition  has,  therefore, 
unconditioned  truth ;  but  it  has  not  thereby  been  made 
clear  how  real  consciousness,  which  is  determined  or 
limited,  is  related  to  the  pure  unity  of  self-consciousness 


160  Fichte. 

as  siicli.  All  limitation  is  negation — this  is  fundamental 
for  Fichte  as  for  Spinoza,  and  in  the  second  proposition 
the  ground  of  the  maxim  is  given — but  it  is  not  thereby 
explained  why  or  how  there  should  be  limitation  at  alL 
In  the  second  place,  the  all-important  distinction  between 
the  abstract  and  concrete  moments  of  self-consciousness 
is  easily  overlooked  Fichte  is  here  giving  expression 
to  the  most  abstract  aspect  of  consciousness,  which 
becomes  real  or  concrete  only  after  the  introduction 
of  many  other  elements.  The  non-Ego  referred  to 
is  the  abstract  aspect  of  that  which  in  the  further 
movement  of  thought  presents  itself  as  the  world  of 
objects,  but  it  is  not  in  itself  the  concrete,  represented 
world- 

The  first  proposition,  as  was  said,  is  not  in  Fichte's 
later  expositions  approached  in  the  artificial  manner 
adopted  in  the  '  Grundlage ; '  still  less  is  this  the  case  in 
regard  to  the  second  fundamental  act.  In  the  later  works, 
specially  in  the  'Darstellung  aus  dem  Jahre,  1801,'  and 
in  the  posthumous  lectures,  the  statement  is  much  more 
concrete  and  intelligibla  Self-affirmation  of  the  Ego  is 
the  primitive  activity  of  consciousness.  But  such  primi- 
tive activity  is  in  itself  but  the  ground  of  consciousness. 
The  Ego,  to  be  real,  must  be  aware  of  its  own  activity  as 
affirming  itself.  This  becoming  aware  of  its  own  ac- 
tivity Fichte  calls  reflection ;  and  it  is  easily  seen  that 
the  essential  feature  of  reflection  is  self-limitation  of  the 
Ego.  But  limitation  is  negation ;  the  Ego  becomes  aware 
of  its  own  activity  as  self-positing  only  in  and  by  oppo- 
sition to  self.  Infinite  activity — i.e.,  activity  related 
only  to  itself — is  never,  as  such,  conscious  activity. 
"  Consciousness  works  through  reflection,  and  reflection 


First  Principles.  161 

is  only  through  limitation."  ^  So  soon  as  we  reflect  upon 
the  activity  of  the  Ego,  the  Ego  is  necessarily  finite ; 
so  soon  as  the  Ego  is  conscious  of  its  finitude,  it  is  con- 
scious of  striving  beyond  these  limits,  and  so  of  its  in- 
finitude. "Were  the  question  raised,  Is  the  Ego,  then, 
infinite  ?  the  Ego,  by  the  very  question,  is  finite.  Is  the 
Ego  finite  ]  then,  to  be  aware  of  finitude,  it  is  necessarily 
infinite ;  and  so  on,  in  endless  alternation. 

The  abstract  expression  of  this  alternation  between 
subject  and  object  as  in  relation  to  one  another,  is  con- 
tained in  the  third  fundamental  proposition, — that  from 
which  the  Wissenschaftslehre  definitely  takes  its  start. 

The  second  proposition  has  brought  forward  a  non- 
Ego,  which  is  in  every  respect  the  negative  of  the  Ego. 
Whatever  is  affirmed  regarding  the  one  must  be  explicitly 
denied  of  the  other.  But,  if  we  consider  our  two  pro- 
positions, we  shall  find  not  only  that  they  contradict  one 
another,  but  that  each  proposition,  taken  in  respect  of 
the  other,  contradicts  itself.  For  if  the  non-Ego  is  pos- 
ited, the  Ego  is  negated ;  but  the  Ego  is  absolute  reality, 
and  consequently  the  non-Ego  is  only  posited  through 
the  Ego.  The  Ego,  therefore,  both  posits  and  negates 
itself.  It  is  in  itself  a  contradiction,  or  unites  contradic- 
tions in  itself.  It  is  evidently  impossible  that  both  can 
be  negated ;  it  is  equally  impossible  that  one  should  be 
negated  by  the  other.  The  only  solution  is  to  be  found 
in  some  act  of  the  Ego  by  which  it  is  limited  as  regards 
the  non-Ego,  and  by  which  the  non-Ego  is  limited  as  re- 
gards the  Ego :  the  Ego  shall,  in  part,  negate  the  non- 
Ego;  the  non-Ego  shall,  in  part,  negate  the  Ego.    So  cer- 

1  Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  269.     Cf.  'Darstellung,  a.  d.  J.,  1801,  §§  17, 
28,  29  ;  '  Nachgelassene  Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  79  ;  vol.  ii.  pp.  339,  349. 
P. — IV.  L 


162  Ficlite. 

tainly,  therefore,  as  the  two  fundamental  propositions  are 
true,  as  certainly  can  they  be  combined  in  the  unity  of 
self-conscioiisness,  only  if  the  Ego  posit  in  itself  a  divis- 
ible Ego  as  limited  by  a  divisible  non-Ego.  In  this  third 
proposition  the  form  is  conditioned,  for  by  the  needs  of 
the  prior  maxims  it  is  prescribed  what  the  activity  must 
be ;  the  matter  is  unconditioned,  for  the  notion  by  which 
the  union  is  effected — that  of  limitation — is  not  prescribed 
beforehand.  The  third  proposition,  therefore,  completes 
the  principles  of  Wissenschaf tslehre :  henceforth  each 
step  in  the  evolution  of  self -consciousness  can  and  must 
be  proved  to  follow  with  demonstrative  evidence  from 
them. 

Moreover,  the  connection  of  the  three  principles,  and 
especially  the  mode  by  which  the  third  of  them  was  at- 
tained, shows  clearly  what  must  be  the  method  of  evolu- 
tion. The  very  essence  of  self -consciousness,  in  its  double 
moments  of  self-position  and  reflection,  is  the  union  of 
contradictory  aspects.  Thesis  and  antithesis  are  the 
formal  expressions  of  the  activity  lying  at  the  root  of 
consciousness.  But  contradictions  can  only  be  for  a  self- 
conscious  subject  when  united  or  contained  in  some  more 
concrete  synthesis.  Limitation  has  manifested  itself  as 
the  first  synthesis  ;  but,  narrowly  examined,  the  members 
there  united  will  be  seen  to  manifest  new  contradictions, 
which  again  require  to  be  resolved  into  some  richer,  more 
concrete  notion.  The  course  of  procedure  is  thus  the 
continuous  analysis  of  the  antithetical  moments  of  each 
notion,  and  the  synthetical  union  of  them :  the  goal  is 
the  complete  synthetical  union  of  the  original  opposition 
of  the  Ego  and  the  non-Ego  in  consciousness.  Term 
after  term  will  be  introduced,  until  at  last  the  gap  between 


Development  of  the  System.  163 

these  two  is  filled  up,  and  the  final  synthesis  either  at- 
tained or  the  full  ground  for  its  unattainability  made 
clear.  The  successive  acts  by  which  the  new  synthesis 
comes  forward,  yield,  in  abstracto,  the  forms  of  the  cate- 
gories, which  will  thus  he  deduced  systematically,  not 
accepted  haphazard,  as  in  the  critical  philosophy.  The 
successive  modes  of  consciousness,  in  and  through  which 
the  categories  receive  application  to  objects,  wiU.  be  rigor- 
ously developed,  and  not  taken  from  empirical  psychol- 
ogy. "Wissenschaftslehre  is  thus  not  only  logic,  in  the 
highest  sense  of  the  term,  but  also  a  phenomenology  or 
pragmatic  history  of  consciousness. 

4. — DEVELOPMENT   OF   THE  SYSTEM. 

The  fundamental  principles  contain  the  groundwork, 
not  only  of  the  developed  system  of  the  Wissenschafts- 
lehre in  its  earlier  form,  but  also  of  the  more  abstruse 
metaphysical  view  to  which  Fichte,  at  a  later  period,  ad- 
vanced. The  union  of  opposites,  as  the  very  essence  of 
consciousness,  and  the  reference  of  the  opposed  members 
to  the  identity  of  the  absolute  Ego,  although  very  differ- 
ently expressed,  remain  common  ground  for  both  the 
earlier  and  the  later  systematic  treatments.  In  the  first 
form  of  "Wissenschaftslehre,  however,  the  interest  centres 
mainly  in  the  deduction  of  the  consequences  involved 
in  the  original  synthesis ;  in  the  later  exposition,  the 
synthesis  itself,  as  a  whole,  is  interpreted  in  a  new  and 
more  concrete  fashion. 

As  it  is  impossible  here  to  follow  the  details  of  the 
elaborate  and  compressed  reasoning  by  which  Fichte,  in 
the  '  Grundlage '  and  '  Grundriss  des  Eigenthiimlichen  d. 
Wissenschaftslehre,'  traces  the  successive  stages  or  aspects 


164:  FicUe. 

of  thought  contained  in  the  primitive  synthesis,  it  will 
be  advisable  to  preface  a  summary  of  his  results  by  a 
freer  and  less  technical  statement  of  their  significance. 

The  original  synthesis — in  the  Ego,  the  divisible  Ego 
is  opposed  to  the  divisible  non-Ego — evidently  contains 
two  propositions,  each  of  which  may  be  subjected  to 
analytic  treatment;  ^  for,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  implied 
in  our  proposition  that  the  Ego  posits  the  non-Ego  as 
determined  by  the  Ego ;  and  in  the  second  place,  it  is 
implied  that  the  Ego  posits  itself  as  determined  by  the 
non-Ego.  The  second  of  these  is  the  fundamental  pro- 
position for  the  theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre — that  is, 
it  expresses  the  very  essence  of  the  Ego  as  intelligence 
generally.  The  first  is  the  expression  of  the  essence  of 
the  Ego  as  practical  The  ultimate  synthesis  must  be 
found  in  that  notion  in  which  the  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical activities  of  the  Ego  are  identified.  At  the  present 
stage,  such  ultimate  synthesis  appears  problematical  in 
fact,  and  scarcely  conceivable  in  thought.  The  approach  to 
it  must  be  effected  by  following  out  the  two  isolated  expres- 
sions according  to  the  general  method  already  recognised. 
We  may  thus  hope  to  make  clear,  first,  what  the  non- 
Ego,  as  in  thought,  must  be  for  the  Ego ;  in  other  words, 
we  may  hope  to  obtain  a  complete  survey  of  the  formal 
determinations  of  thought  in  and  through  which  it  is 
possible  for  a  non-Ego  to  be  presented  to  intelligence. 
How  there  should  be  a  non-Ego  at  all  will  not  thereby 
be  explained ;  but  for  solution  of  this  problem  we  may 

'  The  treatment  is  analytic,  inasmuch  as  we  reflectively  expound 
the  oppositions  contained  in  a  given  synthesis ;  but  the  act  of  con- 
sciousness through  "which  these  oppositions  are  given  and  resolved,  is 
not  analytic,  but  a  continuous  series  of  synthetic  combinations. 


Development  of  the  System.  165 

look,  in  the  second  place,  to  the  development  of  the  nature 
of  the  Ego  as  practical 

Theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre  is  thus  the  systematic 
development  of  the  form  of  consciousness  in  which  Ego 
and  non-Ego  are  opposed,  and  so  opposed  that  the  Ego 
is  determined  by  the  non-Ego.  Opposition  of  this  kind 
between  Ego  and  non-Ego  is  the  characteristic  feature  of 
cognitive  consciousness  or  intelligence.  We  may  there- 
fore express  the  business  of  the  theoretical  Wissenschafts- 
lehre as  the  analysis  of  the  notions,  categories,  or  necessary 
modes  of  action  of  intelligence,  implied  in,  and  making 
up,  the  essence  of  the  recognition  of  a  non-Ego  by  the 
Ego.  Popular  thinking  or  philosophical  theory  employs 
various  notions  in  its  effort  to  explain  the  relation  be- 
tween Ego  and  non-Ego.  The  Wissenschaftslehre  has  to 
deduce  these  notions,  to  assign  to  them  their  value  by 
exhibiting  them  in  their  due  place  as  stages  or  aspects 
of  thought,  and  systematically  to  develop  them  from 
the  fundamental  antithesis.  The  results  of  the  Wis- 
senschaftslehre, so  far  as  it  is  theoretical,  are  purely 
formal ;  and  Kant  was  in  a  measure  correct  when  he 
described  Wissenschaftslehre  as  mere  logic.  But  it 
was  Kant's  mistake,  and  it  has  been  the  mistake  of 
most  critics  of  the  system,  to  confine  their  view  to  one 
limited  aspect  of  it.  Fichte  was  well  aware  that  the  de- 
duction of  the  categories,  which  he  was  the  first  to  under- 
take in  a  genuinely  philosophical  fashion, — nay,  that  the 
exposition  of  the  modes  of  subjective  thinking,  such  as 
representation,  understanding,  judgment,  reasoning,  — 
can  have,  within  the  limits  of  theoretical  Wissenschafts- 
lehre, nothing  but  formal  worth.  It  was  for  him  a  simple 
and  incontrovertible  truth,  that  knowledge,  as  knowledge, 


166  Ficlite. 

is  of  necessity  opposed  to,  and  distinct  from  reality.  Such 
opposition  is  the  very  essence  of  knowledge ;  and  if  it 
can  be  shown — as  Fichte  thought  it  could  be  shown — 
that  this  opposition  necessarily  assumes  in  the  Ego  the 
f onn  of  representation  (  Vorstellung),  then  it  is  absolutely 
certain  that  for  the  cognitive  Ego  there  are  only  repre- 
sentations. Reality  is  given  only  in  immediate  percep- 
tion, or  in  the  element  oi  feeling;  and  feeling  is  practic'al, 
not  theoretical  The  logical  categories,  which  alone  give 
significance  for  intelligence  to  the  non-Ego,  do  not  con- 
tain in  themselves  the  element  of  fact ;  and  were  there 
no  practical  Wissenschaftslehre,  philosophy  would  remain 
where  it  had  been  left  by  Kant, — for  Kant  had  seen  that 
the  affection  of  sense  was  indispensable  if  real  concrete 
matter  were  to  be  supplied  for  the  action  of  intelligence, 
but  he  had  attempted  no  deduction  of  affection.  It  re- 
mained, in  his  system,  a  foreign  ingredient ;  and  his  in- 
competent followers  had,  without  hesitation,  assigned 
the  thing-in-itself  as  ground  of  explanation.  From  the 
very  outset  of  his  speculation,  Eichte  had  maintained  that 
in  his  system  alone  was  tp  be  found  the  solution  for  the 
difficulty  left  by  Kant, — that  sensuous  affection  was  there 
shown  to  be  a  necessary  element  for  intellectual  function, 
and  that  sensuous  affection  was  there  deduced  from  the 
Ego,  though  not  from  the  Ego  as  cognitive. 

"  The  intellectual  intuition  from  which  we  have 
started  is  not  possible  without  sensuous  intuition,  and 
this  not  without  feeling.  It  is  a  total  misunderstand- 
ing of  my  meaning,  and  a  simple  reversal  of  the  very 
meaning  and  purport  of  my  system,  to  ascribe  to  me  the 
opposed  view.  But  sense,  intuition,  and  feeling  are  just 
as  impossible  Avithout  intellectual  intuition.     I  cannot 


Development  of  the  System.  167 

he  for  myself 'wi^ovA,  being  something  (ehcas  =  a  definite 
somewhat),  and  I  am  this  only  in  the  world  of  sense  ; 
I  can  just  as  little  be  for  myself  ^yithovit  being  Ego, — 
and  this  I  am  only  in  the  intelligible  world,  which  dis- 
closes itself  to  me  through  intellectual  intuition.  The 
point  of  union  between  the  two  lies  in  this,  that  what  I 
am  in  the  first,  I  am  for  myself  only  through  absolute 
self-activity  regulated  by  thought.  Our  existence  in  the 
intelligible  world  is  the  moral  law ;  our  existence  in  the 
world  of  sense  is  actual  fact :  the  combining  link  is  free- 
dom, as  absolute  ability  to  determine  the  latter  through 
the  former."  ^  For  this  reason  Fichte  found  himself  on 
so  many  points  in  harmony  with  Jacobi,  whose  general 
tendency  in  speculation  was  otherwise  opposed.  For 
this  reason  he  frequently  employs  expressions  that  are 
easily  misunderstood,  but  which  sound  as  though  his 
philosophy  were  one  of  so-called  Common-sense,  The 
point  is  of  the  last  importance,  and  if  not  kept  in  view, 
a  totally  false  impression  of  the  system  will  be  obtained. 

In  the  theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre,  therefore,  we 
may  expect,  first,  a  pure  logic  of  the  notions  through 
which  the  non-Ego  is  for  the  Ego ;  and,  second,  a  genetic 
or  pragmatic  history  of  the  forms  of  thinking  in  which 
the  non-Ego  is  apprehended.  The  course  of  the  deduc- 
tion of  the  notions  is  the  following  : — 

The  proposition — The  Ego  posits  itself  as  determined 
by  the  non-Ego — yields,  on  analysis,^  the  opposed  expres- 
sions,  The  Ego  is  passive  as  determined  by  the  non-Ego ; 

1  "Sittenlehre,"  'Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  91.  Cf.  '  Werke,'  vol.  i.  pp. 
253,  266,  301,  464,  474.  492. 

2  See  note  p.  164  above  for  the  significance  of  analysis  as  here 
employed. 


168  Fidite. 

and,  The  Ego,  positing  itself,  is  active.  !N"ot  only  is  each 
of  these  expressions  a  contradiction  in  itself,  but  they 
are  mutually  contradictory,  and,  if  the  unity  of  conscious- 
ness is  to  be  preserved,  must  be  imited  through  some 
synthetic  and  more  concrete  notion.  Such  notion  is 
readily  seen  to  be  but  a  richer  form  of  the  category  of  lim- 
itation or  determination,  from  which  the  opposites  took 
their  rise.  The  Ego  is  partly  determined,  partly  deter- 
mines itself.  So  much  reality  as  the  Ego  posits  in  itself, 
so  much  does  it  negate  in  the  non-Ego ;  so  much  reality 
as  it  posits  in  the  non-Ego,  so  much  does  it  negate  in 
itsel£  This  notion,  in  which  Ego  and  non-Ego  are 
thought  as  mutually  determining,  is  called  by  Fichte  the 
category  of  Eeciprocal  Determination  {Wechsel-hestim- 
mung). 

But  the  expressions  which  have  been  united  in  this 
second  synthesis  are  themselves  contradictory.  Each, 
therefore,  must  be  analytically  treated  and  s}mthetically 
solved,  while  a  final  synthesis  will  result  from  the  combin- 
ation of  the  notions  so  reached,— a  final  synthesis  which 
shall  take  up,  in  a  developed  form,  the  category  of  recip- 
rocal determination.  The  first  expression.  The  non-Ego 
determines  the  Ego,  contains,  as  antithetical  elements, 
The  non-Ego  has  reality,  for  only  so  can  it  determine  the 
Ego ;  and,  secondly.  The  non-Ego  has  no  reality,  for  it  is 
only  negation  of  the  Ego,  which  alone  has  reality.  iNow, 
the  positing  of  the  Ego,  through  which  it  has  reality,  is 
pure  activity.  The  non-Ego,  as  negation  of  the  Ego, 
can,  therefore,  have  reality,  not  in  itself,  but  only  in  so 
far  as  the  Ego  is  passive  or  negatively  active.  The 
notion  which  thus  effects  the  desired  synthesis  is  that  of 
causality, — for  the  non-Ego  may  thus  be  thought  as  hav- 


Development  of  the  System.  169 

ing  reality  in  so  far  as  the  Ego  is  affected  (or  passive), 
Eeciprocal  determination  in  this  new  notion  acquires 
greater  definiteness,  for  the  orde)'  of  determination  is 
fixed.  The  one  factor  has  positive,  the  other  negative, 
activity. 

The  second  expression.  The  Ego  determines  itself, 
likewise  contains  antithetical  elements — viz.,  The  Ego  is 
determining,  and  therefore  active, — The  Ego  determines 
itself,  and  is  therefore  passive.  K"ow  the  Ego,  as  posit- 
ing, is  the  sum  of  all  reality,  and  therefore  of  activity. 
But,  as  positing,  it  posits  a  definite  portion  of  this  total 
sphere  of  reality,  and  every  definition  is  negative  as  re- 
spects the  whole.  The  Ego,  therefore,  is  passive  through 
its  own  activity.  As  sum  of  reality  and  activity,  the 
Ego  is  suhstance ;  a  definite  portion  of  the  sphere  of 
reality  or  activity  is  accident.  The  new  notion,  the 
synthesis  of  substance,  thus  gives  a  fresh  definiteness  to 
the  category  of  reciprocal  determination.  The  passivity 
of  the  Ego  is  determined  through  its  activity. 

The  two  syntheses — that  of  causality,  in  Avhich  the 
Ego  is  passive  through  activity  of  the  non-Ego,  and  that 
of  substance,  in  which  the  Ego  is  passive  through  its 
own  activity — are  the  two  most  important  propositions  in 
the  theory  of  knowledge  ;  for  they  are  the  abstract  ex- 
pressions for  the  counter-views  of  dogmatic  realism  and 
subjective  idealism.  If  the  relation  of  Ego  and  non- 
Ego  is  thought  simply  through  the  notion  of  causality, 
all  representation  (Vorstellung)  is  regarded  as  the  effect 
of  an  objective  system  of  things.  If  the  relation  is 
thought  through  the  notion  of  substance,  all  representa- 
tions are  viewed  as  states  of  the  Ego.^  Neither  view 
^  As  above  noted,  p.  127,  Spinoza  (or  Locke)  may  be  taken  as  rep- 


1 70  Fichte. 

is  coherent :  for  the  theory  of  representation  as  effect  of 
the  non-Ego  does  not  explain  how  such  representation 
should  be  thought  hy  the  Ego  ;  and  the  theory  of  repre- 
sentation as  state  of  the  Ego  does  not  explain  why  the 
Ego  should  oppose  to  itself  a  non-Ego.  They  are,  more- 
over, mutually  destructive.  A  new  sjoithesis  must  be 
found,  wherein  shall  be  contained  the  antithetical  ele- 
ments,— passivity  of  the  Ego  as  determined  by  activity 
of  the  non-Ego, — passivity  of  the  Ego  as  determined  by 
its  o^YYL  activity.  Kealism  and  idealism  must  be  united 
in  ideal-realism. 

The  exposition  of  this  new  synthesis,  extending  over 
some  seventy  pages  of  the  closest  reasoning,  interrupted 
by  frequent  digressions,  and  complicated  by  divisions, 
subdivisions  and  cross  divisions,  is  the  hardest  and  most 
involved  portion  of  the  '  Wissenschaftslehre.'  Divested, 
so  far  as  possible,  of  its  technical  terminology,  the  result 
may  be  presented  somewhat  as  follows.  The  Ego  and 
non-Ego  have  now  appeared  in  thought  as  mutually 
determining  and  determined,  and  the  final  relation  be- 
tween them  may  be  expressed  in  the  notion  of  reciprocal 
action  and  passion  (Weclisel-Thun-und- Leiden).  But 
such  a  relation  can  only  be  for  intelligence,  if  there  be 
given  some  activity  of  consciousness  which  is  at  once 
determining  and  determined, — which  shall  at  once  posit 
the  Ego  as  limited  by  the  non-Ego,  and  the  non-Ego  as 
the  limit  of  the  Ego.  The  Ego  itself  is  pure  activity, 
total  reality.  The  new  act  must  therefore  mediately 
posit  each  of  the  two  opposed  factors.  It  must  affirm 
the  non-Ego  as  limiting,  determining  the  Ego;  and  at  the 

resenting  the  first  view,  Berkeley  or  Leibnitz  as  representing  the 
other. 


Development  of  the  System.  171 

same  time  must  affirm  or  posit  this  limitation,  as  a  limita- 
tion of  the  Ego.  The  limit  shall  be  posited  only  in  so 
far  as  the  Ego  is  affirmed  as  passive ;  the  Ego  shall  be 
affirmed  only  in  so  far  as  the  limit  is  posited-  This 
activity,  by  which  the  infinitude  of  the  Ego  is  limited, 
this  activity  which  continuously  mediates  between  the 
opposites  of  infinitude  and  finitude — for  the  Ego  is  infi- 
nite, but,  as  reflective,  as  conscious  of  itself,  it  is  finite — 
Fichte  describes  by  the  term  already  familiar  to  students 
of  Kant,  Productive  Imagination.  It  is  the  necessary 
activity  of  thought  by  which  definiteness,  or  determin- 
ateness,  becomes  possible  for  thought.  By  it  alone  the 
Ego  becomes  subject  and  has  the  object  over  against  it. 
Subject  and  object  are,  in  fact,  the  opposites  of  Ego  and 
non-Ego  as  appearing  in  theoretical  cognition.  !No  sub- 
ject without  an  object ;  no  object  without  a  subject. 
Productive  imagination  it  is  which  wins  for  us  defiinite 
things  from  the  "void  and  formless  infinite."  All 
reality  is  for  us  through  imagination — a  proposition 
which  may  afford  matter  for  reflection  to  those  who 
assume  that  a  specxdative  philosophy  in  any  way  endeav- 
ours to  transcend  experience.  The  product  of  imagina- 
tion, the  representation  (Vorstellumj),  is  at  once  objec- 
tive, for  it  can  only  be  thought  as  related  to  the  non-Ego 
— and  subjective,  for  it  is  only  for  the  reflective  subject. 
Hence  arises  that  curious  and  most  obscure  property  of 
Vorstcllungen,  that  they  are  invariably  thought  as  repre- 
sentations of  some  reality ;  hence  arises,  for  us,  the  oppo- 
sition between  the  subjective  and  objective  orders  of 
experience.^     A  thing,  logically  regarded,  is  but  a  com- 

1  See  'Werke,'  vol.  il.  pp.  400,  401.     The  whole  tract,  'Sonnen- 
klarer  Bericht,'  is  an  essay  on  external  perception,  which  might  with 


172  Fichte. 

plex  of  relations  envisaged  in  imagination — i.e.,  repre- 
sented or  definitely  embodied.^ 

"AU  difficulties,"  Ficlite  concludes,  "are  thus  satis- 
factorily solved.  The  problem  was,  to  unite  the  oppo- 
sites,  Ego  and  non-Ego.  Through  the  faculty  of  imagi- 
nation, which  unites  contradictories,  these  may  be  com- 
pletely reconciled.  The  non-Ego  is  itself  a  product  of 
the  self -determining  Ego,  and  not  anything  posited  as 
absolute  and  external  to  the  Ego.  An  Ego  that  posits 
itself  as  self-positing — i.e.,  as  a  subject — is  impossible 
vrithout  an  object  produced  in  the  fashion  just  described 
(the  very  characteristic  of  the  Ego,  its  reflection  upon 
itself  as  a  definite  somewhat,  is  possible  only  under  the 
condition  that  it  limit  itself  through  an  opposite).  There 
remains  over  only  the  question  how  and  by  what  means 
the  limit,  Avhich  is  here  assumed  as  explaining  represen- 
tation for  the  Ego,  comes  to  be  at  all.  This  question  lies 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre, 
and  is  not  to  be  answered  within  them."  ^ 

Faculty  of  productive  imagination  is,  therefore,  the 
fundamental    cognitive  activity.^     It    is,  however,  only 

advantage  be  compared  with  our  English  analyses  of  the  same 
problem. 

1  '  Werke,'  vol.  i.  p.  443. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  1.  p.  218. 

3  This  productive  imagination,  it  may  be  pointed  out,  is  virtually 
identical  with  Beck's  original  synthetical  act.  The  whole  question  of 
productive  imagination  in  the  scheme  of  the  Kantian  theory  of  know- 
ledge requires  to  be  more  thoroughly  worked  than  lias  yet  been  done. 
Useful  contributions  to  the  solution  are  given  by  Frohschammer, 
'  Ueberdie  Bedeutung  der  Einbildungskraft  in  der  Philosophic  Kant's 
und  Spinoza's,  1879'  (which  does  not  appreciate  fully  the  place  of 
imagination  in  Spinoza's  scheme) ;  and,  more  recently,  by  Mainzer, 
'  Die  kritische  Epoche  in  der  Lehre  von  der  Einbildungskraft  aus 
Hume's  und  Kant's  theoretischer  Philosoiihie,  1881.' 


Development  of  the  System.  173 

the  ground  of  Vorstellung ;  the  more  definite  qualifica- 
tions of  representation  are  due  to  other  activities  of 
consciousness.  These  Ficlite  proceeds  to  trace  with 
much  minuteness,  giving  what  he  describes  as  a  '*  prag- 
matic history  of  consciousness."  The  'Grundriss  des 
EigenthiimHchen  der  Wissenschaftslehre,'  in  particular, 
contains  an  extraordinarily  minute  analysis  and  descrip- 
tion of  sensation  and  intuition,  with  a  much  more 
detailed  deduction  of  the  forms  of  intuition  than  is  put 
forward  in  the  'Grundlage.'  The  characteristic  feature 
of  the  treatment  is  the  continuous  reference  of  the  pro- 
cesses described  on  the  one  hand  to  the  non-Ego,  as  to 
that  with  which  they  are  concerned ;  on  the  other  hand, 
to  the  Ego,  as  to  that  by  which  they  are  posited  or  exist. 
The  successive  acts  are,  in  truth,  stages  in  the  develop- 
ment of  productive  imagination,  and  arise  through  the 
continuous  reflection  of  the  Ego  upon  each  of  the  stages. 
The  treatment  is  thus  Avhat  in  Fichte's  system  would 
correspond  to  psychology. 

The  lowest  stage,  the  first  moment  of  the  process  by 
which  the  Ego  becomes  definitely  conscious  of  the  oppo- 
sition involved  in  its  nature,  is  that  in  which  the  Ego 
finds  itself  limited  or  rendered  passive.  This  state  or 
condition — for  the  Ego  is  not  reflectively  aware  of  the 
activity  which  is,  nevertheless,  involved  in  it — is  sen- 
sation (^Empfindung).  All  sensation  is  accompanied  by 
the  feeling  of  the  passivity  of  the  Ego — i.e.,  by  the  feel- 
ing of  constraint  or  necessity.  This  feeling  of  compul- 
sion, enriched  by  other  products  of  the  reflective  energy 
of  the  Ego,  is  an  essential  element  in  the  belief  m  exter- 
nal reality. 

Sensation,  however,  though  a  passive  state,  is  only  for 


174  Fichte. 

the  Ego  ;  the  Ego  reflects  upon  its  own  state,  and  there 
is  thus  introduced  the  distinction  between  self  and  not- 
self,  which  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  all  reflection. 
The  sensation  taken  reflectively,  and  thereby  referred  to 
the  non-Ego,  is  intuition  (^Anschaimng).  As  the  Ego  is 
not  reflectively  aware  of  the  activity  by  which  it  so 
objectifies  sensation,  it  is,  in  the  process  of  intuition, 
absorbed  or  sunk  in  the  contemplation  of  the  object.^ 
The  intuition,  however,  is,  equally  with  sensation,  for 
the  Ego;  and  the  Ego,  becoming  reflectively  aware  of 
intuition  as  an  activity,  a  product  of  its  own,  so  converts 
intuition  into  a  subjective  fact,  a  mental  representation 
or  image  {Blld).  The  twofold  action  of  the  Ego  in  reflec- 
tion upon  intuition — that  by  which  it  contemplates  intui- 
tion as  the  object,  that  by  which  subjectively  it  is  aware 
that  the  intuition  is  a  mental  fact — explains  the  thought- 
relation  between  the  external  object  as  the  original,  and 
the  intuition  as  its  copy  or  representative,  and  also  ex- 
plains the  distinction  we  draw  in  consciousness  between 
inner  and  outer  intuition.  Outer  intuition  is  the  pro- 
cess thought  as  determined  with  respect  to  the  content 
or  attributes  of  its  product ;  inner  intuition,  the  process 
thought  as  subjectively  mine,  and  therefore  free  or  un- 
constrained as  to  mode  of  action  by  the  object  There 
thus  arises  for  consciousness  the  important  difi"erence 
between  necessity  and  contingency  in  the  sphere  of  intu- 
ition,— a  diff'erence  which  rests  upon  and  implies  the  dis- 
tinction of  intuitions  from  one  another,  their  reciprocal 
determination,  and  the  determined  sequence  of  acts  of 
intuition.     The   condition   under   which  distinction  of 

1  Cf.  'Werke,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  373  et  seq.,  for  a  more  elaborate  exposi- 
tion of  tHs  featiu-e  of  Intuition. 


Development  of  the  System.  175 

intuitions  as  objects  from  one  another  is  possible  is 
space ;  the  condition  under  which  determined  acts  of 
intuition  are  possible  is  time.  ^ 

Intuition,  as  such,  is  not  yet  a  fixed  product  for  the 
Ego.  The  productive  imagination,  of  which  intuition  is 
a  mode,  fixes  nothing.  The  definite  fijcing  or  relating  of 
intuitions  is  the  work  of  understanding  (Verstand),  and 
all  reality  for  cognition  is  in  and  through  the  under- 
standing. The  modes  of  fixing  are  the  categories  already 
deduced  as  involved  in  the  very  essence  of  consciousness, 
and  Fichte  is  thus  enabled  to  show  what  Kant  had  failed 
to  do, — that  category,  schema,  and  intuition  are  organic- 
ally united  ;  that  the  categories  are  not  empty  forms  into 
which  matter  is  thro^vn  from  without,  but  arise  with  the 
objects  themselves. 

The  understanding,  of  which  the  products  are  thoughts 
or  notions,  is  itself  subject  to  reflection,  and  to  a  reflec- 
tion which  is,  as  opposed  to  understanding,  abstractive 
or  free.  The  reflective  action  of  the  Ego  upon  the  whole 
world  of  objects  of  understanding  is  judgment  {Urtheils- 
kraft).  The  highest  stage  of  consciousness  is  reflection 
upon  judgment,  for  in  this,  abstraction  is  made  of  all 
save  the  Ego  itself.  The  Ego  in  its  pure  abstraction  and 
consciousness  of  self  is  reason  {Vemunft).  The  more 
complete  this  power  of  abstraction,  this  withdrawal  from 
objectivity,  the  more  closely  does  the  empirical  approach 
pure  consciousnesa 

The  theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre  has  developed  com- 
pletely the  form  of  cognition,  and  has  shown  that  this 

1  The  deduction  of  Space  and  Time,  a  remarkable  piece  of  analysis, 
is  cat-ried  out  in  great  detail  in  the  "  Grundriss  des  Eigenthiimlichen," 
'Werke,'  vol.  i.  pp.  391-411. 


17G  Fichte. 

form  is  an  organic  or  systematic  whole.  Bnt  it  has  pro- 
ceeded from  a  proposition  containing  an  element  not  yet 
deduced  or  explained.  The  Ego,  positing  itself  as  de- 
termined by  a  non-Ego,  has  been  shown  to  effect  this 
position  by  a  series  of  necessary,  synthetic  acts,  through 
which  both  Ego  and  non-Ego  have  appeared  as  determined 
and  in  relations  to  one  another.  Alongside  of  this  fun- 
damental proposition,  however,  there  stood  a  second, 
equally  necessary  for  consciousness — viz.,  that  the  Ego 
posits  itself  as  determining  the  non-Ego.  The  form  of 
cognition  rests  entirely  on  the  opposition  between  non- 
Ego  and  Ego,  but  explains  in  no  way  the  origin  of  this 
opposition.  The  investigation  must  now  be  directed 
upon  the  second  proposition — the  foundation  of  the  prac- 
tical Wissenschaftslehre — in  order  to  discover  -w^hether 
in  it  there  may  not  be  given  a  solution  of  the  presuppo- 
sition on  which  the  form  of  knowledge  has  rested.  The 
practical  Wissenschaftslehre  is  not  developed  by  Fichte 
with  the  same  dialectical  vigour  as  had  been  manifest 
in  the  treatment  of  knowledge,  and  the  more  important 
doctrines  are  to  be  sought,  not  in  the  '  Grundlage,'  but 
in  the  introductions  to  the  systematic  works  on  Law 
and  Morals.^ 

The  Ego  as  cognitive  recognises  reality  in  the  non- 
Ego,  and  as  active  or  practical,  as  determining  the 
non-Ego,  likewise  ascribes  reality  to  it.  But  how  is  it 
possible  that  there  should  be  for  the  Ego,  which  is  pure 
activity,  mere  self- position,  a  negation  or  opposition? 
How  is  the  primitive  act  of  oppositing,  already  noted  as 
the  most  obscure  and  perplexed  feature  of  the  system, 

^  Particularly  in  the  "  Sittenlehre "  ('Werke,'  vol.  iv.),  which  is 
Fichte's  most  carefully  "written  work. 


Development  of  the  System.  177 

possible  for  the  Ego  ]  It  would  be  possible  if  the  Ego 
were  to  limit  itself, — if  in  addition  to  the  activity  by 
which  the  Ego  posits  itself,  there  were  given  another 
activity  —  e.g.,  that  of  limitation, — for  the  mode  of 
action  of  this  second  activity  must  necessarily  be  op- 
position. If  we  call  the  first  activity  pure,  the  second 
may  be  called  objective.  The  union  of  pure  and  ob- 
jective activity  in  the  Ego  would  explain  the  Anstoss 
or  opposition  upon  which  all  cognition  depends.  The 
pure  activity,  as  self-related,  is  infinite ;  the  objective 
activity  is  finite  and  limitative.  If  the  Ego  is  to  unite 
both,  it  must  be  an  infinite  activity  which  is  at  the  same 
time,  though  not  in  the  same  sense,  finite ;  it  must  be  an 
infinite  striving.  Striving  implies  opposition,  for  with- 
out obstacle,  without  impediment,  there  is  only  bound- 
less activity.  How  shall  the  infinite  activity  of  the  Ego 
be  thought  as  infinite  striving]  The  Ego  is,  but  it  is 
only  for  itself.  Eeflection  is  thus  the  very  law  of  exist- 
ence for  a  conscious  Ego.  The  Ego  is  only  the  Ego,  in 
so  far  as  it  reflects.  But  this  reflection  is  the  very  limi- 
tative obstacle  of  which  the  practical  Wissenschaftslehre 
is  in  search,  and  the  problem  is  therefore  solved.  If 
the  Ego  be  not  activity, — infinite  self-position, — there 
can  be  no  striving.  If  the  Ego  be  not  reflective,  it  can- 
not be  conscious  of  itself ;  it  remains  a  thing,  and  not 
an  Ego.  Thus  the  practical  activity  of  the  Ego  is  the 
ground  of  the  Anstoss,  which  renders  intelligence  pos- 
sible ;  while  reflection  is  the  ground  of  the  self  -  con- 
sciousness of  the  Ego.  For  an  Ego  which  is  not  reflec- 
tive, which  is  not  opposed  by  a  non-Ego,  self-conscious- 
ness is  impossible,  and  to  such  an  Ego  the  system  of 
"Wissenschaftslehre  has  no  application. 

p. — IV.  II 


178  FkUe. 

The  complete  synthesis  of  the  opposed  propositions 
from  which  the  start  was  made,  has  now  been  reached ; 
the  practical  and  theoretical  activities  of  the  Ego  are 
shown  to  be  necessarily  related  to  one  another,  and 
to  the  absolute  Ego.  Without  simple  self-position  of 
the  Ego — i.e.,  without  the  absolute  Ego  as  the  idea 
of  all  reality — there  can  be  no  infinite  striving,  and 
without  infinite  striving,  no  intelligence.  At  the  root 
of  the  infinite  striving  of  the  Ego  lies  the  idea  of  the 
infinitude  of  the  absolute  Ego — an  idea  which,  from  the 
necessary  reflection  of  the  Ego,  is  never  completely  rea- 
lised, but  towards  which  there  is  an  endless  tendency  in 
the  Ego.  The  Ego,  as  infinite  but  reflective  activity 
under  the  idea  of  the  absolute  tendency  towards  self- 
realisation,  is  the  practical  Ego,  and  the  series  of  stages 
throughout  which  it  passes  is  the  ideal  seriea  The  Ego, 
as  limited  by  the  non-Ego,  but  at  the  same  time  as  con- 
tinuously transcending  this  opposition,  is  theoretical,  and 
the  series  of  stages  throiigh  which  it  passes  is  the  real 
series.  "And  so  the  whole  nature  of  finite,  rational 
beings  is  comprehended  and  explained.  Original  idea  of 
our  absolute  being ;  striving  towards  reflection  upon  self 
according  to  this  idea ;  limitation, — not  of  this  striving, 
but  of  our  real  being,  which  is  first  given  through  the 
limitation — through  the  opposing  principle,  a  non-Ego — 
or,  generally,  through  our  finitude ;  self-consciousness, 
and  in  particular  consciousness  of  our  practical  striving ; 
determination  of  our  representations  thereby  (with  free- 
dom and  without  freedom) ;  through  this,  determination 
of  our  actions — the  direction  of  our  real,  sensuous  exist- 
ence; continual  extension  of  the  limits  to  our  activity."-^ 
1  'Werke,'vol.  i.  p.  278. 


Development  of  tlie  System.  179 

Although  all  expositions  of  Fichte's  philosophy  bring 
into  prominence  the  fact  that  for  him  reason  as  practi- 
cal is  the  ground  of  reason  as  theoretical,  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  fact,  so  far  as  his  general  theory  of  know- 
ledge is  concerned,  does  not  seem  to  have  received 
sufficient  attention.  It  has  not  seen  how  the  practical 
side  of  Wissenschaftslehre  bears  upon  and  supplements 
the  proposition  from  which  Fichte  never  departs — that 
knowledge  is  formal  only,  and  that  reality  is  not  con- 
tained in  the  form  of  thought  or  cognition,  Kant  had 
made  the  same  proposition  a  feature  of  his  system,  but 
had  never  been  able  to  offer  any  explanation  of  it, 
and  manifestly  remained  under  the  impression  that 
in  Fichte's  theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre,  the  attempt 
was  made  to  extract  reality  out  of  mere  form  of 
thought.'-  This,  however,  is  by  no  means  the  truth. 
Self-consciousness  is  only  realised  in  the  form  of  knoAv- 
ledge,  but  the  form  of  realisation  is  not  the  reality  itself. 
Opposition  between  self  and  not-self  is  the  necessary 
form  of  self-consciousness,  but  the  necessity  of  the  form 
does  not  explain  the  reality  attaching  to  the  two  factors. 
It  is  on  this  account  that  Fichte  so  continuously  lays 
stress  on  the  principle  that  the  primitive  datum  of  con- 
sciousness is  not  a  fact  to  be  cognised  under  the  neces- 
sary form  of  knowledge,  but  the  product  of  an  act;  that 
the  essence  of  the  conscious  being  is  not  representa- 
tion or  knowledge,  but  activity  or  freedom,  which  is 
cognised  under  the  forms  of  representation  or  know- 
ledge. The  necessary  implication  of  activity  and  cog- 
nition is,  therefore,  the  answer  supplied  by  him  to 
the  problem  left  unsolved  by  Kant — the  problem  of 
1  See  above,  p.  50. 


180  Fichte. 

the  relation  between  intellectual  function  and  affection 
of  sense. 

In  tracing  the  series  of  stages  through  which  the  prac- 
tical Ego  seeks  realisation  for  itself,  Fichte  is  describing 
the  successive  forms  of  real  fact  which  underlie,  and 
are  necessarily  involved  in,  the  existence  of  a  self-con- 
scious subject.  The  complete  exposition  affords  the 
groundwork  for  two  comprehensive  philosophical  doc- 
trines— that  of  Eights  or  Law,  and  that  of  Duties  or 
Morals — while  it  culminates  in  a  statement  as  to  the 
bearing  of  Wissenschaf tslehre  on  the  fundamental  prob- 
lem of  theology.^  No  account  can  here  be  given  of 
the  systematic  treatment  of  the  doctrines  of  LaAV  and 
Ethics.  It  must  suffice  to  indicate  how  these  doctrines 
are  related  to  the  general  principles  of  Eichte's  practi- 
cal philosophy,  and  in  what  respects  their  fundamental 
notions  were  altered  or  amended  in  the  later  stage  of 
his  speculation. 

The  Ego,  as  has  been  seen,  is  in  essence  activity ;  but 
at  the  same  time,  if  an  Ego  at  all,  it  must  posit,  affirm, 
or  be  aware  of  its  own  activity.  The  twofold  aspect  of 
the  Ego,  as  at  once  activity  and  reflection  upon  activity, 
must  ever  be  kept  in  mind  when  the  effort  is  made  to 
trace  further  the  conditions  of  self-consciousness.  As  in 
the  case  of  the  several  stages  of  cognition,  so  here,  it  will 

1  The  general  exposition  is  given  in  the  "Grundlage,"  'Werke,' 
vol.  i.  pp.  285-328 ;  in  the  "  Naturrecht,"  '  Werke,'  vol.  iii.  pp. 
17-91 ;  in  the  "  Sittenlehre,"  '  Werke,'  vol.  iv.  pp.  18-156.  No  work  on 
Fichte's  system  with  which  I  am  acquainted  makes  any  attempt  to 
connect  what  is  put  forward  in  these  three  quarters,  and  the  omission 
is  doubtless  one  great  cause  of  the  common  misconceptions  of  his 
theory.  The  statement  here  given  is  too  compressed  to  do  justice 
to  the  very  elaborate  analysis  contained  in  the  various  writings  re- 
ferred to. 


Development  of  the  System.  181 

be  found  that  the  forms  of  practical  activity  result  from 
the  continuous  reflection  of  the  Ego  upon  the  modes  and 
products  of  its  own  action.  The  most  general  statement 
which  can  be  made  regarding  the  whole  process,  sums 
up  what  is  developed  in  the  successive  steps  by  which 
the  practical  Ego  realises  itself. 

Under  Avhat  conditions  can  the  Ego  be  conscious  of 
itself  1  Only  in  so  far  as  it  is  practical,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
a  striving  force,  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  will  *'  The  prac- 
tical Ego  is  the  Ego  of  original  self-consciousness ;  a 
rational  being  immediately  perceives  itself  only  in  will- 
ing ;  and  were  it  not  practical,  would  perceive  neither 
itself  nor  the  world — would  not  be  an  intelligence  at 
aJL  Will  is  in  a  special  sense  the  essence  of  reason."^ 
This  striving  of  the  Ego  is  only  possible  for  conscious- 
ness in  so  far  as  it  is  limited  or  opposed,  and  the  state 
of  consciousness  in  which  this  hindrance  to  striving  is 
posited  has  already  been  described  as  feeling.  Striving 
which  is  opposed,  but  not  absolutely,  is  impulse  (Trieb). 
The  very  innermost  nature  of  the  Ego  is  therefore  im- 
pulse. The  Ego  is  a  system  of  impulses.  Feeling  in 
which  the  impulse  or  force  of  the  Ego  is  checked,  is 
necessarily  a  feeling  of  incapacity  or  of  compulsion,  and 
the  combination  of  the  immediate  consciousness  of  our 
OAvn  striving  with  the  feeling  of  compulsion  or  restraint 
is  for  us  the  first  and  most  simple  criterion  of  reality. 
The  external  thing  is  for  us  as  real  as  the  activity  of 
the  Ego  with  which  it  is  bound  up.  "  Only  through  the 
relation  of  feeling  to  the  Ego  is  reality  possible  for  the 
Ego,  whether  reality  of  itself  or  of  the  non-Ego.  Now, 
that  which  is  possible  only  through  the  relation  of  feel- 
1  '  Werke/  vol.  iii.  pp.  20,  21. 


182  Fichte. 

ing  to  the  Ego,  while  the  Ego  neither  is  nor  can  be  con- 
scions  of  its  intuition  of  the  same,  and  which  therefore 
seems  to  be  felt,  is  matter  of  belief.  There  is,  then, 
simply  belief  in  reality  in  general,  whether  of  Ego  or  of 
non-Ego."^ 

The  Ego,  therefore,  if  it  is  to  be  aware  of  itself,  if  it 
is  to  be  self-conscious,  must  posit  itself  as  acting — i.e., 
as  willing,  and  as  willing  freely.  This  important  propo- 
sition, which  lies  at  the  root  of  law  and  morals,  may 
be  examined  from  two  sides.  We  may  consider  what 
is  necessarily  implied  or  involved  in  it,  and  we  may  con- 
sider the  conditions  under  which  consciousness  of  free 
activity  is  possible.  So  far  as  the  first  aspect  is  con- 
cerned, the  following  are  Fichte's  results.  An  intelli- 
gence can  ascribe  to  itself  free  activity  only  if  it  posit  or 
assume  a  world  external  to  itself.  But  to  posit  or  as- 
sume a  world  external  to  itself  seems  to  imply  an  activity 
prior  to  the  activity  exercised  upon  the  object, — seems 
to  imply  that  the  activity  of  the  Ego  which  is  free,  shall 
be  at  the  same  time  determined  by  a  prior  fact.  Recon- 
ciliation of  this  contradiction  is  possible  only  if  the  Ego 
be  determined  to  free  self-determination,  and  if  the 
motive  or  occasioning  cause  of  this  free  seK-determina- 
tion  be  itself  a  rational,  active  Ego.  The  Ego,  then, 
cannot  become  aware  of  itself  as  a  free,  active  being, 
without  at  the  same  time  positing  the  existence  of  an- 
other free  and  active  being.  Individuality  or  personality 
is  conceivable  only  if  there  be  given  a  multiplicity  of 
individuals  or  persons,  and  individuality  is  a  condition 
of  consciousness  of  self.     Nay,  further,  the  recognition 

1  'Werke/  vol.  i.  p.  301.  Cf.  vol.  i.  pp.  297,  314 ;  vol.  ii.  p.  263; 
vol.  iii.  p.  3. 


Development  of  the  System.  183 

of  individuality,  which  is  possible  only  in  a  community 
of  free,  active  intelligences,  demands  as  its  conditions 
the  positing  of  an  external  means  of  realising  free  acti- 
vity— i.e.,  of  a  material  organism  or  body.  The  sense 
"world  thus  receives  a  deeper  interpretation  as  the  com- 
mon ground  or  means  of  communication  between  free 
intelligences.  A  community  of  free  beings,  finally,  is 
only  conceivable  if  each  regard  himself  as  standing  to 
the  others  in  a  certain  relation,  which  may  be  called 
that  of  right  or  law.  The  essence  of  this  relation  is 
the  limitation  by  each  of  his  sphere  of  free  activity, 
in  accordance  with  the  notion  of  a  like  sphere  of  free 
activity  as  belonging  to  others.  Eights,  as  Fichte  re- 
peatedly insists,  are  the  conditions  of  individuality.^ 

From  this  point  the  philosophical  treatment  of  juris- 
prudence takes  its  start.  Eights  have  been  deduced  from 
the  very  nature  of  self-consciousness,  and  not  from  any 
ethical  principle,  and  the  whole  science  is  treated  by 
Fichte  in  a  strictly  systematic  fashion,  as  entirely  inde- 
pendent of  ethics.  In  this  procedure  the  '  JS^aturrecht ' 
stands  opposed  not  only  to  the  later  developments  of  his 
thought,  but  to  the  earlier  political  doctrines  of  the 
'  Contributions;'  and  while  the  work  contains  much  acute 
analysis  of  legal  notions,  it  is,  as  a  whole,  fanciful  and 
unsatisfactory.  Perhaps  the  most  interesting  doctrines 
are  the  definite  rejection  of  primitive  rights  as  existing 
beyond  the  state,  the  view  of  the  state  as  essentially  an 
external  mechanism  for  preserving  the  condition  of 
right  in  a  freely  formed  community,  the  notion  of  an 
ephoraf,   or  body  invested  with  right  of  veto  on  the 

^  See  'Briefweclisel,'  p.  166,  for  a  compressed  statement  regarding 
the  relation  of  individuality  to  the  notion  of  the  pure  Ego. 


184  Fichte. 

legislative  and  executive  power,  the  theory  of  punish- 
ment as  purely  protective,  and  the  strongly  socialist 
principles  for  state  regulation  of  property,  labour,  trade, 
and  money.  The  '  Geschlossene  Handelsstaat,'  already 
referred  to,  is  but  the  natural  appendix  to  the  theory  of 
rights  in  general. 

So  far,  the  consideration  of  the  conditions  under  which 
the  Ego  is  conscious  of  itself  has  been  external  The 
Ego,  conscious  of  self-existence  in  willing,  is  necessarily 
an  individual,  standing  in  relation  to  other  individuals. 
The  consciousness  of  self  as  willing  must  be  further 
analysed  But  the  consciousness  of  self  as  willing  is 
identical  with  the  consciousness  of  self -activity,  with  the 
tendency  to  act  in  independence  of  everything  external 
to  self,  with  self-determination.  This  is  the  reality 
which  underlies  the  intellectual  intuition  previously 
noted.  Were  not  the  Ego  absolute  tendency  to  free 
activity,  there  would  be  no  Ego  and  no  self-conscious- 
ness. The  absolute  thoiight  of  freedom,  self-activity  as 
essence  of  the  Ego,  appears  in  consciousness  in  the  cor- 
relative form  of  all  knowledge,  as  subjective, — in  which 
case  it  is  mere  freedom ;  as  objective, — in  which  case  it 
is  necessary  determination  or  law.  The  union  of  these 
in  the  Ego  is  the  consciousness  of  freedom  as  law,  the 
categorical  imperative  or  moral  law. 

Activity,  objectively  regarded,  is  impidse  or  tendency 
{Trieh).  The  Ego,  as  has  been  already  seen,  is  a  system 
of  impulses ;  its  very  nature  is  tendency  or  impulse. 
But  all  tendency  of  the  Ego  must  at  the  same  time  be 
for  the  Ego — that  is,  must  be  reflectively  matter  of  con- 
sciousness to  the  Ego.  A  tendency  of  which  we  are 
reflectively  conscious  is  a  need  or  want,  and  when  fur- 


Development  of  the  System.  185 

ther  determined  in  reference  to  a  definite  object,  a  desire. 
Mature — i.e.^  our  nature — as  a  system  of  tendencies,  has, 
therefore,  one  supreme  end,  satisfaction  of  desire,  plea- 
sure or  enjoyment.  The  Ego,  however,  is  not  merely 
nature,  but  consciousness  of  self,  and  in  so  far  is  inde- 
pendent of  objects.  It  is  at  once  tendency  towards 
objects  and  tendency  towards  self-activity,  realisation 
of  its  own  independence.  The  very  essence  of  the  real 
Ego  is  the  constant  coexistence  in  apparent  isolation  of 
the  two  impulses — natural  tendency  and  tendency  to- 
wards freedom.  Such  constant  coexistence  is  not  to  be 
thought  as  a  state  or  condition,  but  as  a  process.  The 
final  end  which  is  posited  by  the  free  self -consciousness 
— viz.,  absolute  self-dependence,  independence  of  nature 
— is  not  one  to  be  realised  as  a  finite  state,  but  to  be  con- 
tinually approached  in  an  infinite  series.  "  The  Ego  can 
never  be  independent,  so  long  as  it  remains  an  Ego ;  the 
final  end  of  a  rational  being  lies  necessarily  in  infinity, 
and  is  therefore  one  never  to  be  attained,  but  continually 
to  be  approached."^  The  vocation  of  a  finite  rational 
being  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  one  definite  thing,  but  as 
a  constant,  infinite  series  of  vocations,  to  each  of  which 
it  is  imperatively  called.  "  Continuously  fulfil  thy  voca- 
tion," is  therefore  the  practical  expression  of  the  moral 
law.  The  immediate  feeling  of  the  harmony  in  any  case 
between  the  natural  tendency  and  the  tendency  to  free- 
dom is  conscience. 

The  moral  law,  as  the  expression  of  the  constant  ten- 
dency of  the  Ego  towards  realisation  of  the  idea  of  self- 
consciousness,  self-activity,  self-dependence,  is  the  ulti- 
mate certainty,  the  ground  of  all  knowledge,  and  of  aU 
^  *  Werke,'  vol.  iv.  p.  149. 


186  FicUe. 

practical  belief.  "  The  supersensible,  of  which  the  reflex 
in  "US  is  our  world  of  sense, — this  it  is  which  constrains 
ns  to  ascribe  reality  even  to  that  reflex, — this  is  the  true 
thing-in-itself,  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  the 
phenomenal ;  and  our  belief  is  concerned,  not  with  the 
phenomenal,  but  with  its  supersensible  foundation.  ]\Iy 
vocation  as  moral,  and  whatever  is  involved  in  the  con- 
sciousness thereof,  is  the  one  immediate  certainty  that  is 
given  to  me  as  conscious  of  self, — the  one  thing  which 
makes  me  for  myself  a  reality.  .  .  .  Our  world  is  the 
sensualised  material  of  our  duty.  .  .  .  What  compels 
tis  to  yield  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  world  is  a  moral 
force — the  only  force  that  is  possible  for  a  free  being."  ^ 

Thus,  as  the  series  of  acts  by  which  the  theoretical 
Ego  realised  itself  closed  with  the  formal  consciousness 
of  the  independent,  thinking,  reflecting  Ego,  so  here  the 
series  of  real  acts  by  which  the  practical  Ego  realises 
itself  closes  with  the  consciousness  of  the  infinite  law  of 
freedom,  of  duty.  The.  Ego,  as  individual,  as  finite 
and  real  being,  is  at  the  same  time  the  Ego  with  the  idea 
of  its  own  infinite  vocation  and  the  infinite  tendency  to 
realise  the  same.  The  problem  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre 
has  been  completely  solved ;  the  formal  determinations 
with  which  it  started  have  received  their  real  interpre- 
tation. 

It  is  evident  that  in  the  completed  system,  as  here 
conceived,  no  place  is  left  for  those  notions  which  have 
played  so  great  a  part  in  human  thought — the  notions  of 
God  as  a  personal,  conscious  agent,  creative  and  regula- 
tive of  things.  Such  interpretation  as  theology  could 
receive  in  "Wissenschaftslehre  was  given  by  Fichte  in  the 
1  '  Werke,'  vol.  v.  pp.  210,  211. 


Development  of  the  System.  187 

essay  which  led  to  his  removal  from  the  University  of 
Jena.^ 

The  absolute  end  of  reason  has  been  seen  to  be  the 
infinite  realisation  of  the  moral  law.  The  world  of  the 
senses,  contemplated  from  this  point  of  view,  is  not  a 
reality  in  itself,  but  the  necessary  means  for  accomplish- 
ing the  task  of  reason.  It  has  its  foundation  in  that 
moral  law  in  which  finite  intelligences  have  also  their 
bond  of  union.  Belief  in  the  reality  of  the  moral  order 
of  the  iTniverse, — conviction  that  the  morally  good  will 
is  a  free  and  eiFective  cause  in  the  intelligible  system  of 
things, — this,  and  this  only,  is  belief  in  God.  For  a 
rational  being,  God  is  the  moral  order  of  the  universe, — 
not  an  order  which  has  its  ground  external  to  itself — 
not  an  ordo  ordinatus,- — but  the  order  which  is  the 
ground  of  all  reality,  ordo  ordinans.  To  think  of  this 
order  as  object  of  intelligence  is  necessarily  to  bring  it 
under  the  forms  of  cognition,  to  regard  it  as  being,  as 
substance,  as  person.  But  such  predicates  have  no 
validity  when  applied  to  the  moral  order  ;  and  even  to 
describe  this  order  as  supreme  consciousness,  intelli- 
gence, is  but  of  negative  service, — useful  as  obviating 
the  error  of  viewing  the  moral  system  as  a  thing,  hurtful 
as  tending  to  inclose  in  limited  notions  that  which  is 
the  ground  of  all  intelligence.  Tlie  moral  order  is  truly 
a  spiritual  order,  and  in  it  only  our  life  has  reality.  All 
life  is  its  life,  and  the  manifestation  of  this  life  is  the 
infinite  development  of  humanity.  The  life  does  not 
exist  as  a  completed  fact, — hence  the  point  of  view  is  in 
no  way  to  be  identified  with  Pantheism  or  with  Spin- 
ozism, — but  eternally  is  to  be.  The  individual,  finite 
1  See  above,  pp.  56-64. 


188  Fichte. 

Ego,  in  acceptance  of  his  position  as  a  member  in  this 
supersensible  order,  realises  his  infinite  vocation,  tends 
more  and  more  to  lose  his  apparent  individuality,  and 
approaches  ever  more  nearly  to  the  idea  of  infinitude 
which  is  the  characteristic  mark  of  self-consciousness. 
In  this  intelligible  moral  order,  the  problem  of  Wissen- 
schaftslehre  finds  its  final  solution ;  the  abstract  form  of 
self-consciousness  here  receives  its  concrete  development 
and  completion.^ 

1  Cf.  the  passage  already  quoted  (p.  15),  in  which  the  twofold  aspect 
of  the  Ego  as  abstract  starting-point  and  concrete  end  is  indicated. 


189 


CHAPTER    VII. 

LATER   FORM    OF    THE    WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE. 

The  result  of  the  Wissenscliaftslehre,  as  stated  in  the 
last  paragraph,  proved  far  from  final,  and  in  fact  only 
served  to  open  out  a  series  of  problems,  the  treatment  of 
which  forms  the  second  stage  in  the  development  of 
Fichte's  philosophy.  As  has  been  already  pointed  out, 
it  was,  historically,  the  effect  produced  by  his  specula- 
tions on  theology,  that  compelled  Fichte  to  a  renewed 
consideration  of  the  principles  on  which  the  Wissen- 
schaftslehre  rested,  and  the  system  of  knowledge  there 
expounded.  The  course  of  his  inquiry  had  led  him  from 
the  abstract  analysis  of  the  acts  necessarily  involved  in 
the  nature  of  self-consciousness,  to  the  more  concrete 
conception  of  the  essence  of  reason  as  recognised  depend- 
ence on  the  ultimate  moral  law.  The  successive  stages 
had  been  cognition,  in  its  various  forms, — practical  reason 
or  will,  and  the  final  synthesis  in  which  these  were 
united. 

It  was  now  evident  that  the  final  synthesis — the  con- 
crete reality  of  reason — required  a  treatment  much  more 
elaborate  than  it  had  yet  received, — that  in  the  concep- 
tion of  the  finite  Ego  as  accepting  the  infinite  vocation 


190  Fichte. 

of  the  moral  law,  more  was  implied  than  the  pure  self- 
activity,  pure  freedom,  through  which  consciousness  of 
this  vocation  was  possible ;  and  that  the  relation  between 
knowledge  as  form,  Avill  as  ground  of  reaUty,  and  the 
supreme  notion  of  the  divine  order,  was  as  yet  imperfect. 
"In  a  word,  there  was  yet  Avanting  a  transcendental 
system  of  the  intelligible  world."  ^  From  this  point 
onwards  the  inquiry  centres  in  that  divine  idea  of  the 
world  which  appears  as  the  guiding  principle  in  the 
popular  works,  and  which  at  first  sight  appears  to  have 
no  immediate  connection  with  the  Wissenschaftslehre 
in  its  earlier  form.^  In  certain  minor  doctrines,  the 
new  expositions  differ  from  the  Wissenschaftslehre  as  al- 
ready described,  and  the  position  assigned  to  moral  inde- 
pendence is  not  exactly  the  same  as  that  given  to  it  in 
the  '  Sittenlehre,'  but  on  the  whole  we  find  nothing  in 
them  to  contradict  or  supersede  the  "Wissenschaftslehre. 
They  contain  a  wider,  more  concrete  view,  to  which 
Wissenschaftslehre  may  be  regarded  as  an  introduction, 
but  essentially  this  view  is  but  the  more  complete 
evolution  of  Avhat  in  an  abstract  fashion  had  already 
been  stated  there.  The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  sur- 
veying the  new  treatment,  and  perceiving  its  connectioia 
with  the  older  doctrine,  arise  partly  from  the  obscurity 
of  the  language  in  which  expression  is  given  to  the  new 
thoughts,  partly  from  the  varied  modes  in  which  the 
same  matter  is  presented-  Fichte,  who  always  laid  stress 
on  the  fact  of  unity  in  his  philosophy,  approaches  the 
statement  from  the  most  varied  points,  now  selecting  the 

1  '  Briefwechsel,'  p.  333. 

^  See  particularly  the  lectures  on  the  "  Nature  of  the  Scholar," 
'  Werke,'  vol.  vi.,  and  there  pp.  360-371. 


Later  form  of  tlie  WissenscJiaftslehrc.        191 

ultimate  ground  of  things,  now  sketching  the  series  of 
processes  by  which  our  thinking  reaches  this  ground, 
and  again  taking  knowledge  as  a  completed  system,  and 
considering  what  is  impHed  by  it.^  Many  of  these  ex- 
positions are  before  us  only  in  the  form  of  notes  for  lec- 
tures, and  it  is  a  task  of  immense  difficulty  to  foUow  the 
line  of  thought  through  the  disjointed  remarks  and  wil- 
derness of  abstruse  illustration  by  which  Fichte  strove 
to  make  his  meaning  clear.  ^ 

The  work  in  which  we  are  able  to  discern,  with  the 
utmost  precision,  the  transition  from  the  earlier  to  the 
later  doctrine,  is  the  '  Bestimmung  des  Menschen,'  pub- 
lished in  1800.^  In  the  three  books  into  which  the 
work  is  divided,  Fichte  describes  three  fundamental 
views  in  philosophy  :  first,  that  of  naturalism  or  dog- 
matism ;  second,  that  of  theoretical  idealism ;  third,  that 
of  practical  faith  or  ethical  idealism.  !N^aturalism,  the 
systematic  development  of  one  notion,  that  of  the  recip- 
rocal determination  of  the  several  parts  of  experience, 
finds  itself  in  absolute  conflict  with  the  idea  of  our  own 
freedom,  which  is  the  very  essence  of  consciousness. 
If  it  were  possible  for  us  to  regard  consciousness  as 
mere  object  of  knowledge — as  a  thing — then  to  it  would 
apply  the  results  of  this  comprehensive  notion.  This 
being  impossible,  natural  necessity  and  freedom  stand 

1  As  an  instance  of  the  first  method,  the  '  Anweisung  zum  seligen 
Leben '  may  be  selected.  For  the  second,  the  '  Thatsachen  des  Bewusst- 
seyns,'  and  for  the  third,  the  '  Darstellung  der  Wissenschaftslehro 
aus  d.  Jahre  1801,'  are  the  best  illustrations. 

2  These  lecture-notes  make  xip  the  bulk  of  the  'Nachgelassene 
Werke.' 

"  A  translation  into  English  has  been  published  by  Dr  W.  Smith. 
S^e  '  Fichte's  Popular  Works,'  with  a  Memoir  (3d  ed.  1873),  pp.  237- 
379.     To  this  references  are  made. 


192  Fichte. 

opposed  to  one  another,  and  no  means  of  abolishing 
their  opposition  appears  to  be  given.  ^  In  the  second 
book,  entitled  "  Knowledge,"  the  analysis  of  percep- 
tion from  its  subjective  side  is  carried  out  with  a 
subtlety  and  exhaustiveness  that  leave  nothing  to  be 
desired  Gradually  the  thinker  is  led  on  from  the  fii-st 
naive  position  of  intelligence  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
whole  varied  contents  of  external  experience  are  nothing 
and  can  be  nothing  but  Vorstellungen,  determined  modes 
of  intelligence.^  He  is  brought  to  the  point  at  which 
Wissenschaftslehre  as  theoretical  ends  ;  and  the  interpre- 
tation of  his  position,  as  here  given,  is  but  an  expansion 
of  the  principle,  already  noted  as  fundamental  in  Fichte, 
that  knowledge  is  pure  form.  The  process  of  subjective 
analysis — i.e.,  of  analysis  for  cognition,— when  carried 
out  rigorously,  leaves  as  result  a  system  of  Vorstellungen. 
"  There  is  nothing  enduring,  either  out  of  me  or  in  me, 
but  only  a  ceaseless  change.  I  know  of  no  being,  not 
even  of  my  own.  There  is  no  being.  I  myself  know 
not  and  am  not.  Pictures  there  are  ;  ^  they  are  all  that 
exist,  and  they  know  of  themselves  after  the  fashion  of 
pictures, — pictures,  Avhich  float  past  without  there  being 
anything  past  which  they  float ;  which,  by  means  of  like 
pictures,  are  connected  with  each  other ;  pictures  with- 
out anything  which  is  pictured  in  them,, without  signifi- 
cance and  without  aim.      I  myself  am  one  of  these  pic- 

1  Hence  the  title  of  the  first  book,  "  Doubt." 

2  The  '  Sonnenklarer  Bericht '  is  an  excellent  commentary  on  this 
second  book  of  the  '  Bestimmung.'  Togetlier  they  make  a  most  admir- 
able introduction  to  philosophical  analysis. 

3  The  term  picture  must  be  taken  in  a  metaphorical  sense,  in  order 
to  serve  as  translation  of  Bild.  The  English  use  of  the  term  idea,  as 
equivalent  to  mental  picture,  would  be  more  satisfactory. 


Later  form  of  the  Wissenschaftslehrc.        193 

tures ;  nay,  I  am  not  even  this,  but  merely  a  confused 
picture  of  the  pictures.  All  reality  is  transformed  into 
a  strange  dream,  Avithout  a  life  which  is  dreamed  of, 
and  without  a  mind  which  dreams  it,  into  a  dream 
which  is  woven  together  in  a  dream  of  itself.  Intuition 
is  the  dream ;  thought — the  source  of  all  the  being  and 
all  the  reality  which  I  imagine,  of  my  own  being,  my 
own  powers,  and  my  own  purposes — is  the  dream  of 
that  dream."  ^  From  the  point  of  view  of  knowledge, 
there  is  nothing  but  knowledge ;  and  knowledge  is  not 
reality,  just  because  it  is  knowledge.  In  the  form  of 
cognition  we  can  never  attain  to  more  than  formal  truth. 
"With  this  sceptical  conclusion  the  second  book  closes. 
In  the  third,  the  transition  is  effected  to  the  higher, 
the  practical  stage  of  Fichte's  philosophy,  by  a  method 
partly  identical  with  that  already  described,  but  in  part 
containing  a  new  and  startling  feature.  Not  knowledge 
only,  but  action,  is  the  end  of  existence.  The  restless 
striving  after  a  reality  which  is  not  given  in  thought, 
has  significance  only  in  reference  to  the  active,  energetic 
power  by  which  self  endeavours  to  mould  the  world  to 
its  own  purposes.  But  if  we  endeavour  to  subject  this 
feeling  of  free  self-activity,  of  independent  purpose,  to 
the  analysis  of  reason,  the  sceptical  doubts  regarding 
knowledge  return  with  their  former  force.  It  is  con- 
ceivable that  the  distinction  of  the  self  willing  and  the 
conditions  imder  which  the  volition  is  to  be  realised — 
the  twofold  aspect  of  all  will,  as  thought  and  as  act — 
may  be  nothing  but  the  form  imposed  by  cognitive  con- 
sciousness on  the  operation  of  some  unknown  external 
power.     Through  this  sceptical  reflection,  "all  eamest- 

1  P.  309. 
p. — IV.  N 


194  Fidite. 

ness  and  interest  is  withdrawn  from  my  life,  and  life,  as 
well  as  thought,  is  transformed  into  a  mere  play,  which 
proceeds  from  nothing  and  tends  to  nothing."  Xo  exit 
is  left,  save  that  of  resolute  acceptance  of  the  inner  com- 
mand to  act,  and  act  freely.  We  must  have  faith  in  this 
impulse  to  independence,  which  is  the  very  innermost 
secret  of  our  nature.  Thought  is  not  supreme,  but  is 
founded  on  our  striving  energies.  Unhesitating  accept- 
ance of  our  vocation  and  of  the  conditions  implied  in 
it — through  this  only  has  life  reality  for  us.  "  There 
is  something  that  must  be  done  for  its  own  sake — that 
which  conscience  demands  of  me  in  this  particular  situa- 
tion of  life  it  is  mine  to  do,  and  for  this  purpose  only 
am  I  here  ; — to  know  it  I  have  understanding ;  to  per- 
form it  I  have  power.  Through  this  edict  of  conscience 
only  are  truth  and  reality  introduced  into  my  conceptions." 
Obedience  to  the  law  of  conscience  is  the  ground  of 
practical  belief;  and  from  it  follow,  as  consequences, 
practical  belief  in  the  existence  of  others,  and  in  the  ex- 
istence of  a  real  external  world.  To  merely  speculative 
cognition,  the  existence  of  others  and  of  a  world,  must 
be  interpreted  as  only  a  specific  mode  of  representation ; 
but  speculative  cognition  is  abstract  and  one-sided.  Only 
in  reference  to  action  has  the  existence  of  another  con- 
scious being  or  of  an  external  thing,  significance  for  us. 
"  We  are  compelled  to  believe  that  we  act,  and  that  we 
ought  to  act,  in  a  certain  manner ;  we  are  compelled  to 
assume  a  certain  sphere  for  this  action ;  this  sphere  is 
the  real,  actually  present  world,  such  as  we  find  it.  .  .  . 
From  necessity  of  action  proceeds  the  consciousness  of 
the  actual  world ;  and  not  the  reverse  way,  from  the 
consciousness  of  the  actual  world  the  necessity  of  action." 


Later  form  of  the  WissenschaftsleJire.       195 

Action  under  conscience  supposes  an  end,  not  pre- 
scribed by  nature,  but  to  be  realised  by  us  in  nature. 
As  contrasted  Avith  this  end,  even  in  its  formal  aspect, 
the  world  of  fact  presents  itseK  as  but  a  stage  in  progress 
towards  the  more  perfect  harmony  between  the  condi- 
tions of  life  and  the  moral  rule  which  is  its  supreme  law. 
Improvement  of  nature,  development  of  the  powers  of 
humanity,  whether  in  science  or  culture  or  state  organi- 
sation, establishment  of  the  general  rule  of  rational  free- 
dom, —  these  are  contained  under  the  comprehensive 
demand  of  conscience.^ 

Eealisation  of  itself  in  this  world  cannot,  however,  be 
looked  upon  as  the  one  aim  of  the  rational  will.  For  in 
such  realisation  in  deed  or  fact,  that  which  is  to  inner 

1  It  is  to  this  point  that  the  lectures  on  the  *'  Characteristics  of  the 
Present  Age  "  attach  themselves.  In  them,  the  general  progress  of 
humanity  towards  realisation,  with  consciousness  of  its  earthly  aim — 
"  that  in  this  life  mankind  may  order  all  their  relations  with  free- 
dom according  to  reason" — is  traced  in  its  broad  outlines  as  the 
foundation  for  a  philosophy  of  history.  In  such  progress  Fichte  dis- 
tinguishes five  epochs,  or  world  ages :  first,  that  in  which  reason 
acts  as  blind  instinct — the  state  of  innocence  ;  second,  that  in  whicli 
the  growing  consciousness  of  reason  presents  itself  as  external  au- 
thority— the  age  of  positive  systems,  of  progressive  sin  ;  third,  tliat 
in  which  reason  reflectively  frees  itself  from  external  authority,  and 
so  from  all  general  control — the  age  of  individualism,  of  completed 
sinfulness  ;  fourth,  that  in  which  the  rational  end  is  apprehended  as 
reasoned,  philosophic  truth — the  age  of  reconstruction,  of  progressive 
justification ;  fifth,  that  in  which  the  rational  end,  embodied  in  gen- 
eral consciousness,  is  artistically  developed — in  which  humanity,  with 
clear  consciousness  of  its  owu  aim,  endeavours  practically  to  realise 
the  reign  of  freedom, — the  age  of  completed  justification.  Much  that 
is  fantastic  and  iinreal  is  given  in  these  lectures,  especially  as  re- 
gards the  first  stage — the  origin  of  history ;  but  the  general  view  of 
the  progress  of  practical  tliought  is  luminous  and  instructive,  and 
we  note  that  here  the  state  begins  to  have  assigned  to  it  a  higher 
function  in  the  development  of  human  life  than  had  been  accorded  to 
it  in  the  earlier  work  (the  '  Rechtslehre '). 


196  ■  Fichte. 

consciousness  the  pre-eminent  excellence  of  moral  action 
— the  intention  or  disposition — becomes  of  no  account. 
"  In  the  world  of  sense  it  is  never  of  any  moment  lioic, 
and  with  what  motives  and  intentions,  an  action  is  per- 
formed, but  only  what  the  action  is."  The  mechanism 
of  the  world  of  fact  may  be  the  form  in  which  the 
divine  idea  partially  realises  itself,  but  it  cannot  be 
placed  as  coextensive  with  the  divine  idea.  Our  will 
must  be  thought  as  determined  in  a  supersensible  order, 
and  as  carrying  out  in  the  world  of  sense,  under  exter- 
nal conditions,  what  is  there  unconditionally  demanded. 
"  The  earthly  purpose  is  not  pursued  by  me  for  its  own 
sake  alone,  or  as  a  final  aim,  but  only  because  my  true 
final  aim — obedience  to  the  law  of  conscience — does  not 
present  itself  to  me  in  this  world  in  any  other  shape 
than  as  the  advancement  of  this  end."  "This,  then,  is 
my  whole  vocation,  my  true  natura  I  am  a  member  of 
two  orders — the  one  purely  spiritual,  in  which  I  rule  by 
my  will  alone ;  the  other  sensuous,  in  which  I  operate 
by  my  deed.  .  .  .  The  will  is  the  hving  principle 
of  reason  —  is  itself  reason,  when  apprehended  purely 
and  simply.  .  .  .  Only  the  infinite  reason  lives 
immediately  and  wholly  in  this  purely  spiritual  order. 
The  finite  reason — which  does  not  of  itself  constitute 
the  world  of  reason,  but  is  only  one  of  its  many  mem- 
bers— Olives  necessarily  at  the  same  time  in  a  sensuous 
order — that  is  to  say,  in  one  which  presents  to  it  another 
object  beyond  a  purely  spiritual  activity — a  material  ob- 
ject to  be  promoted  by  instruments  and  powers  which 
indeed  stand  under  the  immediate  dominion  of  the  will, 
but  whose  activity  is  also  conditioned  by  their  own 
natural  laws.     Yet  as  surely  as  reason  is  reason,  must 


Later  form  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre.        197 

the  will  operate  absolutely  by  itself,  and  independently 
of  the  natural  laws  by  which  the  material  action  is  de- 
termined ;  and  hence  the  life  of  every  finite  being  points 
toAvards  a  higher,  into  which  the  will  by  itself  alone 
may  open  the  way,  and  of  which  it  may  acquire  posses- 
sion— a  possession  which  indeed  we  must  sensuously 
conceive  of  as  a  state,  and  not  as  a  mere  will"  Thus 
the  triTe  essence  of  the  finite  being  is  his  participation 
in  the  divine,  spiritual  order;  his  true  vocation  is  the 
continuous  approximation  of  his  finite  life  to  the  infinite 
requirements  of  the  law  of  this  spiritual  order.  The 
divine  will  is  the  bond  of  union  between  finite  spirits. 
God,  as  Malebranche  finely  said,  is  the  place  of  spirits.^ 
The  divine  life  or  spiritual  moral  order  has  thus  ap- 
peared as  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  self-conscious- 
ness ;  it  is  the  reality  which,  in  the  earlier  exposition  of 
"Wissenschaftslehre  was  called  the  idea  of  the  absolute 
Ego.  A  new  aspect  is  thus  given  to  the  whole  nature 
of  reason,  theoretical  and  practical,  for  both  appear  as 
related  necessarily  to  this  ultimate  unity.  So  far  as  the 
intlividual  is  concerned,  there  now  comes  forward,  in 
place  of  mere  formal  independence — abstract  freedom  of 
thought  and  self-dependence  in  action — the  free  resigna- 
tion of  the  individual  to  the  law  of  the  divine  order, 
with  love  for  it  and  active  effort  to  give  its  precepts 
realisation.  The  position  of  morality,  as  expressed  in 
the  '  Naturrecht '  and  '  Sittenlehre,'  has  been  transcended 
and  absorbed  in  that  of  religion.  The  will  is  no  longer 
thought  as  striving  to  realise  only  its  own  freedom,  but 

1  '  Rech.  de  la  Vdrite,'  B.  HI.  Pt.  ii.  ch.  6.  "Demeurons  done 
dans  ce  sentiment,  que  Dieu  est  le  monde  intelligible  on  le  lieu  des 
esprits,  de  meme  que  le  monde  matdriel  est  le  lieu  des  corps." 


198  Fichte. 

as  continuously  endeavouring  after  full  harmony  between 
itself  and  the  divine  moral  order. 

The  relation  between  the  earlier  and  later  forms  of 
Wissenschaftslelire  seems,  therefore,  perfectly  intelligible. 
In  the  earlier  doctrine  the  Tiltimate  notion  lay  in  advance 
as  something  to  be  reached  by  laborious  analysis,  as 
what  is  necessarily  contained  in  consciousness.  So  soon 
as  the  ultimate  notion  had  been  gi-asped,  the  Wissen- 
schaftslehre,  in  the  strict  sense,  became  of  secondary  im- 
portance. It  had,  as  Fichte  said,  the  value  of  a  path 
and  no  more.  The  later  doctrine,  accepting  the  ultimate 
idea,  the  metaphysical  unity,  to  which  all  knowledge  and 
action,  however  indirectly,  refer,  has  to  develop  its  con- 
sequences, and  in  the  course  of  the  development  to  show 
what  place  is  occupied  by  Wissenschaftslehre  as  at  first 
conceived.  That  some  points  of  the  earlier  doctrine 
receive  a  new  interpretation  is  certain  ;  that  the  whole 
manner  of  viewing  the  problem  is  fresh  and  original,  is 
equally  certain ;  but  it  requires  little  investigation  to  see 
that  the  two  expositions  are  in  fundamental  agreement, 
and  that  the  second  of  them,  though,  unfortunately,  less 
completely  worked  out  than  the  first,  is  the  true  and 
final  philosophy  of  Fichte. 

It  is  impossible,  within  the  limits  of  this  sketch,  to 
give  any  adequate  account  of  the  various  statements  of 
the  new  doctrine  successively  put  forward  by  their  ever- 
active  and  prolific  author.  All  that  can  be  attempted  is 
a  very  general  description  of  the  results  which  appear  as 
permanent  elements  in  these  statements,  and  a  notice  of 
the  difi&culties  which  appear  to  arise  in  connection  with 
them.  For  such  a  purpose  the  lectures  in  the  '  Nach- 
gelassene  Werke,'  may  be  omitted  j  the  style  in  them  is 


Later  form  of  tlu  Wissenschaftslehre.       199 

so  obscure  as  to  necessitate  constant  and  extended  com- 
mentary ;  and  they  are,  probably,  not  in  a  shape  in  which 
the  author  would  have  wished  them  to  be  laid  before  the 
public.  The  most  valuable  and  interesting  works  are 
the  popular  addresses  on  religion,  '  Anweisung  zum 
seligen  Leben,'  ^  and  the  treatise,  prepared  for  publica- 
tion, though  not  actually  published  during  Fichte's  life, 
on  the  '  Facts  of  Consciousness. '  ^  The  second  of  these 
is  without  doubt  the  best  introduction  to  the  philosophy 
of  the  later  period.  The  ultimate  metaphysical  prin- 
ciple is  approached  by  a  careful,  genetic  analysis  of  con- 
sciousness in  its  several  stages,  from  immediate  external 
perception  to  pure  thought,  in  and  through  which  the 
principle  of  existence  is  apprehended.  The  work  stands 
to  '  Wissenschaftslehre '  very  much  in  the  position  in 
which  the  '  Phanomenologie  des  Geistes '  stands  to 
Hegel's  'Logic'  From  the  systematic  fashion  in  which 
the  several  problems,  arising  in  connection  with  the 
several  stages  of  consciousness,  are  taken,  we  can  dis- 
cern with  the  greatest  definiteness  the  divisions  into 
which  Fichte's  philosophy  now  falls,  and  so  trace  any 
resemblance  to,  or  difference  from,  the  earlier  doctrines. 
In  the  '  Wissenschaftslehre,'  these  divisions  had  been 
two  in  number,  theoretical  and  practical,  corresponding 
to  the  two  main  faculties  of  thought  and  action,  with  a 
common  introduction.  The  development  of  the  Wis- 
senschaftslehre, circular  in  nature,  had  shown  that  the 
final  synthesis  of  the  theoretical  and  practical  was  to  be 
looked  for  in  the  more  concrete  treatment  of  what  had 

1  Translated  by  Dr  W.  Smith  ('  Fichte's  Popular  Works,'  1873. 
pp.  381-564).     To  this  references  are  made. 

2  "  Thatsacheu  des  Bewusstseyns,"  'Werke,'  vol.  ii.  jip.  535-691. 


200  Fichte. 

been  contained  in  the  introduction.  In  the  later  expo- 
sition, this  more  concrete  treatment  appears  definitely  as 
a  third  part,  following  the  analysis  of  the  theoretical  and 
practical  reason,  and  dealing  specifically  with  the  higher 
faculty.  It  is,  in  brief,  metaphysic  or  theology ;  and  here 
only  do  we  find  any  adequate  explanation  of  the  abstract 
statements  with  which  Wissenschaftslehre  started.  As 
was  pointed  out,  Fichte,  in  the  first  sketch  of  his  system, 
adopted  an  artificial  and  somewhat  forced  method  for 
bringing  forward  his  first  principle,  and  the  nature  of 
this  method  tended  to  perpetuate  the  misconception 
under  which  the  w^hole  system  laboured.  It  appeared 
as  if  the  first  principle  were,  somehow,  the  expression  of 
an  act  or  activity  on  the  part  of  the  individual ;  that 
reason  or  consciousness  was  something  possessed  by  the 
individual — an  accident  or  attribute  of  the  conscious  sub- 
ject. So  long  as  this  conception  is  sufi'ered  to  hold  its 
grovuid,  the  whole  system  must  appear  as  one  of  subjec- 
tive idealism,  and  the  scheme  of  forms  and  categories  as 
nothing  but  the  logical  grouping  of  individual  subjective 
impressions.  This,  however,  is  in  no  sense,  Fichte's 
vieAv,  nor  was  it  involved  in  the  earlier  Wissenschafts- 
lehre. He  is  throughout  true  to  the  thought  which  lies 
at  the  root  of  the  Kantian  and  all  the  post-Kantian 
philosophy,  that  the  individual  subject  is  not  per  se 
an  independent,  self-existent  reality,  but  has  his  being 
only  in  and  through  reason.  The  ultimate  distinction 
between  self  and  non-self,  on  which  individuality  is 
dependent,  is  not  made — or,  to  use  the  technical  term, 
posited — by  the  individual  reason,  but  by  the  universal 
common  reason.  "  The  Ego,  as  understood  in  common 
fashion,  posits  neither  the  external  object  nor  itself,  but 


Later  form  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre.       201 

both  are  posited  through,  general,  absolute  thinking,  and 
through  this  the  object  is  given  for  the  Ego,  as  well 
as  the  Ego  for  itself.  .  .  .  But  without  exception, 
Wissenschaftslehre  has  been  understood  as  if  it  said 
the  very  reverse  of  what  has  just  been  laid  down."  ^ 

The  analysis  of  theoretical  cognition  in  the  "That- 
sachen,"  contains  little  or  nothing  beyond  what  has 
already  appeared  in  the  earlier  "Wissenschaftslehre,  and 
differs  only  in  the  total  omission  of  the  somewhat  tech- 
nical phraseology  and  of  the  dialectical  method  there 
employed.  More  important  modifications,  though  not 
alterations,  appear  in  the  treatment  of  the  practical 
faculty,  that  through  which  reality  is  given  to  the  mere 
form  of  knowledge. 

As  in  the  earlier  exposition,  the  key  to  the  new  develop- 
ment is  found  in  the  activity  of  the  Ego — an  activity  of 
which  the  Ego  must  be  reflectively  conscious,  if  it  is  to  be 
Ego  at  all.  The  Ego  is  only  conscious  of  its  activity,  in 
so  far  as  that  activity  is  limited  or  opposed.  There  thus 
lie  in  the  consciousness  of  the  Ego  the  three  elements, — 
feeling  of  impulse  or  striving,  intuition  of  activity,  and 
the  representation  of  the  obstacle  to  activityj  a  repre- 
sentation which  is  the  work  of  productive  imagination. 
The  most  abstract  expression  for  this  necessary  limita- 
tion of  the  activity  of  the  Ego  is  force  contemplated  as 
matter  of  intuition ;  and  this,  again,  may  be  described  as 
matter  in  general,  or  corporeality.  The  essence  of  the 
external  thing  is  force,  and  it  is  the  thought  of  force  as 
lying  behind  the  specific  modes  of  feeling  which  we  call 
sensations,  that  gives  to  the  object  of  perception  its 
qualification  as  an  external,  real  fact. 

1  'Werke,'  vol.  ii.  p.  562. 


202  Fichte. 

The  Ego,  then,  is  only  conscious  of  itself  as  activity 
in  a  corporeal  Avorld,  but  to  be  conscious  of  itself  as 
active  in  relation  to  the  corporeal  world,  it  must  be  for 
itself  corporeal  The  body  or  corporeal  organism  is  the 
Ego  as  an  objective  thing.  The  Ego  is  a  possible  object 
of  intuition  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  corporeal  At  the 
same  time,  the  Ego  exists  for  itself  only  in  and  by  reflec- 
tion, and  reflection  is  in  its  very  essence  limitative  and 
separating.  The  Ego,  therefore,  can  be  conceived  only 
as  one  of  many  Egos,  which  are  united  in  thought,  but 
manifold  for  intuition.  A  system  of  individuals,  cor- 
poreally distinct  from  one  another,  is  thus  the  condition 
under  which  self-consciousness  is  realised. 

The  three  main  features  of  the  representation  of  the 
world  as  objective  have  thus  been  deduced, — a  system  of 
Egos,  a  system  of  organised  bodies  of  these  Egos,  a  world 
of  the  senses.  All  of  these  are  to  be  regarded  as  modes 
or  ways  in  which  the  infinite  life  of  consciousness  mani- 
fests itself.  Distinction  or  difi'erence  among  them  is  not 
absolute,  but  relative  to  the  nature  of  finite  consciousness. 
Eichte,  therefore,  with  justice,  repudiates  certain  famous 
distinctions  which  have  played  an  unfortunate  part  in 
philosophy, — among  others,  the  distinction  of  soul  and 
body.  From  the  speculative  point  of  view,  the  soul,  as 
popularly  regarded,  is  but  a  kind  of  ghost.  Soul  and 
body  are  the  forms  under  which  imagination,  or  percep- 
tion, if  we  prefer  a  less  ambiguous  term,  contemplates 
the  limited,  definite  activity  of  the  Ego.  At  the  same 
time,  his  view  is  not  to  be  identified  either  with  material- 
ism, which  likewise  endeavours  to  regard  all  finite  ex- 
istence as  the  form  of  some  underlying  substance — or  with 
subjective  idealism,  which  regards  external  reality,  and 


Later  form  of  tlie  Wissenschaftslehre.        203 

the  existence  of  other  Egos,  as  modes  of  the  individual 
consciousness.  The  one  system  is  incapable  of  explain- 
ing consciousness  in  general ;  the  other  fails  entirely 
to  render  a  reason  for  the  difference  or  multiplicity  of 
experience. 

The  system  of  finite  spirits  into  which  the  one  life  of 
consciousness  separates  itself  is,  for  intuition,  a  numerical 
multiplicity,  without  bond  of  union.  But  the  physical 
nexus,  which  is  impossible  for  them,  is  not  to  be  thought 
as  the  only  link  of  connection.  The  free  activity 
which  underlies  individual  consciousness,  is  no  mere 
natural  force,  but,  when  received  into  consciousness,  is 
the  ethical  or  moral  freedom  of  the  individual  spirit ; 
and  with  the  recognition  of  this  ethical  freedom — free- 
dom under  absolute  law — a  new  view  is  opened  out. 
In  the  consciousness  of  the  moral  end  which  is  to  be 
realised,  the  individual  is  one  with  the  community  of 
individual  Egos.  The  infinite  life,  if  it  is  to  be  realised 
at  all,  must  have  expression  in  individual  forms ;  and 
each  finite  spirit  is  an  individual,  and  is  aAvare  of  him- 
self as  an  individual,  only  in  so  far  as  he  has  individual 
duties, — a  special  sphere  of  moral  action.  We  must 
therefore  think  of  the  infinite  life  in  which  we  find  our 
place,  not  as  absolute  in  itself — not  as  mere  capacity  of 
action — ^but  as  the  means  of  realising  the  moral  end. 
The  individual  finite  spirits  are  the  modes  in  which  this 
infinite  life  expresses  itself, — and  each  has  his  definite 
position,  his  definite  line  of  action,  prescribed  for  him. 
No  individual  is  originally  or  by  nature  moral ;  nor  can 
he  discover  a  priori  what  his  specific  moral  vocation  is 
to  be.  But  he  becomes  moral,  or  attains  to  a  conscious- 
ness of  his  vocation,  in  and  through  the  continuous  effort 


204  Fichte. 

to  realise  that  supreme  end  which  unites  him  with  all 
other  finite  spirits  in  an  ethical  community.  No  indi- 
vidual form  of  the  infinite  life  perishes ;  but  no  individ- 
ual either  is  here,  or  wiU  be  in  aU  eternity,  an  independ- 
ent being.  Immortality  is  not  beyond  this  life,  but  in  it. 
"  There  is  no  more  striking  proof  that  the  knowledge  of 
true  religion  has  hitherto  been  very  rare  among  men, 
and  that,  in  particular,  it  is  a  stranger  in  the  prevailing 
systems,  than  this,  that  they  universally  place  eternal 
blessedness  beyond  the  grave,  and  never  for  a  moment 
imagine  that  whoever  will  may  here  and  at  once  be 
blessed."! 

The  analysis  of  consciousness  has  thus  led  Fichte  to  a 
conclusion  resembling  in  all  essentials  that  already  stated 
in  the  'Bestimmung  des  Menschen.'  The  concluding 
portion  of  the  work  ^  introduces  a  ncAV  notion  or  at  least 
a  change  of  terminology,  which  has  given  rise  to  much 
misunderstanding,  and  has  caused  excellent  critics,  such 
as  Erdmann,  to  pronounce  the  later  philosophy  out  of 
harmony  with  the  earlier  Wissenschaftslehre.  The  in- 
finite life — that  which  underlies  all  consciousness — has 
been  seen  to  be  the  infinite  means  of  realisation  of  the 
supreme  moral  law.  Its  form  or  expression  for  intuition 
— that  is,  its  phenomenal  manifestation  in  actual  experi- 
ence— is  the  world  of  finite  spirits  and  of  nature  as  the 
organised  limit  of  these  finite  individuals.  But  the  in- 
finite life  is  thus  thought  only  as  an  endless,  continuous 
change — a  conception  which  is  in  itself  incomplete  or 
imperfect.    The  infinite  life  must  be  thought  as  being — as 

^  *  Werke,'  vol.  vii.  p.  235. 

2  "  Thatsachen  des  Bewusstseyns,"  sect.  iii.  ch.  5;  'Werke,' vol. 
ii.  pp.  680-691. 


Later  form  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre.        205 

having  fixity  and  permanence.  It  cannot  reveal  itself, 
save  as  the  revelation  of  that  which  is ;  and  its  revela- 
tion is  thus  distinct  from  its  being  (a  distinction,  how- 
ever, which  is  only  for  us — i.e.,  for  consciousness).  This 
being,  which  reveals  itself  in  the  infinite  life,  which 
manifests  itself  in  the  form  of  individual  consciousness  or 
knowledge,  which  exists  not  apart  from  its  manifestation, 
but  yet  is  as  opposed  to  this  manifestation,  is  the  supreme 
unity  of  thought — a  unity  not  to  be  perfectly  compre- 
hended, not  to  be  grasped  in  thought,  but  seen  to  be  the 
ultimate  inconceivability.  To  this  supreme  unity  Fichte 
gives  the  significant  title — God ;  and  in  it  he  finds  the 
ultimate  notion  of  all  consciousness.  "  Knowledge  as  a 
whole,  is  not  mere  knowledge  of  itself ;  but  it  is  know- 
ledge of  being — of  the  one  Being  which  truly  is — i.e.,  of 
God.  In  no  way  is  it  knowledge  of  a  being  external  to 
God, — for  such  is  impossible  beyond  the  being  of  know- 
ledge itself  or  the  intuition  of  God ;  and  the  supposition 
of  its  existence  is  pure  nonsense.  But  this  one  possible 
object  of  knowledge  is  never  in  its  entirety  present  to 
knowledge,  but  appears  ever  as  broken  into  the  necessary 
forms  of  knowledga  The  exposition  of  the  necessity  of 
these  forms  is  Philosophy  or  Wissenschaftslehre."  ^ 

Tlie  obscurity  of  these  detached  expressions  may  be 
somewhat  removed  by  calling  attention  more  definitely 
to  the  exact  problem  which  Fichte  now  has  before  him, 
and  by  referring  for  a  more  detailed  treatment  to  the 
popular  lectures  on  religion.^  The  problem  is  in  sub- 
stance the  ultimate  question  into  which  run  aU  philo- 
sophical or  theological  speculations — that  of  the  relation 

1  '  Werke,'  vol.  ii.  p.  685. 

2  '  Anweisung  zum  seligen  Leben.' 


206  Ficlite. 

between  the  finite  spirit  and  the  universe,  of  which  he 
seems  to  form  a  part.  "Whether  we  call  this  universe 
God,  or  nature,  or  matter,  or  force,  is  of  comparatively 
small  moment :  its  character  for  us  must  depend  entirely 
on  what  we  think  as  the  innermost  essence  of  the  finite 
spirit,  and  on  the  mode  or  kind  of  relation  between  this 
finite  spirit  and  the  ultimate  reality.  Now  for  Fichte  it 
has  become  apparent,  from  the  mere  systematic  analysis 
of  consciousness,  that  the  very  essence  of  the  finite  spirit 
is  the  combination  of  the  consciousness  of  moral  determin- 
ation with  the  consciousness  of  practical  activity  or  will ; 
and  that  through  this,  its  innermost  being,  it  is  one 
member  of  the  ethical  community  of  spirits,  whose  sole 
aim  is  the  infinite  and  constant  effort  towards  the  reali- 
sation in  nature  of  the  moral  end  or  purpose — the  subjec- 
tion of  nature  to  reasoned  freedom.  The  individual  is 
thus  a  mode  or  form  of  the  process  by  which  freedom 
is  realised,  and  the  infinite  series  of  individuals  makes  up 
the  complete  system  of  modes  or  forms  in  and  through 
which  the  moral  life,  the  divine  plan,  is  to  be  carried 
out.  Xo  one  individual  exhausts  the  possibilities  of 
tliis  divine  life ;  and  as  opposed  to  its  infinite  being,  the 
existence  of  any  individual  must  be  thought  as  contin- 
gent or  accidental.  Nevertheless,  only  in  and  through 
the  form  of  individuality — i.e.,  of  self -consciousness — 
can  the  divine  life  receive  expression.  Thus  nature,  as 
object  of  intelligence,  and  seK-consciousness  as  the  essence 
of  intelligence,  appear  in  their  true  place.  They  are 
modes  of  the  manifestation  or  realisation  of  the  moral 
law  or  ethical  end.  Things  and  finite  spirits  are  not  to 
be  thought  as  developments  of  some  inconceivable,  me- 
chanical necessity,  but  as  the  form  in  which  the  moral 


Later  fwm  of  the  Wissenschaftslelire.        207 

order — the  highest  expression  of  the  reason  we  find  in 
us — has  existence  or  reality. 

It  is  hardly  surprising  that,  in  dealing  with  this  ulti- 
mate problem,  the  tenns  employed  should  often  fail  to 
convey  exactly  the  significance  of  the  thoughts  involved. 
Theology,  which  is  for  the  most  part  a  bad  mixture  of 
metaphysics  and  popular  conceptions,  has  sufijered  more 
than  any  other  branch  of  human  thinking,  from  the  im- 
possibility of  expressing  speculative  results  in  the  lan- 
guage of  ordinary  life.  For  thought,  whether  popular  or 
general,  is  in  essence  abstraction — that  is,  tendency  to 
separate  what  is  inseparable,  to  give  permanence  and 
apparent  independence  to  that  which  is  transient  and 
dependent  Thus  the  relation  of  the  infinite  moral  order 
to  the  finite  modes  in  which  it  takes  expression  for  itself, 
is  hardly  to  be  thought  without  danger  of  falling  back 
into  the  old  theological  error  of  severing  entirely  from 
one  another  God  and  the  world  of  nature  and  finite 
spirits.  That  Fichte  altogether  escapes  this  danger  can- 
not be  said ;  but  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  judge  from  all 
that  appears  in  his  later  works,  he  was  well  aware  of  the 
danger ;  and  one  must  account  it  an  error  to  ascribe  to 
him  the  view  that  Being,  or  God,  or  the  ultimate  reality, 
is  distinct  from  the  manifestation  or  realisation  of  it  in 
the  world  of  consciousness. 

Tlie  special  theology  or  theosophy  of  Fichte's  system, 
as  wa#said,  is  most  definitely  stated  in  the  lectures  on 
the  'Doctrine  of  Religion,'  and  what  is  there  given 
may  be  accepted  as  his  final  utterance  on  the  supreme 
problem  of  speculation.  As  in  the  earlier  Wissenschafts- 
lehre,  though  with  much  greater  fulness  and  concreteness, 
the  exposition  is  twofold :   first,  a  logical  development 


208  Fichte. 

of  the  relation  between  the  ultimate  reality  and  its 
form  or  mode  or  manifestation  ;  second,  a  psychological 
history  of  the  stages  or  forms  of  reflection  by  which 
this  relation  is  received  into  the  consciousness  of  the 
finite  thinking  subject — by  which  it  is  viewed,  appre- 
hended, or  understood.  ■"■  It  is  in  this  second  portion 
that  Fichte  begins  to  connect  in  one  organic  whole  the 
elements  of  his  system  which,  in  the  earlier  Wissen- 
schaftslehre,  had  been  suffered  to  remain  detached  from 
one  another. 

The  function  of  thought,  as  opposed  to  mere  opinion, 
is  to  conceive  of  being,  of  the  ultimate  reality  which 
underlies  all  objects  of  knowledge.  True  being  is  one, 
unchangeable  and  perdurable.  But  in  its  unity  and 
unchangeability  it  does  not  exist ;  it  has  no  reality ;  it 
is  mere  abstraction.  To  say  merely  that  God  is,  is  to 
say  nothing.  The  existence  or  definite  realisation  of 
being,  that,  in  and  for  which  only  opposition  between 
being  and  existence  is  present  and  necessarily  present, 
is  consciousness, — conscious  life,  the  life  of  knowledge, 
thought  and  action.  Now  in  consciousness  there  is 
found  the  root  of  all  the  multiplicity  of  experience ;  for 
the  very  essence  of  consciousness  is  reflection,  character- 

1  The  mode  of  exposition  adopted  by  Fichte  in  the  work  in  ques- 
tion resembles  somewhat  the  well-lcnown  method  of  Schleiermacher's 
Theology.  He  proceeds  by  an  analysis  of  the  elements  involved 
in  the  religious  consciousness,  the  mode  of  thought  in  wTfich  the 
apparent  reality  of  the  world  of  sense  is  recognised  as  apparent  mere- 
ly ;  in  which  the  finite  being  contemplates,  sub  specie  ceternitatis,  his 
own  existence  and  the  being  of  all  things  ;  in  which  he  is  penetrated 
with  the  intellectual  love  of  the  real  divine  life  underlying  the  appar- 
ent world;  in  which  he  becomes  one  with  this  divine  life,  and  lives 
and  works  for  it  alone.  The  closing  portions  of  Spinoza's  '  Ethics ' 
furnish  the  best  commentary  on  the  '  Doctrine  of  Religion. ' 


Later  form  of  the  WissenscJiaftsleJire.       209 

isation  of  the  one  reality  by  separate,  individiial  marks. 
Just  as  light,  in  itself  colourless,  is,  in  relation  to  the 
eye,  broken  up  on  the  surfaces  of  things  into  many 
various  hues ;  so  the  unchangeable  life  is  by  reflection 
and  in  relation  to  consciousness  broken  up  into  infinitely 
varied  forms.  Consciousness,  which  contains  in  itself 
the  element  of  opposition,  can  never  transcend  itself. 
To  it  the  one  being,  apprehended  by  pure  thought  as  the 
one  being,  must  ever  present  itself  in  the  form  of  repre- 
sentation, conception, — in  the  form  of  separate  individ- 
ual things.  "  The  visible  forms  which  by  this  separa- 
tion are  imposed  upon  absolute  reality  are  discernible 
only  in  actual  consciousness,  and  in  such  a  way  that  in 
the  act  of  observing  them  we  assign  to  them  life  and 
permanence — and  they  are  by  no  means  discoverable 
a  priori  by  pure  thought.  They  are  simple  and  abso- 
lute experience,  which  is  nothing  but  experience  ;  which 
no  speculation  that  understands  itself  will  ever  attempt 
or  desire  to  comprehend,"^ 

Thus  the  one  reality,  the  one  life,  the  life  of  conscious- 
ness, which  is  the  manifestation  of  God,  breaks  itself  up 
into  an  endless  multiplicity  of  individual  forms, — forms 
which  in  the  experience  of  the  finite  spirit  must  present 
themselves  as  independent,  self-existing  facts,  but  which 
for  thought  are  only  modes  of  the  one,  infinite  life.  The 
finite  spirit  may  apprehend  this  world  of  phenomena  and 
its  relation  to  the  real  system  by  reflective  consideration 
of  it ;  and  of  such  reflective  consideration  there  are  five 
distinctly  marked  stages.^    The  first  is  that  in  which  the 

1  'Doctrine  of  Religion,'  p.  447. 

2  It  appears  to  me  beyond  doubt  that  Hegel,  in  the  famous  preface 
to  his  '  Phiinomenologie,'  has  Fichte  in  view  as  well  as  Sclielling  ;  and 
further,  that  much  in  the  *  Phanomenologie '  is  due  to  Fichte's  lectures 

P, — IV.  o 


210  Fichte. 

world,  as  matter  of  outer  sense,  is  regarded  as  the  only 
existence  and  the  only  reality.  Such  a  view  is  mani- 
festly imperfect  and  partial — the  things  of  sense  are  only 
there  for  thought ;  and  a  system  which,  abstracting  from 
thought,  proposes  to  treat  them  as  self-existent  facts, 
of  necessity  throws  out  of  account  the  most  important 
factor  in  the  process  of  knowledge.  This  is,  in  essence, 
the  view  already  dealt  with  in  the  first  book  of  the 
'  Vocation  of  Man  : '  it  is  the  view  of  much  popular 
philosophy,  and  it  is  the  speculative  groundwork  both 
of  selfish  Epicurean  morality  and  of  ethical  pessimism. 

The  second  view  is  that  in  which  the  ultimate  reality 
is  regarded  as  the  law  of  independent,  free  intelligences, 
with  equal  rights.  From  the  conception  of  such  a  law 
may  be  deduced  (as  Avas  done  in  the  earlier  Wissen- 
schaftslehre,  and,  implicitly,  in  the  Kantian  system)  the 
existence  of  finite  Egos  and  a  world  of  the  senses.  The 
essence  of  this  view  is  the  notion  of  the  abstract  inde- 
pendence of  the  thinking  subject,  and  in  this  consists  its 
imperfection  and  one-sidedness.  It  is  a  purely  negative 
standpoint,  maintaining,  beyond  doubt,  the  freedom  of 
the  individual  Avill,  but  rejecting  all  possibility  of  uniting 
moral  action  with  consciousness  of  the  supreme  end,  and 
love  for  it.^    The  law  iipon  which  the  individual  rests,  is 

oil  the  'Doctrine  of  Religion.'  The  treatment  in  tlie  'Phanomenologie' 
of  the  gradual  rise  from  immediate  perception  to  pure  thought  is 
more  extended  and  richer  than  what  appears  in  the  '  Doctrine  of  Re- 
ligion,' hut  the  general  resemblance  is  striking  and  unmistakable. 

1  This  is,  in  substance,  the  criticism  of  all  the  jiost-Kantian  think- 
ers upon  Kant's  notion  of  the  categorical  imperative.  It  appears  in 
Schiller,  Schleiermacher,  and  Hegel.  The  view,  as  a  whole,  is  that 
of  formal  morality,  and  its  historical  representatives  are  to  be  found 
in  the  Stoic  and  Kantian  systems.  With  what  is  said  by  Fichte  may 
be  compared  Hegel's  remarks  in  the  'Phiinomeuologie,'  pp.  147-149. 


Later  form  of  (he  Wissenscliaftslehre.       211 

only  a  law  of  order,  not  a  creative  rule.  The  third  vieAV 
takes  up  into  itself  what  is  of  value  in  the  second,  but 
gives  to  it  a  higher  and  deeper  significance.  In  the  higher 
morality,  as  Fichte  calls  it,^  the  individual  is  filled  with 
the  desire  to  realise  actively  the  divine  wilL  The  moral 
law,  and  that  wliich  springs  from  it — rights  and  state 
mechanism — are  regarded  only  as  means  whereby  the 
ideas,  which  represent  in  our  consciousness  the  pre- 
scripts of  the  divine  wiU,  are  to  receive  manifestation 
in  fact.  Acceptance  of  these  ideas — the  ideas  upon 
which  rest  art,  science,  the  polity  of  nations  and  religion 
—  and  self-renunciation  for  tliem,  are  the  only  sources 
of  truly  noble  action.  "Everything  great  and  good 
upon  which  our  present  existence  rests,  from  which  it 
has  proceeded,  exists  only  because  noble  and  powerful 
men  have  resigned  all  the  enjoyments  of  life  for  the 
sake  of  ideas."  ^  The  heroic  life  is  the  life  of  the 
higher  morality,  of  devotion  to  ideas. 

Even  this  heroic  life  manifests  in  one  of  its  aspects 
an  imperfection.  "  So  long  as  joy  in  the  deed  is  mingled 
with  desires  concerning  the  outward  product  of  the  deed, 
even  the  possessor  of  the  higher  morality  is  not  yet 
perfect  in  purity  and  clearness  ;  and  thus  in  the  divine 
economy,  the  oxitward  failure  of  his  deed  is  the  means 
of  forcing  him  in  upon  himself,  and  of  raising  him  to  the 
yet  higher  standpoint  of  true  religion — that  is,  to  the 
comprehension  of  what  it  really  is  that  he  loves  and 
strives  after."  For  if  he  is  truly  penetrated  with  the 
love  of  the  divine  law  and  life,  he  Avill  recognise  as  the 

1  It  is  the  view  expounded  in  the  third  hook  of  the  '  Bestimmung 
des  Menschen.' 

2  "Grundzuge  d.  gegen.  Zeitalters,"  '  Werke,'  vol.  vii.  p.  41. 


212  Fichte. 

one  thing  above  all  value  the  development  of  the  divine 
life  in  him.  He  is  one  manifestation  of  the  divine  life  : 
aU  that  he  does  or  thinks  is  the  act  and  thought  of  the 
divine  life.  That  the  result  of  his  thought  and  action 
should  not  correspond  with  his  conception  or  desire  will 
not  affect  him.  The  object  of  his  will  is  only  "that  in 
the  conduct  of  each  individual  there  may  be  manifested 
purely  that  form  which  the  essential  divine  nature 
has  assumed  within  this  particular  individual — that,  on 
the  other  hand,  each  individual  may  recognise  God,  as 
He  is  outwardly  manifested  to  him  in  the  conduct  of  aU 
other  men ;  that  all  others  may,  in  like  manner,  recog- 
nise God  as  He  is  outwardly  manifested  to  them  in  the 
conduct  of  this  particular  individual — and  that  thus 
God  alone  may  be  ever  manifested  in  all  outward  ap- 
pearance."^ 

Eehgion,  — -  the  fourth  stage  of  reflection,  —  which 
thus  consists  in  regarding  and  recognising  all  earthly 
life  as  the  necessary  development  of  the  one,  original, 
perfectly  good  and  blessed  life,  may  indeed  be  real- 
ised in  conduct,  althoxigh  the  individual  has  not  the 
clear  consciousness  of  the  thought  which  animates  and 
directs  his  efforts.  But  in  this  consciousness,  the 
final  standpoint  of  science  or  philosophy,  all  others  are 
contained  and  involved.  "  Religion  without  science  is 
a  mere  faith,  though  an  immovable  faith;  science  su- 
persedes all  faith  and  converts  it  into  insight."  ^  "  From 
the  beginning  of  the  world  do\vn  to  the  present  day, 
religion,  whatever  form  it  may  have  assumed,  has  been 
essentially  metaphysic;  and  he  who  despises   and  de- 

1  'Doctrine  of  Religion,'  p.  533.     Cf.  "  GrundzUge,"  Lect.  xvi. 

2  '  Doctrine  of  Religion,'  p.  460. 


Later  form  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre.       213 

rides  metaphysic — that  is,  everything  a  priori — either 
knows  not  Avhat  he  does,  or  else  he  despises  and  derides 
religion."  ^  The  final  and  crowning  stage  of  the  devel- 
opment of  the  individual  consciousness  is  therefore  that 
in  which  the  finite  spirit  by  thought  or  reason  appre- 
hends the  organic  plan  of  existence,  knows  with  clear- 
ness the  intimate  nature  of  the  relations  which  unite 
him  and  all  other  finite  spirits  in  one  community  of 
free  intelligences  with  a  common  aim  and  purpose, 
and  thus  subjectively  realises  the  supreme  synthesis 
of  thought.^ 

1  "Gmndziige,"  '  Werke,'  vol.  vii.  p.  241. 

2  It  is  impossible  to  do  more  than  call  attention  to  the  fact  that 
under  this  view  historical  Christianity  must  be  interpreted  somewhat 
differently  from  the  ordinary  or  popular  fashion.  In  the  "  Anwei- 
sung"  (Lecture  vi.)  and  in  the  "  Staatslehre,"  Fichte  enters  upon  a 
very  elaborate  comparison  between  his  theory  of  religion  and  Chris- 
tianity, as  expressed  in  the  Johannine  Gospel,  which  he  regards  as 
the  only  authentic  or  pure  statement  of  the  Christian  faith.  The 
distinction  drawn  between  the  historical  and  the  metaphysical  ele- 
ments in  Christianity  (particularly  in  the  appendix  to  the  sixth  lec- 
ture) has  had  great  influence  on  the  later  speculative  theology  in  Ger- 
many. It  would  require,  however,  a  very  detailed  treatment  to 
show  precisely  Fichte's  position  to  theology.  Lasson's  work  ('  J.  G. 
Fichte  im  Verhaltniss  zu  Kirche  und  Staat,"  1863)  is  very  thorough. 
There  is  also  a  monograph  on  the  subject  by  F.  Zimmer  ('J.  G. 
Fichte's  Religions-Philosophic,'  1878). 


214 


CHAPTER   YIII. 


CONCLUDIXG     REMARKS. 


Of  the  two  stages  into  which  Fichte's  speculations  have 
been  divided,  only  the  first  has  exercised  any  influence 
on  the  historic  development  of  philosophy,  and  to  it 
consideration  must  be  limited  when  the  attempt  is  made 
to  define  the  historic  value  of  the  system.  As  has  been 
already  indicated,  this  value  appears  to  lie  in  the  ex- 
tended application  made  by  Fichte  of  principles  implicit 
in  the  critical  philosophy.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  the  full  bearings  of  the  critical  method  only  become 
apparent  when  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  development 
it  has  received  at  the  hands  of  Fichte  and  HegeL  In 
the  Kantian  system,  the  problems  of  speculation  were 
taken  up  in  the  form  presented  by  the  antecedent, 
popular  philosophy, — a  form  essentially  Hmited.  in  scope, 
— and  it  was  therefore  matter  of  some  difficulty  to  dis- 
cern the  real  import  of  the  new  treatment  to  which  they 
were  subjected.  One  may  even  say  that  from  Kant 
himself  the  significance  of  much  of  his  work  was  con- 
cealed by  the  limited  and  partial  character  of  the  ques- 
tions which  presented  themselves  to  him  as  the  essential 


Concluding  BemarJcs.  215 

problems  of  speculative  inquiry.  In  the  critical  pliilo- 
sophy  can  be  traced  the  transition  from  the  somewhat 
narrow,  psychological  method,  characteristic  of  modem 
thought,  to  the  larger  view  of  speculative  problems 
which  recalls  the  great  work  of  the  Greek  thinkers.  The 
analysis  of  liuman  knowledge,  which  had  been  for  Locke 
and  his  successors  the  sole  function  of  philosophy,  appears 
in  the  critical  system  as  part,  though  an  essential  part,  of 
the  more  comprehensive  inquiry  dealing  with  the  whole 
round  of  human  interests,  to  which  only  the  title  philo- 
sophy by  right  belongs.  The  question  how  the  human 
mind,  regarded  as  a  thing  of  definite  or  indefinite  cliar- 
acteristics,  comes  to  have  the  filling-in  which  we  call 
experience,  opens  out,  when  duly  considered,  into  the 
much  wider  problem  as  to  the  relation  of  any  individual 
consciousness  to  the  sum  total  of  things,  a  relation  which 
may  be  either  cognitive,  or  practical,  or  religious.  The 
merely  subjective  or  psychological  analysis  of  the  cog- 
nitions possessed  by  the  individual  mind,  even  if  the 
result,  as  stated  in  Locke  and  his  followers,  be  accepted 
— that  such  cognitions  are  effects  produced  we  'know  not 
how — still  leaves  at  an  immeasurable  distance  the  true 
problems  of  philosophy.  For  it  offers  no  explanation  of 
the  nature  of  this  individual  consciousness,  formed  in 
whatsoever  fashion  ;  eff'ects  no  junction  between  it  and 
the  universe  of  things  supposed  to  originate  it ;  and  can 
offer  as  final  philosophic  solution  nothing  beyond  the 
barren  propositions  that  experience  somehow  is,  and  that 
it  consists  of  states  of  the  individual  mind. 

Enough  has  been  said,  in  the  introductory  remarks  to 
the  account  of  Fichte's  system,  to  show  that  this  solu- 
tion is  internally  incoherent,  and  also  to  indicate  where 


216  Fichte. 

the  root  of  the  incoherence  is  to  be  found.  If  we  start 
in  our  philosophic  inquiry  with  the  supposition  of  an 
individual  mind  and  a  system  of  things,  no  human  inge- 
nuity can  ever  effect  a  reconciliation  between  the  two 
isolated  members  of  our  hypothesis.  The  notion  of  indi- 
viduality, one  of  the  hardest  to  solve,  has  been  the 
stumbling-block  in  the  Avay  of  all  the  eighteenth  century 
philosophy,  and  it  is  the  pre-eminent  merit  of  the  critical 
system  to  have  for  the  first  time  subjected  the  notion 
to  detailed  and  rigorous  treatment.  The  forms  under 
which  the  critical  method  is  applied — such  as  the  dis- 
tinctions between  a  priori  and  a  'posteriori  elements 
in  cognition,  between  matter  and  form,  between  pheno- 
mena and  noumena,  between  sense,  understanding,  and 
reason — ought  not  to  disguise  from  us  the  true  nature 
of  the  question  Avhich  underlies  all  of  them.  How 
knowledge  becomes  possible  for  any  intelligence,  is  in 
fact  the  problem— how  are  we  to  think,  under  one  of  its 
aspects,  the  relation  between  individual  consciousness 
and  the  wider  sphere  of  reality  % 

To  Kant  himself,  as  was  indicated,  the  full  bearing  of 
his  work  was  not  apparent.  There  still  runs  through  all 
the  critical  work,  the  obtrusive  idea  that  the  ultimate 
reality  is  the  individual  consciousness,  given  as  a  fact, 
and  that  this  individual  consciousness  is  mechanically 
related  to  the  sum  of  existence.  Hence  arise  the  nu- 
merous obscurities  and  inconsistencies  of  the  Kantian 
system.  Term  after  term  is  introduced  in  order  somehow 
to  effect  the  final  synthesis  between  the  individual  mind 
and  the  wider  sphere  disclosed  by  reason ;  but  such  final 
synthesis  is  never  reached,  and  indeed  never  can  be 
reached,  if  at  the  outset  an  absolute  difference  is  postu- 


Concluding  Remarhs.  217 

lated.^  That  there  lay  in  the  Kantian  system  the  germs 
of  a  wider,  more  comprehensive  solution,  was  undoubted; 
and  the  work  of  that  which  is  called  by  pre-eminence 
German  philosophy,  has  been  the  development  of  these 
germs. 

To  this  development,  the  first  great  contribution  was 
the  'Wissenschaftslehre.'  In  it  the  critical  method  was 
carried  out  with  definite  consciousness  of  its  full  import, 
and  the  effort  was  made  to  work  out  systematically  the 
thought  upon  which  that  method  rested,  and  to  apply  it 
to  the  resolution  of  the  whole  body  of  philosophical 
problems.  It  has  been,  historically,  the  misfortune  of 
the  '  Wissenschaftslehre,'  that  only  its  earlier  form  has 
played  a  part  in  influencing  siibsequent  thought,  for  the 
defects  of  that  form  are  manifest  on  the  surface.  Earn- 
estly as  Fichte  strives  to  enforce  the  doctrine  that  self- 
consciousness,  which  is  for  thought  the  ultimate  ground 
of  reality,  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  individual,  but  as 
that  in  and  through  Avhich  individuals  are,  and  are  con- 
nected with  one  another,  he  never  succeeds  in  divesting 
his  system  of  a  certain  air  of  subjective  idealism.  More- 
over, the  special  applications  of  his  method  in  the  sphere 
of  concrete^  historical  reality,  show  that  in  certain  im- 
portant aspects  it  had  not  yet  lost  its  abstractness.     His 

1  The  forms  of  this  ultimate  difficulty  are  well  known  to  Kantian 
students.  They  appear  in  the  constant  tendency  to  regard  thought 
as  analytic,  in  the  independence  assigned  to  sense-affection,  in  the 
subjective  solution  offered  of  antinomy,  in  the  abstract  deism  of  the 
Kantian  theology,  in  the  fonnalism  of  the  Kantian  ethics,  and  in  the 
obscurity  attaching  to  the  critical  treatment  of  teleology.  The  con- 
jecture may  be  hazarded  that,  had  Kant  been  penetrated  with  the 
spirit  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy,  had  he  known  anything  of  Spinoza 
— as  he  certainly  did  not — his  work  would  have  been  more  systematic 
and  fruitful. 


218  Fichte. 

treatment  of  empirical  science,  of  aesthetics,  and  of  liis- 
tory  in  the  widest  sense,  is  essentially  abstract  and 
barren.  ■'•  In  fact,  although  Fichte  was  perfectly  suc- 
cessful in  seizing  the  critical  principle,  and  in  apprehend- 
ing its  universal  bearing, — although,  further,  his  work 
manifests  a  wonderful  subtlety  and  skill  in  tracing  the 
necessary  consequences  of  the  principle, — he  was  not  able 
to  evolve  systematically  from  it  the  whole  body  of  phi- 
losophy, nor  do  his  results  form  a  complete  and  perfectly 
concatenated  whole.  It  was  left  for  a  later  philosopher 
to  take  up  afresh,  in  the  light  of  the  *  Wissenschafts- 
lehre '  and  of  Schelling's  contributions,  the  critical  prin- 
ciple, and  to  incorporate  all  that  was  of  value  in  them 
in  one  comprehensive  system.  The  Hegelian  method 
contains  nothing  but  the  systematic  development  of 
that  which  had  already  been  brought  to  light  in  the 
*  Wissenschaftslehre ; '  but  as  opposed  to  Wissenschaf ts- 
lehre,  the  Hegelian  work  has  all  the  value  of  the  system 
to  which  the  other  has  been  the  introduction.  In  some 
respects,  it  is  true,  an  introduction  has  advantages  over 
a  system.  The  treatment  is  occasionally  freer  and  more 
independent ;  and  so  one  may  always  assign  to  the  '  Wis- 
senschaftslehre '  an  honourable  position  alongside  of  the 
Hegelian  work,  and  may  obtain  from  it  much  light  on 
what  is  obsciTre  in  the  systematic  result.  But  so  far  as 
solution  of  the  philosophic  problem  is  concerned,  there 

^  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  said  that  the  continuous  objection 
to  the  Wissenschaftslehre  by  Schelling  and  Hegel,  on  the  ground  of 
its  neglect  of  Nature,  is  not  in  all  respects  justified.  So  far  as  Natur- 
philosophie  is  concerned,  Fichte's  position  seems  to  us  much  more 
secure  and  in  harmony  with  the  philosophic  notion  than  tliat  of 
either  Schelling  or  Hegel.  The  weakest  portion  of  the  Hegelian 
system  is,  beyond  all  question,  the  philosophy  of  nature. 


Concluding  Remarks.  219 

seems  notliing  in  the  '  Wissenschaftslelire '  which  is  not 
carried  out  with  greater  concreteness  and  fuhiess  in  the 
later  system.^ 

With  this  view  of  the  historical  value  of  Fichte's 
philosophy,  it  seems  unnecessary  to  attempt  any  state- 
ment as  to  the  relation  in  which  it  stands  to  what  one 
may  call  the  present  radical  opposition  of  philosophic 
doctrines — the  opposition  between  Hegelianism  on  the 
one  hand,  and  scientific  naturalism  or  realism  on  the 
other,  ^  A  single  remark,  however,  may  be  permitted 
upon  the  defect  already  noted  in  Fichte's  system,  for 
this  defect  indicates  the  point  towards  which,  as  one 
may  conjecture,  philosophic  thinking  must  be  directed, 
and  at  which  the  opposed  doctrines  touch  one  another. 
The  final  notion  of  Fichte's  philosophy,  expressed 
more  clearly  in  the  later  works  than  in  the  *Wissen- 
schaftslehre,'  has  been  seen  to  be  that  of  the  divine 
or  spiritual  order  of  which  finite  spirits  are  the  manifes- 
tation or  realisation,  and  in  the  light  of  which  human 
life  and  its  surroundings  appear  as  the  continuous  pro- 

1  The  historic  influence  of  the  '  Wissenschaf tslehre '  is  not  ex- 
hausted in  its  influence  on  Hegel.  At  least  two  off"shoots  from  the 
Kantian  philosophy  owe  much  to  the  Fichtian  method  and  principles. 
Except  his  pessimism,  which  is  no  necessary  consequence  of  the  sys- 
tem, there  is  absolutely  nothing  in  Schopenhauer's  philosophy  which 
is  not  contained  in  the  later  works  of  Fichte.  And  Herbart's  Meta- 
physic,  though  deviating  widely  from  preceding  systems,  owes  no 
small  portion  of  its  fundamental  notion  to  Fichte's  analysis  of  reality 
as  simple  positing  by  the  Ego. 

2  Hegelianism  is  here  taken  in  a  wide  sense.  It  is  not  implied 
that  all  or  any  who  in  the  main  would  rank  themselves  on  this  side, 
are  inclined  to  accept  the  Hegelian  work  in  its  entirety.  A  thought- 
ful and  instructive  notice  of  what  is  here  called  the  radical  opposi- 
tion of  philosophic  doctrines  will  be  found  in  Professor  Masson's 
'Recent  British  Philosophy'  (3d  ed.),  pp.  277-297. 


220  Fichte. 

gress  in  ever  higher  stages  towards  realisation  of  the  final 
end  of  reason.  Under  this  conception,  the  oppositions  of 
thought  which  play  so  important  a  part  in  philosophy, — 
Being  and  Thought,  Mind  and  K'ature,  Soul  and  Body, 
Freedom  and  Law,  Xatural  Inclination  and  !Moral  Effort, 
Mechanism  and  Teleology, — are  reconciled.  They  ap- 
pear in  their  due  place  as  different  aspects  of  the  several 
stages  in  and  through  which  the  spiritual  order  is  real- 
ised. But,  as  has  also  been  seen,  the  element  wanting 
in  Fichte's  system  is  the  definite  reconciliation  between 
this  view  of  the  spiritual  development  of  reason  and  the 
natural,  historical  development  of  nature  and  humanity. 
It  is  this  second  element  that  forms  the  substance  of 
modern  scientific  realism ;  ^  and,  as  in  Fichte's  system  the 
difficulty  is  the  transition  from  the  spiritual  to  the  real 
order,  so  here,  the  counter-difficulty  of  transition  from 
the  real  order  to  the  order  of  thought  presents  itself  as 
the  ultimate  problem.  Of  the  value  of  scientific  real- 
ism as  a  contribution  to  philosophic  reflection,  there  can 
be  no  question.  Every  eff'ort  of  speculative  thought  is 
affected  by  the  general  condition  of  knowledge,  and 
every  advance  in  scientific  inquiry  opens  up  new  aspects 
of  these  notions  through  which  explanations  of  specula- 
tive difficulties  have  been  found.  The  problem  Avhich 
now  lies  before  philosophy  is,  in  brief,  the  effort  to  re- 
think the  new  materials  that  have  been  furnished  in  such 
ample  quantity.  So  far,  however,  as  scientific  realism  has 
yet  endeavoured  to  offer  a  metaphysical  explanation  of  its 
own  procedure,  its  success  has  been  small.  The  attempt  to 
regard  thought  as  somehow  arising  from  mechanical  con- 

^  A  system  of  which  Mr  Spencer  may  be  taken  as  the  hest  known, 
though  by  no  means  the  only  or  the  best,  representative. 


Concluding  Remarks.  221 

ditions  has  only  r^ulted  in  the  reappearance  of  the  old 
perplexities  which  pressed  with  such  intolerable  weight 
upon  the  earlier  English  philosophy.  We  cannot  regard 
thought  as  merely  a  product,  a  thing,  of  which  the  char- 
acteristics are  due  to  the  nature  of  the  mechanical  ante- 
cedents out  of  which  it  has  arisen.  When  we  do  so, 
we  are  at  once  confronted  with  the  problem,  how  are  we 
to  conceive  the  nature  of  these  antecedents  ?  By  sup- 
position they  are  not  in  thought,  but  external  to  it,  and 
therefore  never  to  be  reached  in  thought.  Shall  we 
then  say  —  there  are  varied  modes  of  consciousness, 
thoughts  of  different  kinds,  and,  as  these  are  products, 
they  must  be  due  to  some  ultimate  reality,  the  nature  of 
which  is  for  ever  inconceivable  1  This  is  merely  to  give, 
as  explanation,  the  impossibility  of  any  explanation. 

A  fundamental  difficulty  of  this  nature  is  clear  evi- 
dence of  the  abstract  or  one-sided  character  of  the 
principle  which  has  been  applied.  It  is  not  possible 
that  the  view  of  thought  as  a  thing  or  product  should 
also  be  competent  to  explain  the  nature  of  thought  as 
self-consciousness.  Reflection  upon  self,  in  which  the 
individual  consciousness  transcends  its  own  individu- 
ality, through  which  only  it  can  recognise  itself  as  one 
with  other  individuals,  is  not  explicable  through  the 
notion  of  mechanical  composition.  !Xor  is  scientific  real- 
ism more  successful  in  the  application  of  its  favourite 
conception,  that  of  development.  Neither  the  evolution 
of  consciousness,  nor  the  concrete  nature  of  consciousness 
which  appears  as  the  final  term  of  evolution,  can  be  re- 
garded as  completely  explained  by  mere  reference  to  the 
simplest,  most  abstract  elements  involved  in  the  develop- 
ment.    The  true  notion  of  humanity  is  not  to  be  found 


222  Fichte. 

by  consideration  of  the  undeveloped  thought,  but  iu 
thought  in  all  the  fulness  of  its  concrete  life  and  reality. 
The  external  history  of  the  several  stages  by  which 
human  thought  and  culture  have  developed,  though  an 
indispensable  auxiliary  to  philosophic  reflection,  can  never 
be  accepted  as  adequately  solving  the  problem  of  the 
significance  or  meaning  of  experience.  The  full  treat- 
ment of  the  whole  mass  of  empirical  detail  is  impossible 
without  a  more  thorough  metaphysic — that  is,  without  a 
more  systematic  discussion  of  the  notions  by  which  ex- 
perience becomes  intelligible  for  the  conscious  subject. 
~^o  contrast  is  sharper  than  that  between  scientific 
realism  and  the  philosophic  method  of  which  the  '  Wis- 
senschaftslehre '  is  a  tyj^ ;  nevertheless  the  two  are 
complementary,  and  the  very  sharpness  of  the  contrast 
shows  that  in  the  reconciliation  of  the  apparent  difier- 
ence  between  them  lies  the  problem  for  our  present 
speculative  efibrts. 


END    OP   FICHTE. 


PRINTED  BY   WILLIAM   BLACKWOOD   AND  SONS. 


Sixth  Edition,  Revised  and  Improved. 


AN    ETYMOLOGICAL    AND    PRONOUNCING 

DICTIONARY  OF  THE  ENGLISH  LANGUAGE. 

INCLUDING   A  VERY   COPIOUS   SELECTION  OF   SCIENTIFIC,    TECHNICAL, 

AND   OTHER   TERMS   AND  PHRASES.       DESIGNED  FOR   USE   IN 

SCHOOLS   AND   COLLEGES,    AND  AS   A   HANDY   BOOK 

FOR     GENERAL     REFERENCE. 

By  the  Rev.  JAMES   STORMONTH. 

The  Pronunciation  carefully  revised  by  Rev.  P.  H.  PHELP, 
M.A.  Cantab. 

Sixth  Edition,  carefully  revised  throughout.     Crown  8vo,  pp.  800,  price  7s.  6d. 


OPINIONS     OF     THE     PRESS. 

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pronunciation,  derivation,  all  the  inflections  of  words,  postfixes,  abbreviations, 
classic  and  foreign  phrases,  Scripture  and  other  proper  names,  with  the  pronun- 
ciation, &c.  It  is,  so  far  as  words  go,  a  little  library  of  reference;  and  the  whole 
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it  differs  from  other  lexicons ;  but  we  cannot  with  justice  omit  mentioning  some 
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in  a  dictionary,  and  we  find  some  which  honourably  distinguish  it  from  other  works 
of  the  same  kind. ' — Aberdeen  Journal. 

"This  strikes  us  as  likely  to  prove  a  useful  and  valuable  work.  .  .  .  The 
number  of  scientific  terms  given  is  far  beyond  what  we  have  noticed  in  previous 
works  of  this  kind,  and  will  in  great  measure  render  special  dictionaries  super- 
fluous. Great  care  seems  also  to  have  been  exercised  in  giving  the  correct  etymo- 
logy and  pronunciation  of  words.  We  trust  the  work  may  meet  with  the  success 
it  deserves." — Graphic. 

"We  have  taken  some  trouble  in  the  examination  of  this  book,  and  have  no 
hesitation  in  pronouncing  it  one  of  the  most  useful  and  complete  dictionaries  of 
its  size.  It  is  a  hand-book  for  tlie  use  of  schools  and  colleges,  and  as  such  will  be 
invaluable." — Noncov/ormist. 


WILLIAM  BLACKWOOD  &  SONS,  Edinbukoh  and  London. 


CLASSICAL    TRANSLATIONS. 


THE   iENEID   OF   VIRGIL.     Translated  in  English  Blank 
Verse   by   G.    K.    Rickabds,    M.A.,   and    Lord   Ravensworth. 
2  vols.  fcap.  8vo,  10s. 
"  Lord  Ravensworth's  success  and  strength  are  to  be  found,  not  so  much  in 

his  verbal  force  as  in  the  Virgiliaii  spirit  wliich  breathes  througliout  his  lines. 

No  English  reader  can  well  miss  their  poetical  grace  and  vigour;  no  scholar 

will  deem  unfaithful  the  clean-cut,  decisive  lines  of  this  masterly  version." — 

Evening  Standard. 

THE     METAMORPHOSES     OF     OVID.       Translated    in 
English  Blank  Verse.     By  Henry  King,  M  A.,  Fellow  of  Wadham 
College,  Oxford,  and  of  the  Inner  Temple,  Barrister-at-Law.    Crown 
8vo,  10s.  ed. 
"An  excellent  translation." — Athenmum. 

"The  execution  is  admirable.  .  .  .  It  is  but  scant  and  inadequate  praise 
to  say  of  it  that  it  is  the  best  translation  of  the  Metamorphoses  that  we  have." 
— Observer. 

THE    ELEGIES   OF   ALBIUS    TIBULLUS.      Translated 

into  English  Verse,  with  Life  of  the  Poet,  and  Illustrative  Notes. 

By  James   Cranstoun,  LL.D.,  &c.,  Author  of  a  Translation  of 

'Catullus.'     In  crown  8vo,  6s.  6d. 

"We  may  congratulate  Mr  Cranstoun  on  having  occupied  a  place  for  which 

his  poetical  skill,  no  less  than  his  manifest  classical  training  and  acquirements, 

abundantly  fits  him." — Saturday  Review. 

"  By  far  the  best  of  the  few  versions  we  have  of  this  sweet  and  graceful  poet. " 
— Standard. 

THE  ELEGIES  OF  SEXTUS  PROPERTIUS.  Trans- 
lated into  English  Verse      By  the  Same.     In  crown  8vo,  7s.  6d. 

THE  ODYSSET?  OF  HOMER.  Books  I.-XIL  Trans- 
lated into  English  Verse,  with  Notes  and  Parallel  Passages,  by 
Sir  Charles  Du  Cane,  K.C.M.G.     Large  octavo.  10s.  6d. 

THE  WORKS  OF  HORACE.  Translated  into  English 
Verse,  with  a  Life  and  Notes.  By  Sir  Theodore  Martin,  K.C.B. 
In  Two  Volumes,  crown  8vo,  printed  on  hand-made  paper. 

[Nearfy  readii. 

THE  POEMS  OF  CATULLUS.  Translated  into  English 
Verse,  with  an  Introduction  and  Notes.  By  the  Same.  Second 
Edition,  revised.     Crown  8vo,  printed  on  pa]pie7-  verge,  7s.  6d. 

POEMS   AND    TRANSLATIONS.     By  Philip  Stanhope 
WORSLEY,    M.A.,    Fellow    of    Corpus    Christi    College,    Oxford. 
Edited  by  Rev.  Edward  Worsley.     New  Edition,  fcap.  8vo,  6s. 
"  Mr  Worsley's  poetry  is  always  full  of  healthy  spirit;  he  is  tender  as  well  as 

vigorous,  and  blends  a  deep  religious  spirit  with  classic  ^vslcq."— Saturday 

Review. 

WILLIAM  BLACKWOOD  &  SONS,  Edinburgh  and  London. 


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